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Abstract 
Early on the morning of December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the 
leader of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), declared martial law, 
ending the so-called "Polish Crisis," which began with the creation of the Independent 
Free Trade Union "Solidamosc" in August 1980. Over the next eight years, the 
Communist government and the opposition struggled over power, culminating in 1989 
with the creation of a Solidamosc-led government which ended fifty years of Communist 
rule in Poland and led the way to further democratic revolutions throughout Eastern 
Europe. The purpose of this dissertation is to utilize newly available and underutilized 
archival sources as well as oral history interviews, from both international and American 
perspectives, to fully chronicle American policy toward Poland from the declaration of 
martial law until the creation of the Solidarnosc government. 
Rather than explaining Polish-American relations in bilateral terms, the 
dissertation illuminates the complex web of influences that determined American policy 
in Washington and affected its implementation within Poland. This includes descriptions 
of internal tensions within the Reagan administration, differences between American 
decisions in Washington and implementation in Warsaw, lobbying from Polish-American 
groups, clashes between Capitol Hill and the White House, coordination with American 
labor organizations to support Solidarnosc, disagreements with West European allies in 
NATO and international financial organizations, cooperation with the Vatican and the 
Polish Catholic Church, synchronization with American humanitarian organizations 
working in Poland, limitations caused by the realities of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, 
and complications caused by domestic Polish concerns. By taking a broad view of 
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American policy and highlighting internal Polish decisions, with both the Communist 
. government and the democratic opposition, the dissertation provides concrete examples 
of America's role in Poland's transformation, arguing, however, that this role was very 
limited. These conclusions are relevant to arguments abont the end of the Cold War, the 
nature of American power, as well as current discussions abont possibilities to promote 
democracy within hostile regimes. 
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Introduction: Supporting the Revolution 
Early on the morning of December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the 
leader of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), declared martial law, 
ending a sixteen-month period of openness, liberalization, freedom, and fluidity often 
referred to as the "Polish Crisis." The crisis began with the formation of the Independent 
Free Trade Union "Solidarnosc" in August 1980, and ended with Polish government 
forces implementing a nation-wide military operation to capture and intern thousands of 
Solidarnosc and affiliated activists. Martia11aw ended the Polish Crisis and brought a 
tense calm to the nation, but the opposition was not vanquished. Under the gaze of the 
United States and within the constraints of the bi-polar Cold War world, the Communist 
government and the opposition struggled over Poland's future for the next eight years. In 
1989, officials from a PZPR-led coalition sat across a round table from Solidarnosc and 
Catholic Church leaders to negotiate a power-sharing agreement that directly led to semi-
free elections in the summer of 1989 in which a long-time Solidarnosc activist became 
Poland's prime minister. In less than a decade Poland transformed from a Communist 
dictatorship which utilized massive military force to maintain control over its population 
into a transitional democracy with an independent executive branch and a bi-cameral 
parliamentary system of government, complete with competing political blocs. In contrast 
to earlier reform movements in Eastern Europe, Poles completed their democratic 
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transformation non-violently, sparking other revolutions and bringing an end to the Cold 
War in Eastern Europe. 
Existing public accounts including newspaper articles and memoirs provide a 
broad narrative for understanding American policy toward Poland from 1981 to 1989. In 
its barebones form, the story line unfolded as follows: In the wake of martial law, 
President Ronald Reagan announced a series of economic and political sanctions, some 
of which were also implemented by NATO allies, to pressure the Polish government to 
return to the liberalizing path it had pursued prior to December 1981. In determining its 
policies, America maintained three basic objectives: the end of martial law, the release of 
all political prisoners, and the resumption of negotiations between the PZPR, 
representatives of the Catholic Church, and leaders from the opposition, all meant to 
move the country toward the final stated goal of national reconciliation. Over the course 
of the 1980s sanctions were lifted and further imposed to push the PZPR toward 
accepting these objectives. Simultaneously, the United States led a concerted effort to 
support Solidarnosc and rebuild the opposition movement. Martial law was lifted in July 
1983, all political prisoners were finally released in September 1986, and representatives 
from the govermnent, Church, and Solidarnosc sat down to negotiate Poland's future 
during the Round Table process from February through Aprill989, fulfilling all three 
American objectives. American conventional wisdom is that American goals were 
accomplished because the United States caused meaningful changes within Poland. 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to utilize newly available ana 
underutilized sources, from international as well as American perspectives, to fully 
chronicle American policy toward Poland from the declaration of martial law until the 
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creation of the Solidarnos6 government, and to take a sober accounting of American 
influence on internal Polish developments. 
A Complex Web 
Defining the parameters of "American policy" over this period, however, is 
difficult. First, policy was aimed at two separate constituencies within Poland: the 
Communist government and the democratic opposition. So, American efforts were really 
two concurrent policies with overlapping concerns. In conceptualizing this structure it is 
more helpful to think of a triangle with the United States, the PZPR, and Solidarnos6 at 
the three corners, than envisioning a bilateral relationship with Poland and the United 
States at opposite ends. 1 Further confusing the picture, American policies occasionally 
focused directly on the Polish people, who fell somewhere between the two corners of 
Solidamos6 and the PZPR. 
Second, it is misleading to think about a singular policy pursued by the American 
government. Voices within the executive branch often disagreed among themselves. The 
State Department frequently advocated steps that the Defense Department or the Central 
Intelligence Agency argued Vehemently against (particularly ip the first years after the 
I 
declaration of martial law). Most of these disagreements came to a head at the White 
House in the National Security Council with the president making a final decision; 
however, prior to these definitive decisions the individual departments often pursued 
policies at odds with viewpoints in other parts of the government. Moreover, American 
representatives in the embassy in Warsaw sporadically pursued their own independent 
ideas, consistent with the broad outlines of government policy. Further complicating the 
1 \Vi thin the text, the term 11 bilateraJ relations" refers to U .S. governmental policy toward the PZPR. 
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image of a cohesive governmental policy, Congress actively shaped American reactions 
to events in Poland. Often White House policies needed budgetary approval from Capitol 
Hill or were forced to acquiesce to criticisms from congressmen and senators. Domestic 
American political concerns also influenced decision making within the White House. 
Third, American policy toward Poland was shaped by numerous public groups 
who operated on the fringes of government. Powerful constituencies like the AFL-CIO 
labor union and the Polish-American Congress lobbied both Capitol Hill and the White 
House on policy toward Poland, each advocating for their own constituencies and goals. 
Both of these groups, as well as smaller organizations like the Committee in Support of 
Solidarity, also acted independently and in conjunction with the government to support 
Solidarnosc and the wider opposition movement by sending needed money and material 
to them. American business leaders with financial commitments in Poland also advocated 
their own approach to the situaiton. In addition, private humanitarian organizations 
including Catholic Relief Services, CARE, and Project HOPE played an essential role by 
sending hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, staving off a humanitarian crisis and 
simultaneously affecting America's image in Poland. 
Fourth, Americans were not the only people concerned with events in Poland. The 
U.S. government frequently butted heads with leaders within the Western alliance over 
the best moves to make. Confrontations often occurred within NATO, but also spilled 
over into organizations like the International Monetary Fund and internationallending 
groups. With Solidarnosc activists spread throughout the West following the declaration 
of martial law, American activities were influenced by Polish emigre organizations, most 
notably the Solidarnosc Coordinating Office Abroad in Brussels. The Vatican too, with a 
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Polish Pope at its head and an overwhelmingly Catholic population in Poland, pursued 
policies that both limited and amplified the actions Americans took. Finally, given 
Poland's position behind the Iron Curtain, Soviet actions and the pace of their own 
internal transformation greatly limited the scope and effectiveness of American policy. 
Fifth, both the PZPR and Solidamosc had their own domestic Polish concerns. 
Although they were not elected, Jamzelski and his comrades regularly acted to dissipate 
domestic tensions or to curry favor with the public. Similarly, as an underground political 
movement Solidarnosc was only as formidable as the constituency it could claim to 
represent: without the support of the Polish people they would be powerless. As an 
important third column, the Polish Catholic Church mediated between the state and the 
opposition, but certainly not without their own interests. Simply, it is impossible to look 
at American policy without taking into account how Polish concerns on the ground 
affected that policy. 
Mapping out all these influences and limitations on "American policy" produces a 
picture that looks more like an intricate web of overlapping and conflicting threads than a 
simple triangle. However it is only possible to get an accurate view of American policies 
and their effects in Poland by taking into account as many of the. disparate opinions, 
arguments, viewpoints, goals, constituencies, and perspectives as possible. Oddly, 
complexity provides clarity rather than confusion. Therefore, one of the goals of this 
dissertation is to not only describe American policy as it looked finally formed, but to 
explore how that policy came to be, investigating the many leaders, groups, 
organizations, countries, and common people who shaped it in Washington, Warsaw, and 
points beyond. 
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Filling in the Gaps 
In terms of existing scholarship, no comprehensive review has been published 
about American-Polish relations between the declaration of martial law in December 
1981 and the collapse of the Communist government in 1989. On the tenth anniversary of 
Poland's democratic revolution in 1999, the journal Polish Review published a number of 
short pieces by American officials who worked in Poland during the 1980s (including 
Ambassador John Davis). In addition, Prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Paczkowski has published a 
single chapter weighing the importance of the superpowers' international policies on 
Poland's political transformation ("The Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-
89"). This essay acted as a guide for the research and conclusions drawn here. Near the 
end of the 1980s, John Resenbrink wrote Poland Challenges a Divided World and Arthur 
Rachwald published In Search of Poland: Solidarity's Response to the Superpowers, 
1981-1989, but both lacked access to declassified Western governmental sources or 
Communist archives. Similarly, the most in-depth study ofU.S.-Polish relations in 
English, Piotr Wandycz' s The United States and Poland was published in 1980, before 
the events chronicled here had even occurred? 
Nonetheless, a large cache of scholarship and excellent journalism already exists 
on developments within Poland in the 1980s. This includes a wide range of materials, 
from Timothy Garton Ash's The Uses of Adversity and Michael Kaufman's Mad Dreams, 
Saving Graces to Janine Wedel's anthropological study of mass dissidence, Private 
Poland, each attempting to explain the rise of the Solidarnosc trade union and the 
2 Full citations for the books and articles in this section can be found in the bibliography at the end of the 
dissertation. English translations of Polish titles-are provided there as well. 
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opposition movement A number of Polish leaders from the period have also written 
personal accounts, including Lech Wal<;:sa, Wojciech Jaruzelski, and Mieczyslaw 
Rakowski. In the past decade, Polish scholars have incorporated new materials from 
government and private archives to help explain the successful conclusion of Poland's 
long march to democracy. These studies include Antoni Dudek's Reglamentowana 
Revolucja, Andrzej Garlicki's Karuzela, and Paczkowski's The Spring will be Ours, 
among others. Drawing from the proceedings of an oral history conference on the events 
of 1989, the Institute of Political Studies in Warsaw published a three-volume set, Polska 
1986-1989:Koniec Systemu, comprised of documents, conference transcripts, and 
commentary. Political scientists like MaJjorie Castle have also written scientific studies 
on Poland's.revolution, attempting to understand the mechanisms for change. 
Unfortunately, these sources emphasize domestic political concerns without fully 
explaining international influences. Moreover, much of the literature on Poland's 
transformation focuses on the last three years of the decade, leaving out crucial trends 
and events from the preceding years. 
A similar criticism can be made about another significant body of work on 
Poland. Scholars including Vojtech Mastny, Mark Kramer, Doug MacEachin, Helen 
Sjursen, Matthew Ouimet, Malcolm Byrne, and Paczkowski have spent considerable 
energy exploring the domestic issues and international pressures surrounding the Polish 
Crisis; however, these books and articles only follow developments in Poland through the 
first few months of 1982, ending where this study begins. 
There is also a growing amount of work on Solidarnosc' s underground activities 
following the declaration of martial law, most notably Andrzej Friszke's Solidarnosc 
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Podziemna 1981-1989, translated works by Adam Michnik, and Maciej Lopinski, Marcin 
Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk's translated ruminations on life in the underground, Konspira. 
As with other literature, these studies look for answers internally; discussions about the 
U.S. role are either neglected or underdeveloped. 
In the fifteen years since the end of the 1980s, officials and biographers have had 
plenty of time to provide book-length studies of the careers of Washington officials and 
insiders like Secretaries of State Alexander Haig, George Shultz, and James Baker; AFL-
CIO President Lane Kirkland; Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski; 
Reagan National Security Council official Richard Pipes; and Bush National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft, among others. There is also a growing historiography on 
Reagan, including insightful biographies by Lou Cannon, Reagan's own autobiography, 
and collections of Reagan 's writings, diaries, and speeches edited by Kiron Skinner and 
Douglas Brinkley. More generally, scholars have written extensively on American 
foreign policy during the 1980s including: studies on American intelligence activities by 
Bob Woodward and Robert Gates, accounts focusing on Reagan's policies (namely, work 
by Frances Fitzgerald, Michael Dobbs, and Beth Fischer, among others), and important 
works by Robert Hutchings, Condoleezza Rice, and Philip Zelikow with sections on the 
Bush administration's policies throughout 1989. Relevant studies of the broader forces 
for change in Eastern Europe include work by Charles Gati, Vladimir Tismaneau, and 
Kramer. Padraic Kenney and Timothy Snyder have also completed wide-ranging studies 
on the role of nationalism and transnational movements in the collapse of the Soviet 
power in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately for readers interested in Poland's transformation, 
most of these works contain either only passing references t9-or incomplete accounts of 
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American policy toward Poland. When works on American foreign policy do discuss 
policy toward Poland, they follow the story only in 1981 or 1989, overlooking important 
transitions and significant shifts in the years between crises. 
There is also a substantial body ofliterature on the international confrontation and 
cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1980s. Authors 
such as Michael Beschloss, Jack Matlock, Don Oberdorfer, and Raymond Garthoff 
concentrate on the relationship between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikbail Gorbachev, 
seeking a framework to understand the dissolution of Cold War tensions within the 
actions of these two men. Moreover, a number of monographs and books available in 
English take a more Moscow-centric view ofthe end of the Cold War, including: analysis 
by Jacques Levesque, the memoirs of Gorbachev's advisor Anatoly Chernyaev, 
collections of speeches and writings by Gorbachev, and numerous biographies of the 
former general secretary. However, by focusing on the larger superpower confrontation, 
all of these studies lose the nuances of American policy toward Poland. 
One ofthe schools of thought that bubbled up from this collection ofliterature is 
what some have termed "triumphalism. "Triumphalist accounts argue that the United 
States won the Cold War, beating the.Soviet Union because of the strength of democratic 
capitalism and because of the Reagan administration's tough policies against Gorbachev 
"' ' 
and his predecessors. Memoirs and retrospective ac:counts by policy makers from the 
Reagan administration initially presented these arguments, and proponents of this 
viewpoint are often linked with the neo-conservative political movement in the United 
States. Importantly, these arguments have had a pervasive effect on American public 
perceptions of the end of the Cold War and have been furthered by respected scholars 
9 
including John Lewis Gaddis. The movement found its purest mouthpiece, however, in 
Peter Schweizer, whose books Victory and Reagan's War unapologetically chronicle 
Reagan's long-suffering "struggle and final triumph over Communism" as well as his 
administration's "secret strategy that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union. "3 
Triumphalist histories come in many gradations but consistently maintain a few 
central arguments. Accounts typically focus on Reagan's moral leadership to redefine the 
Cold War, not as a negotiated global system with two legitimate political-economic 
systems, but as a contest between two competing systems, one right and one wrong: 
democracy·versus totalitarianism, capitalism versus communism, West versus East, good 
versus evil. Triumphalist narratives also stress Reagan's push to intensify the arms race, 
which both intimidated and bankrupted the Soviet Union. Other arguments concentrate 
on the Reagan administration's economic policies to revitalize the West by introducing 
stronger market mechanisms, and conversely to wage economic war against the East by 
cutting off access to Western technology, decreasing foreign currency infusions into the. 
Communist world, and imposing economic sanctions to punish the Soviet Union. Finally, 
proponents of triumphalism view American efforts to support proxies (the Mujaheddin in 
Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, for example) to undermine Soviet power in the 
developing world as an essential move to strain and then defeat communism's global 
reach. 
American policy toward Poland plays a central role within the triumphalist 
cannon. Poland led the way in the race toward democracy that culminated in 1989. 
Schweizer's more nuts and bolts accounts describe American efforts to morally and 
3 These quotes are taken from the ~ub-titles of Schweizer's two books, Reagan's War (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2002) and Victory (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), respectively. 
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financially support the Solidarnosc trade union, as a central part of the Reagan 
administration's policy to undermine and overthrow Soviet power in Eastern Europe. 
Further, American economic sanctions effectively punished the Polish Communist 
government and successfully pressured the government to pursue negotiations with the 
democratic opposition. The argument follows that without American leadership and 
support, Poland's democratic revolution would not have occurred. However, triumphalist 
accounts of American foreign policy during the 1980s provide an oversimplified view of 
Poland's transformation andrely heavily on American sources, much to the detriment of 
Polish and European perspectives. 
One of the other dominant strains of thought that has emerged from the 
historiography on the 1980s is the argument that the end of the Cold War can be best 
explained by looking for'answers 'within the Soviet Union. The Cold War did not end 
because of American actions but because of the Communist system itself. This school 
includes arguments which emphasize the importance of Gorbachev and his "New 
Thinking" on Eastern Europe. It also includes arguments which place prime importance 
on the inherent or exposed weaknesses of the Communist system, meaning the Soviet 
Union and its empire crumbled from within, not because of pressures from outside. 
However, as Beth Fisher argues in her essay, "The United States and the Transformation 
of the Cold War," dismissing the importance ofReagan and his administration's policies 
is an oversimplification, as well. 
This dissertation seeks to fill numerous holes in the current historiography to, 
provide a more COII).plete and nuanced account of American policy toward Poland. By 
taking a "sober accounting" of the influence of American policy, this work engages 
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honestly with both triumphalist and other literature to move beyond ideological 
arguments and seek concrete examples and instances when American policy had a causal 
effect in Poland's tran~formation. Proving causal link~ is often very difficult But, by 
exploring all of the disparate influences on American policy and their interconnections 
(explained above), instances of effective American influence do become apparent. 
However, it is only possible to show specific causal effects through gathering as many 
sources as possible, from a wide variety of perspectives . 
. Research Methodology 
The research process for this dissertation began nearly eight years ago and 
combines an international array of private and governmental archival sources with 
interviews of people who participated in events on all sides of the story. Regarding Polish 
government sources, this account utilizes materials from the PZPR, particularly Politburo 
files, foreign department materials, and Jaruzelski's files, located at the Archiwum Akt 
Nowych (Archive of Modern Records). The author was also given special permission to 
review materials in the Archives of the Ministry ofF oreign Affairs' files from their North 
American department, which was responsible for contacts with the United States. Other 
government documents were culled from the Miedzeszyn Collection, gathered by the 
Institute for Political Studies. To understand the democratic opposition's changing 
perspectives over the I 980s, this study draws heavily on the collection of underground 
literature, pamphlets, and weeklies collected by the KART A foundation in their 
Archiwum Opozycji (Opposition Archive). To understand the Polish people's changing 
attitudes, the dissertation relies on rest<arch reports from the Centrum Badania Opinii 
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Spolecznej (Center for Public Opinion Research), a government-sponsored polling 
organization. Former members from both the government and the opposition were also 
interviewed. 
In the United States, extensive efforts were made to draw from both governmental 
and private collections. For government papers, the dissertation relies mainly on 
declassified materials from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, 
California, and declassified records held at the National Security Archive at The George 
Washington University, in their National Endowment for Democracy, Soviet 
Flashpoints-Polish Crisis, and The End of the Cold War collections. The author also 
filed personal Freedom ofinformation Act requests which led to further document 
declassifications. These documents are located in the National Security Archive's 
collections. 
Most non-governmental archival sources for the dissertation were drawn from the 
Washington, D.C., area. The library at the National Endowment for Democracy's 
headquarters provided some general information on that institution's history and inner 
workings. Catholic Relief Services maintains an impressive administrative archive on 
their humanitarian efforts at their headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland. Fonner members 
of the Committee in Support of Solidarity (now closed) made some of their older files 
available at the offices of a successor institution in Washington. Casimir Lenard of the 
Polish American Congress graciously gave permission to view his private archive of 
records chronicling the congress's humanitarian efforts and their work supporting the 
opposition in Poland with funds from the National Endowment for Democracy. To better 
understand the AFL-CIO's viewpoint, the dissertation relies on Executive Council and 
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Press Release files available at the George Meany Memorial Archive located in Silver 
Spring, Maryland. Following a special request to the Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-
CIO, the author was also allowed to viewunprocessed records from the Office of the 
President and the International Affairs Department, which had not been opened 
previously to researchers. The dissertation also draws upon records at the Hoover 
Institution for War and Peace's archive located at Stanford University. Of particular 
interest were collections from Polish security services files, the personal papers of 
Zdis!aw Najder, files from Radio Free Europe, and records from American charitable 
groups working in Poland. 
To supplement these written records, participants from the American side were 
also interviewed. Irena Lasota provided particularly fascinating material on American 
groups supporting Solidarnosc. For American government perspectives, Ambassador 
Davis provided numer<;>us opportunities to talk, as did a number of his staff who worked 
at the Warsaw embassy over the course of the 1980s. Finally, higher-level officials from 
the executive branch were interviewed when possible. 
When studying events in very recent history, a researcher can often be challenged 
to find enough material on which to base conclusions. It is true that the majority of U.S. 
government documents from the 1980s remain classified, and were this study based only 
on materials available at governmental archives it would not be very successful. This 
problem was best remedied by collections at the National Security Archive, which has 
done an amazing job using the Freedom of Information Act to get materials on American 
policy toward Poland and general American policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union released, well before the usual thirty-year declassification period. Moreover while 
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Reagan's correspondence with AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland may be classified in 
government collections, it is readily available in AFL-CIO collections. The Polish 
American Congress, Committee in Support of Solidarity, Hoover Institution, and 
Catholic Relief Services archives all included gems like this. 
More importantly, Polish archives from the Communist period are almost 
completely open. Whateverrecords have not been destroyed or hidden are available to 
see, offering a fascinating "back door" view into American policy. For example, while 
American accounts of high-level visits to Poland remain under lock and key, one can read 
the full transcript of the meeting in Polish. This provides an interesting set of problems 
for analysis; however, by beginning research in Polish rather than American collections, 
it was possible to recreate a complete chronology of important meetings between Poles 
and Americans. These Polish records also provided outward evidence of important shifts 
in American policy. Armed with this detailed information, it was possible to compose 
specific and knowledgeable Freedom ofinformation Act requests which were processed 
quickly and yielded important insights. Finally, with this detailed information from 
Polish archives, material from memoirs, leaked papers, and unattributed statements in the 
public record (which are often too vague to be used conclusively on their own) could be 
placed in a more concrete framework, providing useful insights into American policies. 
Therefore, this dissertation also draws heavily from contemporaneous newspaper 
accounts. 
Undoubtedly, secrets and revelations remain to be found in classified American 
records and undiscovered Polish files. However, studying recent events holds one very 
important advantage over waiting until all records are declassified: personal interviews. 
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Less than tweny years after the historical events in question, many of the participants, 
both major and minor, are still alive. Waiting thirty or more years after 1989 would have 
meant that important memories would have been lost with participants' deaths or, at least, 
dulled by age. Acting sooner opened up an immense amount of information that would 
have been unavailable otherwise. Importantly, when dealing with sensitive events and 
underground opposition activities, many meetings, conversations, and exchanges were 
never recorded on paper. The same is true for opinions, anecdotes, or retrospective 
reevaluations that were never recorded in diplomatic cables. Once the memories 
disappear, so does the information. Of course memories are imperfect and malleable. But, 
by basing questions on and verifYing information in available documentation (a method 
often referred to as critical oral history) it was possible to get an accurate picture that is 
more vivid than one which comes only from written and archived sources. 
Overview 
The chapters in this dissertation are arranged chronologically. Chapter I begins 
with an overview of the Polish Crisis from August 1980 to December 1981 and then 
focuses on the month directly following the declaration of martial law, stressing 
government-to-government relations during this critical period. It also follows American 
attempts to coordinate policy with its Allies, while explaining the deep rift caused in 
Polish-American relations by the declaration of martial law. Chapter 2 begins in January 
1982 and describes some of the broader concerns sparked by. December 13; including the 
growth of humanitarian aid to Poland and early efforts by American trade unions to 
support Solidamosc as it was rebuilt as an underground organization. This chapter also 
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traces internal American government arguments about the efficacy of sanctions, as well 
as the increasing role played by Congress and concerns about international propaganda. 
Finally, this chapter shows how policy toward Poland slowly became embroiled in Allied 
disagreements over building a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western 
Europe, eventually causing the Reagan administration to re-evaluate policy toward 
Poland and take a more pragmatic approach. 
Chapter 3 begins in September 1982 and ends in January 1985, following the ups 
and (mainly) downs of Polish-American relations. Specifically, it examines how 
decisions to lift American sanctions were used to push for gradual reforms in Poland as 
part of what was know as the "step-by-step" policy. This chapter also explains continuing 
work by humanitarian organizations, as well as the creation of the National Endowment 
for Democracy which greatly increased resources available to support the Solidarnosc 
underground. This chapter explores the role of Radio Free Europe and the Catholic 
Church within Poland, as the PZPR took small steps to liberalize and reform the system. 
Chapter 4 backs away from purely Polish-American relations to take a broader 
view of the effects of Poland's international situation on changes within its borders. This 
·includes both Soviet bloc and West European pressure on Poland, with a particular 
emphasis on how foreign relations became linked to the internal economic situation. This 
chapter ends with a discussion of the international influences on the PZPR's decision to 
declare a complete amnesty for all remaining political prisoners in September 1986. 
Chapter 5 returns to Polish and American concerns, and follows efforts by both countries 
to normalize relations through a series of hig)l-level negotiations. This chapter explains 
the American decision to lift all remaining economic sanctions on February 19, 1987, and 
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details Vice President George Bush's visit to Warsaw in November 1987. The chapter 
concludes with a visit by American diplomat John Whitehead, demonstrating just how 
much the bilateral relationship had improved since 1985. 
Chapter 6 recounts the growing tension within Poland as expressed through 
massive strikes in spring and summer 1988. The chapter also argues that America's 
longstanding position linking economic aid with Polish steps to resume negotiations to 
move toward national reconciliation empowered the opposition during the secretive 
Magdalenka meetings in fal11988. It then balances Washington's decision to pause and 
redefine American foreign policy under the new Bush administration, as the Round Table 
negotiations progressed under their own momentum. The pace of events continued to 
accelerate through the spring and summer of 1989, despite American attempts during 
President Bush's July trip to restrain the pace of change by becoming directly involved in 
Poland's crisis over electing Jaruzelski to the newly formed office of president. The 
chapter ends by discussing American elation at the creation of the Solidarnosc-led 
government. Chapter 7 summarizes the dissertation's key findings and evaluates 
American influences on Poland's internal developments. This final chapter also provides 
a few key lessons from Poland for American efforts to promote democracy in the future. 
This dissertation would not have been possible without immense support and 
guidailce from an important group of colleagues, friends, and mentors. (Financial 
supporters are listed on the acknowledgements page.) In particular, I would like to thank: 
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thousands of pages of documents. In particular, I would like to thank: Urszula 
Krasnicka-Zajdler at the KART A Foundation, Pan Jerzy and Pan Stepan at the 
MSZ, Casimir Lenard and his staff at the Polish American Congress offices in 
Washington, and Bob Reynold at the AFL-CIO archives. 
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Chaper 1 
"A watershed in the political history of mankind": 
The Reaction to Martial Law 
December 1981 to January 1982 
At 11:30 p.m. on Saturday night, December 12, 1981, elite units of the Polish 
People's Militia and other units ofthe Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), backed by the 
Polish Anny, took to the streets of Poland to round up and imprison the leadership of the 
Solidamosc trade union. They cordoned off regional So1idamosc headquarters, captured 
union leaders who had been meeting in Gdansk, set up road blocks and checkpoints 
throughout the country, and cut all lines of communication. At 6:00 a. m. on Sunday, 
December 13, General Wojciech Jaruzelski went on Polish radio to announce that martial 
law had been imposed, declaring: "Our homeland was on the edge of a precipice ... , we 
found ourselves facing a difficult test. We must show ourselves equal to this test, we 
must show that 'We are worthy of Poland."' 
Word from the American embassy in Warsaw about irregular military movements 
first reached Secretary of State Alexander Haig at 3:00 a. m. in Brussels, where he had 
spent the previous evening dining with other Western diplomats before a NATO meeting 
was scheduled to begin on December 13. On the other side of the Atlantic, President 
Ronald Reagan was away from the White House at Camp David. When Haig spoke with 
Vice President George H. W. Bush, the two decided not to whisk Reagan back to 
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Washington. Haig also asked if he should rush immediately to Washington, but the vice 
president reassured him that there was no hurry to get back, saying, "Nothing will happen 
in Washington for now, Al." 1 Secretary of Defense Caspar W einberger was somewhere 
over the Atlantic in a plane headed to London. The National Security Council stafflacked 
a permanent national security advisor-Richard V. Alien had left Washington and would 
not be officially replaced by William Clark until January 5, 1982. President Reagan was 
not told of the news until the next morning. As Haig recalls, the Reagan Administration 
found itself in a "surprised state" without a clear plan for how to react.2 
Washington was caught off guard by General Jaruzelski's announcement on 
December 13. The U.S. initially responded with caution, but soon anger in the White 
House produced punitive measures. A week after the declaration of martial law, the 
Reagan administration declared economic sanctions on Poland and extended similar 
punishment to the Soviet Union a few days later. Washington also actively advocated for 
sanctions within the NATO framework and eventually succeeded in getting a tough 
public response from their European allies, but little immediate action. In Poland, for the 
first thirty days after the declaration, Warsaw's martial law policy successfully controlled 
the opposition, much to the.relief of the Soviets and Poland's neighbors. Warsaw, 
however, did not expect a concerted or forceful Western response. The American 
response of surprise followed by anger was replayed within the Polish Communist Party 
which responded with surprise and then anger of their own at Western sanctions. In the 
first month after the declaration of martial law, both sides took unexpected steps which 
1 As quoted in Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, I 984), 248. 
2 In his memoirs, NSC staff member Richard Pipes writes about a lack of knowledge of intelligence on 
martial law. Vixi (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), I 69-170. For the quote regarding 
State, see Caveat, 248. 
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created a deep wound in U.S.-Polish relations, one that would leave lasting scars. 
The Polish Crisis 
December 1981 was the final act of what was known outside of Poland as the 
"Polish Crisis." The crisis began in the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk in August 1980, when 
Polish workers went on strike. As with earlier strikes and crises in 1956, 1970, and 1976, 
the workers were responding to food price increases, this time announced on July 1, 
1980. Unlike previous strikes, this time the workers in the Lenin Shipyard included 
political not just economic demands as part of their strike announcement They also 
elected Lech Wal«sa, an electrician who was active in the free trade union movement and 
who had been fired for political activity in 1976, as their head negotiator. Joining with 
other strikers along the Baltic Coast in an Inter-Factory Strike Committee, the Gdansk 
strikers laid out a list of twenty-one demands, including the right to form independent 
trade unions, a right to strike, freedom of expression, and the adoption of measures to 
address the national economic crisis. Deciding against the use of force, the PZPR 
Politburo sent negotiators to Gdansk and Szczecin (also on the Baltic Coast). With 
Bronislaw Geremek, Andrzej Gwiazda, Bogdan Lis, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki at his side, 
Wal«sa successfully negotiated and signed the Gdansk Agreements with the government 
on August 31, 1980, allowing unprecedented political concessions, including: 
independent trade unions, the right to strike without reprisals, the right to "freedom of 
expression",pay increases, improved working conditions, Saturdays off, and Sunday 
L 
Masses broadcast over loudspeakers. 
Well aware of the ramifications of the historic deal, both superpowers watched 
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developments attentively. On August 25, the CPSU Politburo created a special 
commission to oversee policy toward Poland headed by party ideology secretary Mikhail 
Suslov. In accordance with the advice of the Suslov Commission the Soviet Ministry of 
Defense readied three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division to be prepared to 
intervene in Poland at the end of August if necessaryJ The troops were never mobilized, 
but after the agreements were signed the Kremlin continued to signal its disapproval and 
nervousness about events by making strong recommendations to their Polish colleagues 
on the best methods for the PZPR to regain control of the domestic situation. 
On the same day the Suslov commission was created, President Jimmy Carter 
solicited reactions from British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, West German 
chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and French president Valery Gischard d'Estaing about events 
in Poland. With tensions rising between the Soviets and the Poles in the first weeks of 
September, Carter's Polish-born national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, called a 
Special Coordinating Committee meeting on Poland for September 23. The main 
purposes of this meeting were to explain the most recent intelligence on events in Poland, 
to discuss whether or not the Soviets were preparing to intervene militarily, and to decide 
how American contingency planning for such an intervention.should proceed.4 
From August 1980 until December 1981, the question of Soviet intervention 
dominated discussions in both Washington and Moscow. As with Czechoslovakia in 
1968, General SecretaryLeonid Brezhnev authorized Soviet-led Warsaw Pact exercises 
3 See "CPSU CC Politburo Commission Order to Enhance Readiness of Military Units for Possible Use in 
Poland; August 28, I 980," in Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., From Solidarity to Martial 
Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 A D~cumentary History (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2006), 64-65. 
4 See "Special Coordination Committee, Summary of Conclusions. 'Meeting on Poland: with attachment, 
September 23, 1980" in ibid, 87,90. 
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(Soyuz 80 and Soyuz 81) to remind Poles of the realities of power in Eastern Europe and 
to pressure the Polish leadership to act decisively against the opposition. The Kremlin 
never made a final, definitive decision to intervene militarily, but the option remained a 
real possibility throughout the crisis5 In response to Soviet actions and statements, the 
Americans focused most of their public efforts on keeping the events in Poland an 
internal process without "external interference." Washington closely watched Soviet 
troop movements and build-ups with spy satellites, looking for any outward signs of an 
invasion. When American analysts and politicians feared that an invasion was imminent 
in both December 1980 and March 1981, they used a full array of diplomatic tools to 
make sure the Soviets understood the detrimental consequences of invading Poland. This 
included both public and private pronouncements explaining the punitive steps the United 
States would take if the Soviets intervened. 
On the ground, the Inter-Factory Strike Committee quickly expanded into a 
national movement, with Wal'(sa at its head. Other regional leaders including Zbigniew 
Bujak from Warsaw and Wladyslaw Fransyniuk from Wroclaw joined with their 
colleagues to create a national trade union, the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 
NSZZ "Solidarnos6" (referred to simply as Solidarnosc or the English equivalent, 
5 The question of whether the Soviet Uriion was planning on inva~ing Poland during the crisis has been a 
major focus of many of the studies on the period. For literature on the possibility of Soviet intervention, see 
particularly: Mark Kramer, Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981, Special Working 
Paper No. 1 (Washington, n:c.: Cold War International History Project, 1999); Vojtech Mastny, The Soviet 
Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980181 and the End of the Cold War, Working Paper No. 23 (Washington, 
D.C.: Cold War International History Project, 1998); Matthew Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezh!wv 
Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina, 2003); Greg Domber, "The 
Rise and FaLl of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy," Journal of Cold War Studies, 7:3 
(Summer 2005): 186-188; AndrzejPaczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, "On the Decision to Introduce 
Martial Law in POland in 1981": Two Historians Report to the Commission·on Constitutional Oversight of 
the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Working Paper No. 21 (Washington, D.C.: Cold War International 
History Project; 1997); and. Wejdq nie Wejdq. Polslw 1980-1982. Konferencie w Jachrance (London: 
ANEKS, 1999). Wejdq nie Wejdq published the transcripts from an oral history conference held outside of 
Warsaw in 1997 With testimony by Russian, American, and Po-lish policy makers involved in events in the 
Polish Crisis. 
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Solidarity). Over the course of the crisis the trade union grew to include nearly 9.5 
million members or more than one-in-four Poles. Once formed Solidamosc focused on 
consolidating the concessions agreed to in Gdansk. The process of officially registering 
the union, alone lasted until mid-November 1980. Once officially registered, the union 
began to push for the economic reforms that had been agreed to in Gdansk, including 
work-free Saturdays. With Solidarnosc as an example, other groups including peasants 
and students called for greater pluralism in society and created their own organizations: 
the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union ofindividual Farmers (Rural Solidarnosc), 
and the Independent Union of Students (Niezaleiny Zrzeszenia Student6w, or NZS), 
respectively. 
Overall, the sixteen months prior to martial law involved a precarious tug-of-war 
between the people and the Party to determine Poland's future. SolidarnosC's main 
demands remained relatively consistent and included calls to "cease all attacks on the 
union, pass the law [legalizing independent] trade unions, hold democratic elections to 
national councils, establish a Social Council for National Economy [an independent 
group of union and government officials who would take control of reforming the 
economy], and give Solidarity access to the media. "6 In this confrontation, the union's 
main tool to pressure the government to move toward reform was the ability to call 
intermittently forregional or national work stoppages and strikes. For example, in a tense 
atmosphere caused by the government's unwillingness to recognize Rural Solidamosc 
(and following a provocation between PZPR officials and local Solidarnosc activists in 
Bydgoszcz in which three opposition members were severely beaten), a four-hour general 
6 Andrzej Paczkowski, Spring Will be Ours, trans. by Jane Cave (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2003), 442. · 
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strike was held on March 27, 1981. A follow-up strike for March 30 was called off when 
the PZPR agreed to register Rural Solidarnosc and publicly stated that those responsible 
for the Bydgoszcz beatings would be punished. 
In addition to Solidamosc, the Polish people had another advocate during these 
tense days: the Catholic Church. Unlike other Communist countries where the church had 
been eviscerated (as in the Soviet Union) or eo-opted (as in Hungary), the Polish Catholic 
Church retained a strong, independent voice throughout the Communist period. During 
the Polish Crisis, the Church (led by the Archbishop of Warsaw, Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszyiiski until his death on May 28, !981, and then by his successor Cardinal J6zef 
Glemp) viewed itself as an intermediary between the opposition and the PZPR. In this 
role, during tense periods the Church often called publicly for moderation and met 
frequently with both Solidarnosc and PZPR members. The Church's attitude toward.the 
opposition, however, should not be confused by its willingness to work with the PZPR: 
"although the Church did not encourage radical actions or demands, it was nonetheless 
unambiguous in its support for the union."7 
The Vatican also took an active role in the Polish crisis, seeking to influence 
events both within Poland's borders and beyond. As a Pole and a national hero, Pope John 
Paul II (the former Bishop ofKrak6w, Karol Wotyla) had both a personal interest in· 
events and an immense -influence on public opinion. During the crisis, he spoke publicly 
about the need for calm and moderation as did other Catholic officials in Poland. 
Reflecting the Church's preference for Solidamosc, behind the scenes the Pope played an 
7 For an in depth analysis on the role of the church see sections seven and eight of Antoni Dudek and 
Ryszard Gryz, Komunisci I Kosci61 w Polsce (Krakow: Wydawnictwo ZNAK, 2003). For document 
coiiections on state-church relations see Tajne dokumenty: Panstwo-Kosci6/ 1980-1989 (London: ANEKS, 
I 993); as well as ·numerous works by Peter Raina listed in the bibliography. For quote see Paczkowski, 
Spring. 420. 
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active role to help undermine Communist rule in Eastern Europe. During Carter's term, 
Brzezinski was in regular contact with the Pope about developments in their shared 
homeland; under President Reagan, this working relationship intensified to the point 
where the U.S. government was exchanging highly classified intelligence (spy satellite 
photos, closely held analysis, etc.) with the Pope on a regular basis in return for 
information and analysis from the Church. With parishes, churches, and cathedrals in 
every town and city throughout an almost homogenously Catholic country, the Vatican 
was extremely well informed. As National Security Advisor Alien remarked, "An ideal 
intelligence agency would be set up the way the Vatican is. Its intelligence is absolutely 
first rate." Both during and after the crisis, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey 
and Ambassador-at-large General Vernon Waiters traveled frequently to Rome acting as 
liaisons between the White House and the Vatican, sharing intelligence and briefing the 
Pope on American policy. The Pope's delegate to Washington, Pi<J Laghi, and 
Philadelphia bishop John Krol, a Polish American who had been close with the Pope 
since Vatican II, both worked as the Pope's representatives in Washington8 
On the other side of the barricades from the forces for change, the PZPR was 
under constant pressure from the Kremlin to make sure that reforms did not go too far. 
Soviet officials were in frequent contact with their Polish colleagues pushing them to 
hold strong against Solidarnosc and to regain control of the situation. Regular high-level 
meetings of Polish and Soviet officials-including Brezhnev, Suslov, Marshal! Victor 
Kulikov (commander of Warsaw Pact troops), ~tanislaw Kania (who replaced Eduard 
Gierek as PZPR first secretary on September 5, 1980), J6:Zef Czyrek (Polish foreign 
8 For the best exploration of the Reagan administration's relationship with Pope John Paul II, see Cari 
Bemstein and Marco Polit~ His Holiness (New York: Double Day, 1996); particularly on the Polish crisis: 
260-288, 280-282; Alien quoted at 270. 
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minister) and Jaruzelski (who was both minister of defense and prime minister after 
February 9, 1981)-took place in Warsaw, Moscow, the Crimea, and even a railroad car 
in Byelorussia. At each meeting the Soviets spoke about the threat of counterrevolution, 
telling the Poles that they needed to take decisive action against the opposition and 
warning of grave consequences. 
Within the PZPR, the possibility of martial law became a major focus of attention 
as a proper form of decisive action and a possible way out of the crisis soon after the 
Gdaiisk Agreements were signed. On October22, 1980, Jaruzelski personally began 
preparations to update plans for instituting martial law. The CPSU Politburo also openly 
discussed the desirability of imposing martial law at a meeting on October 29, 1980.9 
This option remained on the table throughout the months leading to December 1981, with 
the PZPR holding war games to practice implementing military rule in February 1981. 
But it was not untjl September 13, 198 I, that final preparations for Operation X, the 
imposition of martial law, were in place. 10 
As the Soviets were pressuring the Poles to take steps to crush the opposition, the 
newly elected Ronald Reagan utilized a second lever to American policy vis-a-vis 
Poland; not only did Reagan keep pressure on the Soviets to stay out of Poland, but he 
continued the Carter administration's policy of offering carrots for the Polish regime if 
they allowed liberalizing trends to continue. 11 During the Gierek era, Poland accepted 
large Western loans to prop up its economy artificially. By the end of 1980, Polish debt to · 
9 . See Documentary History, 123-128. 
10 
"Protocol No. 002/81 of a Meeting of the Homeland Defense Committee," dated September 13, 1981, in 
ibid., 350-356. 
11 For an excellent overview of.the Carter administratiori's policy toward Poland during this period, see: 
Patrick Vaughan, "Beyond Benign Neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980," The Polish . 
Review vol. 44, no. I (1999): 3-28. 
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the West had risen to about $23 billion and was beginning to come due, weighing down 
an already weak economy that was experiencing major shortages. The cost of living rose 
15% in the first six months of 1981 and in July a 20% cut in meat rations was announced, 
evidence of just how weak the Polish economy had become. These weaknesses were only 
exacerbated by the strain of strikes and political instability. To help alleviate some of this 
economic strain and to reward the PZPR for its concessions to Solidamosc, in August 
1981 the Reagan administration signed an agreement to delay payment of90% of 
Poland's debt to the United States for eight years. In the fall of 1981 other agreements 
were being negotiated to increase American food and humanitarian aid. U.S. policies 
aimed to alleviate some of the pressure the PZPR was feeling from its population because 
Kania and Jaruzelski continued to allow reform to move forward, however slowly. 
In the weeks prior to December 1981, Poland remained in a precarious position: 
Solidamosc continued to call for political and economic reforms consistent with goals 
articulated earlier in the crisis, Moscow continued to push the PZPR toward action 
against the opposition, and Washington continued to try to keep foreign interference at 
bay and internal reforms moving forward. In this laboratory of pressures, the 
Solidamosc's National Congress met from September 26 to October 7, 1981, to decide on 
how to proceed. Overruling Wal«sa's calls for moderation, the National Congress called 
for significant political reforms including increased self-.government for workers. The 
congress also approved a "Message to the Working People of Eastern Europe," actively 
promoting the creation of free trade unions beyond Poland's borders. Tensions remained 
high as a confrontation with the PZPR appeared more and more likely. In the late fall of 
1981, localized strikes and work stoppages were being called almost daily with little if 
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any coordination with Solidarnosc's central leadership. Generally, the opposition was 
growing increasingly impatient with the government's lack of responsiveness to its long-
standing grievances. In this atmosphere of frustration regional leaders from around 
Warsaw called for a protest rally in the capital city on December 17. 
During its fourth Plenum from October 16 to 18, 1981, the PZPR Central 
Committee took steps to respond to the increasing tension. Reacting to Solidarnosc's 
congress, the group removed Kania from his leadership position and elected Jaruzelski to 
a third office: Party frrst secretary. The Soviets interpreted this change as a sign that the 
party was steeling itself to implement martial law. Jarnzelski did, in fact, begin to take 
concrete steps towards declaring martial law including extending the period of military 
service for conscripts and dispersing military operational groups around the country. In 
November and early December the general took the further step of launching a strong 
anti-Solidarnosc propaganda campaign, accusing the union of breaking with the Gdansk 
agreements and making a grab for greater political power. Pressure from the east 
remained steadfast in favor of martial law, with Marshal Kulikov arriving in Warsaw on 
December 7 to keep an eye on Jarnzelski. In the hours and days before the final decision, 
Jaruzelski was agitated and nervous, vacillating about taking the final steps toward 
military rule, but by 2:00p.m. on December 12, the general made the final call for 
Operation X to go into motion. 12 Tanks and militia were fully mobilized ten hours later, 
overtaking the country .and rounding up the opposition. 
12 On General Jaruzelski's state of mind prior to implementing martial law, see his Stan Wojenny Dlaczego 
(Warszawa: BGW, 1992), esp. pp 1-10, 377-405; Mark Kramer, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the 
·Imposition ofMartial Law in Polaod: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981," Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin no. I I (Winter I 998), 5- I 4; "The Anoshkiri Notebook on the Polish 
Crisis, December 1981" Cold War International History Project Bulletin no. I I (Winter I 998), 17-3 I; and 
Jaruzelski, "Commentary," Cold War International History Project Bulletin no. I I (Winter I 998), 32-39. 
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Missed Intelligence and Mixed Signals 
Jaruzelski's move toward martial law was not a total surprise to the Americans. 
The Reagan administration had been well informed about the possibility and specifics of 
implementing military rule, months before the final moves. Since the early 1970s, a 
Polish Army officer named Ryszard Kuklinski had been working for the CIA, sending 
valuable information to Langley on the Warsaw Pact's war plans with the West. During 
the Polish Crisis, Colonel Kuklinski was a member of the planning group charged with 
preparing for martial law. Intelligence from Kuklinski had been a major factor in the 
December 1980 and March 1981 intervention scares that created a flurry of anti-Soviet 
posturing in~ Washington. Kuklinski also sent regular intelligence on preparations for 
martial law, including detailed information on war games plans from February 198 L He 
also sent numerous warnings in the fall of 1981 about the imminent threat of martial law. 
His reporting came to an end, however, about a month before martial law was declared. 
In October, Kuklinski's colleagues, who had become aware that high-level information 
about martial law was being leaked to the Americans, confronted him. When the colonel 
began to see signs that he was being trailed by internal security service personnel and he 
believed martial law was imminent and unstoppable, he asked to be taken out of PolandY 
On November 7, 1981, the CIA whisked Kuklinski and his family away from Warsaw 
and gave them asylum in the United States. 14 
Armed with this intelligence, the Reagan administration was at least partially 
13 Kuklinski first gave details ofhis work in an interview from 1987 reprinted as "The Suppression of 
Solidarity," in Between East and West, ed. Robert Kostrzewa (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), 72-98. For 
his state of mind before asking to be removed, see 92-94. 
14 For comprehenSive information on Kuklinski's life and reporting on martial law see Benjamin Weiser's 
biography, A Secret Life (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
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prepared for martial law. Eight days after Reagan entered office, the Department of State 
prepared a memo on U.S. policy in response "to the use of force by the Polish 
government against the Polish people," advocating a flexible policy calibrated to 
optimize American leverage. 15 The Reagan administration also made explicit statements 
. to the PZPR about negative consequences if the PZPR utilized force against their own 
people. The president, the White House, and Congress provided a flurry of this kind of 
statement in March 1981, during one of the intervention scares that peaked on the 
weekend of March 28. Specifically, a March 26 White House statement read: 
We would like to make clear to all concerned our view that any external 
intervention in Poland, or any measures aimed at suppressing the Polish 
people, would necessarily cause deep concern to all those interested in the 
peaceful development of Poland, and could have a grave effect on the 
whole course of East-West relations. At the same time, we would 
emphasize our continuing readiness to assist Poland in its present 
economic and financial troubles, for as long as the Polish people and 
authorities continue to seek through a peaceful process of negotiation the 
resolution of their current problems.16 
In Warsaw, this and other statements warning against the use of force against the Polish 
people were consistently monitored from late winter 1981 forward by the Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MSZ). 17 
It is important to note the complexity and nuances of the March 23 statement. The 
15 Department of State Memo, "U.S. Policy Response to Use of Force by the Polish Govermnent Against 
the Polish People," dated January 28, 1981, National Security Archive (hereafter NSA), Soviet Flashpoints 
Originals, Box 4. Robert Gates also wrote that he wrote a brief on January 23, 1981, on the possibility.''that 
the Poles would enforce coercive measures themselves as a way t_o keep the Soviets out." See Gates, From 
the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 228. 
16 Public Papers of the President of the United States (1981), "Statement by the Press Secretary on the 
Situation in Poland, March 26, 1981" (available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu). 
17 For Polish reporting on these statements, see a number of reports from Department Ill to high-level 
PZPR officials, including the minister of foreign affairs, in "Stosunki Bilateralne PRL-USA" [Bilateral 
U.S.-PRL Relations], Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, files ofDepartinent Ill (hereafter referred 
to as MSZ, D. 111), (1981 ), Zespol49/84, W I, AP. 22-1-81; and "Stanowisko USA Wobec Sytuacji W 
Polsce" [U .S. Position on the Situation in Poland], MSZ, D. Ill, (1981) 49/84, W I, AP. 22-1-81. At the 
Jachranka Conference in 1997, Jaruzelski produced a large amount of Western press on the issue of martial 
law, most likely prepared during the 1980-1981 period, see Wejdq nie· Wejdq. 
33 
American government rarely, if ever, solely condemned the possible use of force by the 
Polish military against the Polish people. Rather, the message was wrapped in warnings 
about outside interference, alluding to--at least from the American perspective-Soviet 
intervention. Warning messages also consistently included statements about America's 
willingness to continue to reward the PZPR for moves towards reconciliation and 
negotiation with the opposition. More often than not (although not in the strongly worded 
statement above), American statements also expressed sympathy for the Polish situation 
and referred to the development of the situation as a Polish affair, in which the United 
States would not interfere. 18 This complex message, therefore, contained a certain 
ambiguity about how exactly the United States would react to the imposition of martial 
law. 19 
This ambiguity in American policy-. warning primarily against external 
intervention and only secondarily against the Polish use of force--appeared in American 
statements throughout 1981. On September !9, 1981 a week before SolidarnosC's 
National Congress, Warsaw embassy official Howard E. Wilgis presented Head ofMSZ 
Department III, J6zef Wiejacz, with a statement from Haig that read, "In the present 
. situation we think it extremely important that Poland's leadership realize the devastating 
effect that repressive measures taken by them could I:tave on United States attitudes 
. towards Poland." This statement, however, was preceded by paragraphs condemning 
Soviet pressure on Poland, mentioning American sympathy toward the government of 
Poland, explaining that the United States did "not wish to interfere in Poland's internal 
affairs," and elucidating American fears that instability in Poland could lead to greater 
18 For example, see statements in the next paragraph. 
19 The PZPR's analysis of American statements appears later in this chapter. 
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instability in Europe and "unforeseen consequences"-i.e., civil war and expanded 
conflict. 20 So, while the Reagan administration was concerned about martial law, their 
messages to Warsaw were encased in other language about external interference and an 
attempt to show some kind leniency or sympathy toward Poland's economic predicament. 
The Reagan administration's messages about martial law, therefore, never had the clarity 
of their statements about the consequences of a Soviet intervention. 
This ambiguity reflected the Reagan administration's internal dynamics. Based an 
account by the director of the Soviet and East European desk in the NSC, Richard Pipes, 
the Reagan administration did not have a united policy on Poland before the declaration 
of martial law. In Pipes' account, even the "vice president did not agree with the 
president" on the proper approach to Poland.21 Moreover, because the administration 
assumed power in the middle of the crisis, policy took ona reactive quality. The NSC did 
not have time to prepare overriding guidance on policy toward Eastern Europe until well 
after December 1981, and the administration was often split between more ideological 
perspectives advocated by neo-conservative members of the cabinet and more pragmatic 
approaches advocated by voices like the vice president and officials in the State 
Departrnent.22 Reagan's oWn attitude toward policy making bred divided action within the 
foreign policy machinery. According to Pipes, "President Reagan had many virtues, but 
he didn't take up his time with the details of government .... He gave a lot of freedom to 
members of his administration. They would do, as a matter of fact, what they wanted and 
20 
"Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z charged affairs HE Wilgisem z 19 bm" [Information Note from the 
Conversation with H. E.Wilgis on the 19th of this month], dated September 19, 1981, MSZ, Dept Ill 
(1981), 49/84, W I, AP 22-1-81/B. Unless otherwise noted, all translations <if Polish documents and 
sources were made by the author. 
21 Wejdqnie Wejd<p 290. 
22 For futher discussiOn of the creation of a national security decision document on policy toward Eastern 
Europe, as well as the split between nee-conservatives and pragmatists, see_ chapter 2. 
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therefore there was confusion."23 The ambiguity of American statements about martial 
law, therefore, reflected the lack of a coherent, concise policy within the Reagan 
administration. 
The PZPR was also receiving conflicting advice from American business leaders. 
For businessmen the most important issue was simple: stability. In a report to Warsaw 
about a September 1981 conference at the Woodrow Wilson Center which brought 
together Polish government officials and executives from private American banks, the 
Poles paraphrased the bankers' position as follows: 
Private banks have to guide their decisions about fmancial credits only with 
economic criteria. Especially at present, improved interest rates [on loans J would 
require an end to difficult conditions for economic efficiency. [These needed] 
conditions do not exist in Poland today. And therefore in today's situation banks 
cannot safely engage in Poland with new money .... Today the central source of 
uncertainty regarding the Polish economy resides in the lack of social-political 
stability.24 . 
Similarly, in a memo about meetings in Warsaw from September 17-19 between PZPR 
officials and a delegation from the US. Commerce Department led by Eric Lawson, the 
Americans made the point that the most important factor to improve chances for 
increased economic contacts with Americans was Poland "moving toward a clear, 
effective program ofstabilization." ("Effective program ofstabilization" is underlined in 
the Polish originaL i 5 As one retrospective analysis concludes, "The Western banking 
community [expressed] its uneasiness about the growing instability, which could 
undermine the economic fabric of the country. Because their primary concern was to 
23 Wejdq nie Wejdq, 308. 
24 
"Sprawozdanie z pobytu sluzbowego w Stanach Zjednoczonych AP w dniach od 14 do 19 wresnia" 
[Report from an Official Trip to the United States from 14 to 19 September], MSZ, D. lil (1981 ), 49/84, W 
I, AP. 22-l-81. . 
25 
"Komisja Mieszana D/S Handlu X Sesja [Tenth Session of the Joint Commission of the Department of 
Trade], Wizyta Wicepremiere Jagielskiego w USA [Visity by Vice Premier Jagielski to the U.S.A.], 
Wyzyta Wicepremiera Z Sladeja w USA [Visit by Vice Premier Z Sladej to the U.S.A.," Memo from A. 
Karas, September 25, 1981, both in MSZ, D.ll!, (!981) 49/84, W 2, AP. 23-8-81. 
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have their [loans repaid], the bankers looked favorably on the alternative of a Soviet 
invasion .... Ironically, Western big business sided with the communists."26 
Adding to the ambiguity of government statements and the conflicting messages 
from Western businesses, in the month prior to the declaration of martial law, the U.S. 
government was silent about martial law. The United States issued no explicit warnings 
despite the fact that Kuklinski had been removed from Poland-an obvious signal to the 
PZPR that the Reagan administration knew about their specific plans for martial law. The 
main issue in Polish-American relations during early December 1981 was not the 
prospect of martial law, but the possibility of increased aid. Warsaw applied for $740 
million in aid to purchase agricultural commodities and $200 million in emergency food 
aid, and they were hoping for lenient terms to reschedule debts due in 1981 and 1982. In 
an attempt to gauge his government's chances of receiving this much-needed aid, Deputy 
Premier Zbigniew Madej visited Washington from December 7 to 10. While the 
Department of State briefmg memo for Madej's meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Jack Scanlan mentions the negative impact that the use of force would have on bilateral 
relations, the memo also states that the United States respects "the course followed by 
Polish authorities over the past year which had permitted the peaceful resolution of many 
critical problems and which is in our view facilitating resolution of Poland's many 
problems. [The Uriited States has] carefully avoided interfering in Poland's internal 
affairs, and we plan to continue that policy in the future."27 The Polish record of the 
26 Arthur Rachwald, In Search of Poland: The Superpowers' Response to Solidarity, /980-/989 (Stanford, 
Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 50. The question of American businessmen's effects on PZPR 
thinking is an area I hope to clarify in my continuing research on the. topic and presents an excellent 
opportunity for a concentrated oral history project. 
27 Briefing Memorandum froin H. Alien Holmes to Amb Stoessel, "Your Meeting with Polish Deputy 
Prime Minister Zbigniew Madej, December 7," NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 3. 
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meeting reports on the later points, but does not mention any warnings about martial law, 
presumably because Scanlan did not bring up that talking point.28 The Polish record of 
Madej's conversation with Bush does not mention martial law either, only that the vice 
president inquired about the "possibility of the government cooperating with the union 
movement to realize an economic program for exiting the crisis. "29 If the U.S. had been 
looking for a chance to quietly or vocally signal· America's disapproval of plans for 
martial law, these meetings with Madej presented just such an opportunity. There is no 
evidence on either side, however, that strong or even muted warnings were made in the 
month before December 13. 
The main reason martial law was not a major focus in Polish-American relations 
in December 1981 was that Washington had never viewed martial law as a likely 
outcome. From the beginning of the crisis until December 1981, the White House, the 
Department of State, and the CIA remained myopically focused on Soviet military 
intervention. Public statements were ambiguous about martial law partially because they 
reflected the White House belief that Soviet intervention was the main problem. It was a 
"strongly held conviction of both U.S. intelligence analysts and policy officials before 
martial law was imposed, that the Poles would not impose martiallaw."30 American 
28 
"Notatka Informacyjna z rozrnowy z Johnem Scanlanem, Zast~pc'\ Asystenta Sekretarza Stanu d/s 
Europy Wschodniej w Departmencie Stanu w dniu 9 bm." [Information Note from the Conversation with 
John Scan!en, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Europe in the Department of Stale on the 91h 
of this month], MSZ, 49/84, W-2, Dep Ill (1981), AP 23-8-81. In conversations about the events, General 
Jaruze!ski has mentioned that there were cables from Madej that dealt with the meeting in more detail. 
While I was able to gain access to all confidential and secret materials in the MSZ Archive's Department Ill 
files, I was not able to review the top secret szyferogram files that would have included the cables 
Jaruzelski has referred to. It is po.ssible that sensitive material sending wami~gs about martial law may 
have only been transmitted in the more highly classified szyferograms. 
29 Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note re Madej trip to Washington, sent to Czyrek on December I 7, 
198I], MSZ, 49/81, W-2, D. Ill, (I98I), AP 23-8-81. 
30 Doug MacEachin, U.S. Intelligence and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the 
Study oflntelligence, 2000), I95. MacEachin's work is the best source on American intelligence activity in 
Poland from I 980-198 I and is the only comprehensive attempt to understand the intelligence failure 
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analysis of Jaruzelski consistently cited his standing as a patriotic Polish officer who was 
famous for saying that "Poles won't shoot Poles."31 Finally, raw intelligence from 
Kuklinski was closely guarded, so information about specific preparations for martial law 
did not receive a wide audience. Pipes claims that he and Haig had not seen the 
intelligence prior to December 13. Only National Security Adviser Richard Alien, who 
left the White House around November 23 under the shadow of a bribery scandal, and 
Defense Department officials knew the specifics of Kuklinski's reporting, so Pipes "like 
the rest of the administration" was "ignorant that throughout the year the Polish 
government. .. was laying the groundwork for a military crackdown. "32 
Another reason martial law was not at the forefront of American policymakers' 
minds was that, from the American perspective, tensions between Solidamosc and the 
PZPR appeared to be lessening. Although October had been a very tense month-with 
SolidamosC's National Congress and a series of strikes and clashes with police-in 
November Jaruzelski appeared to be pursuing a conciliatory policy. On November 4, 
Jaruzelski, Glemp, and Wal«sa met to discuss the possibility of a Front of National 
Accord. Although this meeting "yielded nothing apart from some curt communiques, "33 
this presumed move toward negotiation and reconciliation was received by the 
Washington intelligence community with "cautious optimism."34 
Therefore, in the two weeks prior to martial law, Washington's main concern was 
surrounding the declaration of martial law; see esp., 179-203. This book was re-published in a revised form 
as U.S.1ntelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-1981 (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2002). 
· 
31 For an example of American analysis on Jaruzelski, see "Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to 
Secretary of State, 'General Wojciech Jaruzelski,' December 16, 1981,'' in Documentary History, 478-479. 
For a reference to Jaruzelski's comments from 1976 about violence against Poles, see Ash, The Polish 
Revolution, 248. 
32 ~ipes, Vixi, 169-170, quoted 170. 
33 Paczkowski, Spring, 441. 
34 As quoted in MacEachin, U.S.1ntelligence, 169. 
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not repression against the Polish people, but Poland's deteriorating economic situation. 
The Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs met on November 30 to discuss Poland, with a 
State Department briefing memorandum arguing that "Poland's economic outlook is 
extremely grave" and that "economic collapse may offer the best chance to restore Soviet 
domination."35 Writing to Reagan on December I, Haig's main concern was to maintain 
the recent calm by strengthening Wal«sa's hand in negotiations with the PZPR by 
providing necessary aid to Poland and averting the possibility of further economic decline 
precipitating a crisis-"the sort of crisis that could demoralize and discredit the 
democratic forces and lead to the re-imposition of an inflexible Soviet-style Communist 
dictatorship." With this in mind, the NSC held a meeting on December 8 to discuss $740 
million in long-term agricultural aid, including $100 million in emergency aid in the form 
of corn and soybean meal destined for Poland's poultry industry which the Cabinet 
Councii'on Economic Affairs had already approved. 36 Writing to DCI Casey on 
December 4, Director of the DCI/DDCI Executive StaffRobert Gates stated that 
investing foreign aid was a risky proposition, but "that our national security interests are 
well served by gambling $740 million (or other sums) in credits in the hope that it will 
' 
allow the Polish experiment to continue and in the knowledge that the experiment's very 
survival will contribute to the long-term unraveling of the Soviet position in Eastern 
Europe."37 
In international circles, the main topic of conversation vis-a-vis Poland in the days 
35 Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs from Roger B. Porter, dated November 27, 
1981, NSA, Soviet Flash points Originals, Box I. 
36 See, "Memorandum from Alexander Haig to President Reagan, 1J.S. Assistance Program to Poland,' 
December I, 1981," in Documentary History, 409-411. 
37 Memorandum from ·Robert M. Gates to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Assistance to Poland: 
. . 
Tuesday's NSC Meeting," dated December 4, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box I. This 
sentiment was reiterated Qy the CIA in a Memorandum, "Pol<;tnd," dated December I 0, 1981, NSA, Soviet 
Flashpoints Originals, Box I. 
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prior to the imposition of military rule was also aid. At a December 10 dinner in Brussels, 
French, German, British, and American foreign affairs officials, martial law was not 
mentioned. According to American reporting, the quadripartite group "emphasized the 
necessity of continuing Western assistance to Poland in order that the Polish experiment 
in pluralism would continue."38 As late as December 11, the Department of State reported 
to the secretary's team in Brussels that "tensions in Poland have lessened in the wake of 
the government's apparent decision not to submit an 'emergency measures' law ... and 
the increasingly active role played by the church. "39 Twenty-four hours after this message 
was sent to Haig; however, tensions spiked; by December 12 they had passed a breaking 
point 
Shock, Anger, and Protests 
When word reached Washington late on December 12 that tanks and armored 
vehicles were moving around Warsaw and surrounding Solidarnosc headquarters there, 
Washington officials emanated a unanimous sense of shock. As the Secretary of State 
recalled, "the timing of [martial law] ... came without forewarning to the United 
States. "40 Echoing this, a few days after Polish troops had been deployed the New York 
Times noted, "High officials here have made no secret that the repression so swiftly and 
stunningly imposed last Sunday morning by General Jaruzelski caught them by 
surprise."41 Assistant Secretary ofDefense Richard Perle went as far as to refer to "a 
38 Cable from SecState to Amembassy Bonn, "Quadripartite Dinner Highlights, December I 0, 1981," dated 
December 11, 198l,.NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2. 
39 Cable from Secstate Washington to Arnembassy Brussels for Eagleburger/Price, dated December 11, 
1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2. 
40 Haig, Caveat, 248. 
41 Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Stick and Carrot," New York Times (Dec. 18, 1981): Al7. 
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collective failure" in intelligence gathering and assessment prior to December 12.42 
This sense of surprise in Washington was, perhaps, only matched by a feeling of 
anger. Policy makers on all sides of the political spectrum were truly upset by Jaruzelski's 
decision, none more so than the commander-in-chief himself. Upon hearing the news, 
Reagan was "absolutely livid" and decided to take a stand, allegedly saying to Pipes that 
"something must be done. We need to hit them hard and save Solidarity."43 Reagan's 
anger was equally apparent when he met with Polish-Americanleaders on December 21. 
One participant reported that "'the President was awfully angry' about the events in 
Poland."44 
In this atmosphere of equal parts surprise and anger, the Washington policy 
community. began to decide on the best response to martial law. First however, they 
needed to understand just what was going on. As part of martial law, Polish troops cut off 
both internal and international phone communications, so tbe American embassy in 
Warsaw and consulates in Krak6w and Poznan could only report on what they saw 
themselves; they could not readily receive information on the situation beyond these three 
cities. As Andrzej Paczkowski writes, "The crackdown had ... disrupted virtually all 
channels of communication, not only between regions, but also within individual 
towns."45 Poland was blanketed with a heavy cloud cover, so satellites and photographic 
intelligence were of no help. Even the Vatican, which had been such an important source 
of intelligence during the crisis remained in the dark in the first few days.46 
42 Drew Middleton, "Soviet Action inside Poland Being Smdied; Military Analysis" New York Times (Dec. 
21, 1981): Al9. 
43 Peter Schweizer,Reagan~ War (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 165-166. 
44 Bemard Gwertzman, "The President Weighs Steps on Poland," New York Times (Dec. 22, 1981): AI. 
45 Paczkowski, Spring, 450. . 
46 Bemstein and Politi, His Holiness, 340-341. 
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In this news blackout, Jaruzelski had the first word on the situation in Poland. In 
his remarks that began broadcasting every hour on Polish radio beginning at 6:00 a.m. on 
December 13, the leader of the party and the state argued that Poland was deep in crisis, 
saying: "Our country is on the verge of an abyss .... Chaos and demoralization have 
reached the level of defeat The nation has reached the border of mental endurance ... 
now, not days but hours are nearing a nationwide catastrophe." This so-called catastrophe 
was precipitated by the growing "aggressiveness of extremists, clearly aiming to take 
apart the Polish state system." In response, the communist Party was acting to control 
growing extremism, announcing that he had declared martial law and created a Military 
Council of National Salvation (Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego or WRON). 
Jaruzelski, however, lamented the use of force against the Polish people and declared his 
intention was not a military takeover of the government Democracy (such as it was) was 
not abandoned; WRON was formed only "to create guarantees of reestablishing order and 
discipline." For this reason, "a group of people threatening the safety of the country [had) 
been preventively interned" including "extremists in Solidarity," "members of illegal 
organizations," and "sharks of speculation gaining illegal profit" Jaruzelsk:i said that he 
took these actions with a heavy heart knowing that this would not be an easy time for 
Poland. Invoking a long tradition of benevolence in the Polish armed forces, the general 
asked Poles to accept his decision. Only a stark change could move Poland away from the 
precipice of instability and confrontation.47 
In private the Polish government reiterated these points to Washington in even 
more specific terms. Meeting with Scanlan on December 14, Polish ambassador Romuald 
47 
·For a nearly complete translation of Jaruzelski's remarks, see "Text of Polish martial law declaration," 
United Press lnterriational (Dec. 13, 1981), available via Lexis-NeXis Academic Universe_ All quotes in 
the previous paragraph are from this text. 
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Spasowski referred specifically to his government's belief that Solidarnosc had been 
"leading the nation into civil war" and action was taken to "avoid an internal tragedy 
which could have had a serious impact ... on European security"-a clear assertion that 
Jaruzelski acted to preclude a Soviet military intervention. Referring to Poland's 
sovereignty, the ambassador hoped that "other countries will understand the situation" 
and that Poland remained "interested in good relations with Western countries."48 With 
their initial statements the PZPR attempted to ease concern about the situation and to 
show that they had the situation under control. In both public and private Jaruzelski 
argued that martial law was the lesser of two evils. The country had been on the edge of a 
precipice, a spiral toward chaos that could only lead to civil war, or worse, a Soviet 
invasion. In his messages to both the people of Poland and the international community, 
Jaruzelski sought sympathy and understanding, because he and Poland's military had 
acted to save Poland from worse consequences than military rule. 
Soon after the first reports of martial law, however, accounts began to seep out 
that workers were clashing with government forces. Prior to December 13, Solidarnosc 
planned to call for a continuous general strike immediately if the government took 
extreme action. In line with this policy "union militants called for a general strike" to 
res.Rond to the government's provocation, raising the possibility of open conflict.49 The 
CIA's National Intelligence Daily for December 14, 1981, reported that the real test for 
Jaruze1ski's government would be when workers returned to factories, raising the 
48 Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, 11 Po-Iish Government Statement on Situation in Poland; U.S. 
Suspension of Aid to Warsaw," dated December 15, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2. 
49 Associated Press, Dateline Warsaw, Poland (Dec. 13, 1981, PM cycle), available via via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Universe. 
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probability that "[Sotidarnosc] members are not likely to passively accept defeat. "50 News 
from Moscow papers also fanned the flames of concern, emphasizing SolidamosC's 
militancy and reporting that some activists had openly called for seizing power from the 
PZPR in the hours before martial law was declared. 5 1 
On December 14, the Washington Post began reporting that the call for a general 
strike had been followed in large steel mills and mining operations, with Polish troops 
massing around the striking workplaces.52 Sit-in strikes were held in "hundreds of the 
largest enterprises: in all the shipyards, ports, mines, iron and steel works, and in most 
factories in the metal and tight industries. "53 Most of these strikes were broken on the 
night of December 14-15 by forces from the MSW backed by elite military units, who 
stormed the factories using explosives to break down doors and gates and tear gas and 
flood lights to overcome the strikers. Strikes in mines in Silesia proved to be harder to 
break, with miners holding sit-in strikes in the mine-shafts. At the Wujek mines, this led 
to the bloodiest episode of martial taw when government forces stormed the mines and 
fired on workers, killing six immediately imd mortally wounding three others. 
For Poles living in the United States sporadic reports of clashes between workers 
and troops and the uncertainties. of martial law led to an atmosphere of near panic. Polish 
students and citizens who had either emigrated from Poland or who were stranded in the 
United States on trips gathered together for shots of vodka, "voiced [theirrworst fears, 
listened to the continual newsbreaks, and anxiously speculated about the fate of family, 
50 
"CIA National Intelligence Daily, 'Poland: Test of Government Measures,' December 14, 198 I," in 
Documentary History, 476-477. 
51 See in particular, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 1: USSR (Dec. 14, 1981), available via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. · 
52 
"Some Polish Workers Defying Martial Law; Polish Workers Reported Striking Against New Rule,'' 
Washington Post(bec.15, 1981):AI. 
53 Paczkowski, Spring, 451. 
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friends, and Poland .... Most ... imagined the worst---civil war, Soviet invasion, or 
both."54 
In response, Poles in America and Polish-Americans began to organize. In New 
York City, Eric Chenoweth, Irena Lasota, and a few members of Solidamosc stranded in 
the United States formed the Committee in Support of Solidarity, with the intention of 
keeping the American public aware of events and trying to help the opposition in any 
way possible. The AFL-CIO issued a press release on December 14 proclaiming: "The 
AFL-CIO pledges its full support to our Polish brothers and sisters. We do not presume to 
recommend what Solidarnosc should or should not do .... Whatever the decisions of 
these courageous people, we shall do what we can to assist them .... We call upon the 
governments and peoples of the free world to raise their voices in protest against the 
' . 
ongoing destruction of human rights in Poland. "55 Spontaneous or at least loosely 
organized public protests took place almost immediately in New York Outside the 
United States, crowds took to the streets to protest outside Polish embassies in Paris, 
Vienna, London, Brussels, Milan, Rome, Lisbon, Athens, Toronto, and Tokyo. 56 On 
Monday, December 14, these protests in the U.S. expanded to the Polish embassy on 16th 
Street in Washington, D.C. and the Polish consulate in Chicago. In Paris 3,000-4,000 
protesters took to the streets to march in support of Solidarnosc, with smaller events 
taking place in Milan, West Berlin, Madrid, Copenhagen, Vienna and The Hague. 57 
54 Janine Wedel, The Private Poland (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986): I. 
55 
"Press Release, Monday, December 14, 1981 ," George Meany Memorial Archives (hereafter referred to 
as GMMA), AFL-CIO Press Releases 1981 (December), Box 47, Folder 47/6. 
56 
"West Rallies Behind Solidarity," United Press International (Dec. 13, 1981), accessed via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Universe. 
57 Loren Jenkins, "Western Europeans Demonstrate Against Crackdown in Poland," Washington Post (Dec. 
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First Steps 
In reaction to the slow pace of information and rising public concern, the U.S. 
government took a decidedly cautious approach in its initial comments. Reagan did not 
return to the White House until Sunday morning and Haig lingered in Brussels to keep 
from showing too much anxiety and triggering alarms in Moscow. Speaking in Brussels 
on December 13, Haig emphasized that the U.S. was deeply concerned about events in 
Poland and was watching the situation carefully. Reagan took a similar tact when 
responding to reporters upon returning from Camp David, stating, "We're monitoring the 
situation. Beyond that, I can't have any comment "58 This caution was mirrored by 
America's NATO allies and pursued in private correspondence as wel159 When the under 
secretary of state and former ambassador to Poland, Waiter Stoessel, met with the Soviet 
deputy chief of mission in Washington on December 13 he 
emphasized that the U.S. was deeply concerned about developments in 
Poland and their effect on stability in the region. [Stoessel] said the U.S. 
urged all parties to exercise the maximum degree of restraint, prudence, 
and caution in their approach to the Polish situation. The USG [U.S. 
government], in briefing congressional leaders and other public figures, 
had urged them to be cautious in their public statements. The U.S. did !lot 
. . 60 
want to see an over-reachon or excess excitement 
In calling for a measured response without inflammatory comments, the U.S. 
government was taking a cue from the history of Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe. 
Following American inaction in November 1956 and tacit American acceptance of the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Poles, Aillericans, and the world 
58 John Goshko and Don Oberdorfer, 11 Wal~.sa is Summone:d to Warsaw; U.S. Expresses 'Serious Concern' 
to Poland and Russia," Washington Post (Dec. 14, 1981): AI. 
59 Leonard Downy, Jr.,"NATO Allies, Reacting Cautiously, Consult on Polish Crackdown," Washington 
Post (Dec. 14, 1981): Al2. 
6° Cable from Secstate to U.S. delegation Secretary, "Under Secretary Stoessel's meeting with 
Bessmertnykh, December 13," dated December 13, 198!, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box I. 
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knew that the United States would not react militarily to events in Poland. At the same 
time, Washington had learned from the Eisenhower administration that they did not want 
to incite violence to cause needless bloodshed. More practically, the Reagan 
administration did not want to give the Soviets an excuse to move in troops, which any 
increase in violence could provide. Earlier contingency planning for the Polish 
government's use of force against the Polish people had, in fact, noted that the use of 
force by Warsaw could be "staged as a pretext for greater Soviet involvement."61 U.S. 
·government comments, therefore, were kept to a minimum. 
The Catholic Church also decided to emphasize caution. Speaking to a crowd of 
pilgrims outside his Vatican window on December 13, Pope John Paul II prayed, "Polish 
blood cannot be shed, because too much of it has been shed .... Everything possible 
must be done to peacefully build the future of the Homeland. "62 Speaking at 
Czt;stochowa on the morning of December 13, Cardinal Glemp took a similar tone: "We 
must calmly reflect on the situation, the aim of which should be peace and the saving of 
lives, so that we avoid bloodshed." Later that same day, Glemp went further in a sermon 
in Warsaw, explaining, "I am going to call for reason even if it means laying oneself open 
to insult, and I shall ask, even ifl have to go barefoot and beg on my knees: Do not begin 
a fight of Pole against Pole. Do not lose your heads brother workers. "63· 
In private, however, Washington's policy wheels began to take measured frrst 
61 For document reference see footnote 15. It is interesting to note that a similar awareness of history 
shaped American signaling to the Soviets during 1980-1981. National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski was keenly aware of American policy toward Hungary in I 956 and Czechoslovakia in I 968. He 
did not Waht "stir up the pot" to incense the Soviets. Nor did he want to repeat the mistake of reinaining 
quiet on the possibility of Soviet intervention for fear of promoting that outcome. "Special Coordinating 
Committee, Summary of Conclusions, 'Meeting on Poland,' with attachments, September 23, 1980," 
Documentary History; 87-90. 
~2 "Speech by Pope John Paul If Concerning Martial Law, December I 3, I 98 I:' Documentary History. 475. 
63 As quoted in Paczkowski, Spring, 451. 
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steps. On December 13 a meeting was held in Deputy Secretary of State William Clark's 
office in the morning, and Vice President Bush chaired a special emergency-group on 
Poland that afternoon. The following morning, December I 4, Scanlan met with 
Ambassador Spasowski to receive a message from Jaruzelski on his reasons for declaring 
martial law, to which Scanlan responded with his own written statement mmouncing: 
"U.S. government aid and economic support activities for Poland will be placed on hold 
for the time being. This means that further consideration of the Polish government's 
request for 740 million dollars in agricultural assistance is being suspended."64 This 
included $I 00 million in emergency aid that had just recently been approved. By the time 
American Ambassador to Poland, Francis Meehan (who had been in West Germany 
when martial law was declared), returned to Warsaw and met with Foreign Minister 
Czyrek on December 16, the Poles had taken notice of the United States first move; 
Czyrek "argued vigorously" that he could not understand the decision to suspend 
agricultural aid. Meehan, however, saw no change in the PZPR's position: "I do not 
believe my broader comments had any particular impact on Czyrek .... But at least he is 
in no doubt that [U.S.] economic assistance is not on. That kind oflanguage he 
understands. "65 
·Five days after the implementation of military rule, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency took stock of the situation. Their initial point was that "martial law has been 
implemented in Poland with more efficiency and less resistance than had been expected." 
The DIA summarized reports that Polish police and military units had been breaking 
64 Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Polish Government Statement on Situation in Poland; US 
Suspension of Aid to Warsaw," dated December 15, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flash points Originals, Box 2. 
65 Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, "Meeting with Czyrek," dated December 17, 1981, NSA, 
Soviet Flash points Originals, Box 4. 
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strikes in a "methodical fashion" but that as of the past two days they have been 
confronted with serious, violent opposition, with reports of 324 injuries in the Gdansk 
shipyards and the death of miners in Silesia. The report concluded rather bleakly that "the 
situation in Poland under martial law has by no means been clarified .... Having taken 
the gamble, Jaruzelski must pursue his present course until he wins or loses." Despite the 
administration's first punitive move, the situation had continued to deteriorate with 
increased clashes and no reports signaling that the Communist party was looking to 
negotiate with either the Church or Solidarnosc to come to some kind of new national 
reconciliation. 
The same day the DIA released its report, Reagan made his first in depth public 
statement, raising pressure on the Polish leadership. He began his December I 7 remarks 
by focusing on human rights concerns, declaring the arrest and imprisonment of 
thousands of union leaders and intellectuals a "gross violation of the Helsinki pact." The 
president viewed the situation in "the gravest of terms." Turning to the question of aid, he 
said: "We have always been ready to do our share to assist Poland in overcoming its 
economic difficulties, but only if the Polish people are permitted to resolve their own 
problems free of internal coercion and outside intervention." Reagan stated that martial 
law would have to be suspended, prisoners would need to be freed, and free trade unions 
would need to have their previous rights restored for the United States to return to 
helping "Poland solve its economic problems." Later in the press conference, however, he 
refused to discuss options and tactics for future actions. 66 
In a private meeting on the same day, American frustration with the PZPR 
66 For a full record ofPresid€mt Reagan's remarks, see "President's New Conference, December 17, 1981," 
Public Papers (I 981 ), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu. 
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surfaced more fully_ Meeting with Spasowski on December 17, Scanlan echoed the 
president's public statements, but made the possible outcome clearer. Scanlan explained: 
when the U.S. suspended aid to Poland, we called attention to the fact that 
it was for the "time being" because we hoped that the military regime that 
was being introduced would indeed be moderate and permit the social and 
political process of renewal to continue. Unfortunately __ . we do not see 
that happening. Massive force has been used, and thousands of Poland's 
most patriotic and devoted workers and intellectuals have been arrested. 
There is no indication whatsoever that the new Polish military regime 
intends to seek a politically negotiated accommodation with all of the 
social, spiritual and political elements of Polish society. _ . _ When the 
U.S. sees the Polish military regime move toward a genuine political 
accommodation by permitting a free atmosphere of negotiation by free 
men, we will be prepared to help economically.67 
As before the declaration of martial law, bilateral relations with Poland focused on 
economic aid, this time with the White House dangling continued economic aid to 
mitigate the PZPR's repressive policies. 
Imposing Sanctions 
With frustration increasing, the Reagan administration took stock of its options. 
As the senior policy maker on Eastern Europe in the NSC, Pipes found himself 
scrambling to put together a possible list of actions.68 According to contingency planning 
from January 1981 for the use of "significant force by the Polish government," the 
Americans could choose from the following responses: threaten the Polish ambassador 
with a severe economic cutback; recall the American ambassador; restrict debt 
rescheduling; cut off Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) agricultural credits; withhold 
Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) financing; signal to private banks to restrict financial 
67 Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Polish Ambassador on Situation in Poland," dated 
.December 18, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2. 
68 Wejdqnie Wejd<L 308. 
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agreements; decrease fishing allocations; restrict trade through export controls and 
COCOM; raise the issue in the CSCE, International Labor Organization (ILO), and the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission; intensify consultations with NATO, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania; send a private message to the Soviet Union advocating restraint and non-
interference in Poland's internal affairs; and make strong public statements urging against 
interference in Poland's internal affairs.69 
The first and last steps had already been taken, so most actions available now fell 
within the realm of economic sanctions. However, the Americans knew that their 
economic leverage in Poland was limited. Writing on December 17 to Haig, Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affairs Robert Hormats explained that the primary point of 
Western leverage came from debt servicing payments to Western governments and 
private banks. Poland was also reliant on the West for cash and Western industrial and 
agricultural goods. According to the memo, the Poles could probably meet their 
obligations to purchase Western goods with funds from their own exports in 1982, "but 
they cannot finance their debt service payments." Therefore, "Western governments have 
maximum economic leverage as long as the Poles continue to accept an obligation to pay 
their western currency debt." For any economic sanctions on the contingency list to be 
effective, private banks would have to be convinced not to declare Poland's loans in 
default. This is exactly what Haig recommended for Secretary of the Treasury Don Regan 
to tell American bankers, under strict secrecy.70 
69 For. document info see footnote-15. 
70 Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger and Robert Hormats to the Secretary, 11 Western Economic 
Leverage on Poland and Secure Phone Call to Regan," dated December !7, !98!, NSA Soviet Flashpoints, 
Box 26, Dec l-22, !981. 
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Full NSC meetings were called on December 19, 21, 22, and 23 to discuss Poland. 
By this point, however, the response to martial law was no longer just a matter of reacting 
to Poland and the Poles. From the beginning of the martial law crisis, the Reagan 
administration believed that the Kremlin should be punished for its complicity in the 
crackdown. Although intelligence from Kuklinski was not employed to predict martial 
law, it was quickly exploited to confirm Soviet involvement in Poland. On December 15, 
Haig reported to the Western Allies that, "for sometime our government has been 
holding very sensitive intelligence which convincingly confirms that the Soviets were 
intimately involved with the Polish government from the outset in the planning of this 
weekend's operation."71 Marshal Kulikov had, in fact, traveled to be in Warsaw on 
December 11. The White House interpreted this as further evidence of Soviet complicity. 
As State explained to the Allies, Jaruze1ski was a "tool of the Soviets .... No reasonable 
man can believe that this tragedy would be happening without Soviet pressure. The 
degree of their direct involvement ... is largely irrelevant" 72 At his December 17 press 
conference, Reagan went public with a simple but persuasive argument: "It would be 
naive to think [that martial law could be declared) without the full knowledge and the 
support of the Soviet Union. We're not naive." 73 These sentiments were repeated in 
private the following day when Under Secretary Stoessel met with Soviet ambassador to 
the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, to warn that "if the present situation continued ... it 
would inevitably have an adverse impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, since the influence of 
71
-Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Bonn, London, and Paris, ''Message from the Secretary," dated 
December 15, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box I. 
72 Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Paris, London, and Bonn, "Messages for Cheysson, Carrington and 
Genscherfrom the Secretary," December 19, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2. 
73 See footnote 66. 
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the Soviets in Poland was overwhelming. "74 
Moreover, these internal discussio~s and Reagan's public comments about Soviet 
complicity were consistent with Reagan's longstanding opinions of the Communist 
system. In Reagan's worldview, Moscow treated Eastern Europe as a colonial possession, 
so it would be inconsistent to believe that Jaruzelski had acted on his own to promote his 
own conception of Polish national interests. 75 This view at least partially explains the fact 
that the Reagan administration had not done more to prepare for martial law. The Soviet 
Union had been the focus of American statements on the Polish crisis, because 
Washington assumed that any resolution to the crisis would be imposed by Moscow. 
More importantly, Reagan and nee-conservative members of his administration 
viewed the declaration of martial law as a real opportunity to act proactively to decrease 
Soviet capabilities in the world, possibly even to change the global balance of power. 
Reacting to martial law gave the Reagan White House a chance to intensify their battle 
against Communism in general. As Reagan wrote in his diary, "This may be the last 
chance in our lifetime to see a change in the Soviet empire's colonial policy re Eastern 
Europe."76 Reagan and his advisors viewed Solidarnosc as the kind of organization that 
could undermine Communist power in Eastern Europe, and they certainly were not going 
to abandon their hopes now that Solidarnosc was under attack. Even more grandly, 
74 Cable from Secstite to Amembassy Moscow and Warsaw, "Poland: Discussion with Ambassador 
Dobrynin December 18," dated December 22, 1981, .NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1. 
75 For an excellent study of Reagan's longstanding views on Communism and his struggle against it, see 
Schweizer's Reagan 's War. The internal Polish-Soviet struggle over martial law was much more complex 
than Reagan's simplistic characterization_ As Hope Harrison and other scholars have convincingly argued 
in other situations, Eastern European leaders did not simply do as they were told by the Soviets. This was 
certainly the case in Poland in 1981. Interestingly, Jaruzelski has argued similarly to Reagan's point: he 
imposed martial law under extreme pressure from the USSR aild only did so to preclude the introduction of 
Soviet troops. The question of whether the Soviet's would have sent troops into Poland remains a matter of 
historical debate_ The central point, however, is that Reagan believed that martial law was declared in 
response to Soviet pressure. There is nothing in the historical record to dispute this interpretation. 
76
-As quoted in Reagan's War, 166. For the full entry,-dated December 21, ~ee: Reagan, The Reagan 
Diaries, ed. by Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 57. 
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Reagan believed that they had been handed an historical opportunity to turn back 
Communism. Reagan considered this opportunity akin to Franklin Roosevelt's decision to 
lead America into World War II to defeat fascism. He was inspired by his "mounting fury 
against the communists" and his sense that Poland was "the last chance of a lifetime to go 
against this damned force. "77 Reagan believed himself to be charged with the historical 
mission of defeating Communism, and the declaration of martial law and the possibility 
of supporting Solidarnosc gave him the opportunity to push this mission. As Pipes 
recalls, "The president was gung-ho, ready to go. "78 
This call for a proactive response to martial law was not only confined to the 
more neo-conservative members ofReagan's cabinet. Looking toward global geo-
political options in the first days after martial law, the State Department sought indirect 
means to punish the Soviets, including; to look into ways to send more direct U.S arms 
aid (included shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, mines, and explosives) to Afghan 
rebels; to discuss with other government agencies covert aid to Central America, 
Ethiopia, and other areas; to increase Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts 
targeted against the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact; and to plan for "strategic 
consultations" with the Chinese. 79 The declaration of martial law was seen as much as an 
opportunity to "take it to" the Soviets as it was seen as a setback for Pohind and the Poles. 
A week after the declaration of martial law as it became clear that martial law 
would not be temporary, the White House grew more vocal about Soviet complicity and 
the NSC began to discuss the possibility of sanctions against both Poland and the USSR. 
77 Pipes, Vi.xi, 171. 
78 As quoted in Schweizer,Reagan's War, 165. 
79 Memo from Richard Burt to the Secretary, "Poland: Current U.S. Geopolitical Optians," dated December 
19, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2. 
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The president was the most vocal proponent for tough action on sanctions. On the other 
side, Haig was concerned about relations with the Allies, and Commerce Secretary 
Malcolm Baldridge, Agriculture Secretary John Block, and Treasury Secretary Regan 
worried about the effects of economic sanctions on American businesses. 80 The main 
discussions, therefore, revolved around the extent of sanctions. On December 19 the NSC 
resolved to suspend the remaining shipment of surplus dairy products to Poland (which 
had been previously allocated), suspend renewal ofEx-Im Bank insurance and activate 
"international organizations (U.N. Secretary General, U.N. Human Rights Commission, 
and the ILO) to weigh in on human rights questions." The NSC also opted against 
declaring Poland in default on its debt agreement and in favor of delaying an 
International Harvester license for exports to the USSR. Additional options under 
consideration at the December 21 NSC meeting vis-a-vis Poland included: suspending its 
request to join the IMF, invoking tougher COCOM standards, reconsidering fishing 
allocations in American waters, writing a presidentialletterto Jaruzelski, advising private 
banks not to declare Poland in default, and calling for a Papal visit.81 
While disagreements in the NSC about sanctions policy regarding Poland were 
mild, the NSC was more deeply divided about how to respond to the Soviets. In meetings 
chaired by Acting Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Admiral John 
Nance, DCI Casey wanted "forceful measures," with Regan, Baldridge, and Block 
arguing for either massive punishment or no punishment at all (in effect arguing for no 
punishment, given that it was unlikely that extreme measures would be employed). AI 
80 Pipes, Vixi, 171. 
81 Memorandum for James Nance, "Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting,n dated December 21, 1981, NSA, 
Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December l-22, !981." It is interesting to note that almost all of these 
provisions are drawn from the January 1981 contingency plans for martial law. 
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Haig took a "centrist" position, somewhere between the two82 At the December 21 NSC 
meetings, these three groups were given a laundry list of eighteen possible actions to 
consider against the Soviets. They included: a letter to Brezhnev; recalling Ambassador 
Arthur Hartman from Moscow; suspending or delaying new talks on long-term grain 
agreements and maritime agreements; arranging high-level consultations with NATO 
allies, Japan, and China; suspending Aeroflot flights; halting "the export of oil and gas 
equipment to the Soviet Union"; reconsidering export licenses for American pipe-laying 
equipment; strengthening American and Allied agreements for COCOM restrictions; an 
embargo on all new contracts for exports to the USSR; and denying new official credits, 
credit guarantees, and credit insurance for exports to the USSR. Regarding internationally 
coordinated actions against the Soviets, the December 21 discussion included the 
possibility of calling an emergency sessions of NATO foreign ministers and the U.N. 
Security council, postponing the resumption of CSCE talks in Madrid, conducting an 
"extensive campaign of public condemnation," postponing INF negotiations, and 
suspending MBFR negotiations. 83 
The NSC met again on December 23 to continue discussing options against the 
Soviet Union and to approve a final list of sanctions against Poland. The Department of 
State created a comprehensive list of economic sanctions ordered from "limited" to 
"severe." In addition ·to options explained earlier, the list included limited steps such as 
suspending activities of the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission, requesting 
suspension of activities by the private Polish-US. Economic Council, canceling both 
government and private American participation in the Poznaft Trade Fair, reducing the 
82 Pipes, Vixi, 171. 
83 Memorandum for James Nance, "Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting," dated December 21, 1981. 
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number of personnel allowed at the Polish commercial office in New Y ark, and 
suspending all LOT flights. The "medium" range of options comprised steps to suspend 
technology transfer, to restrict Polish access to American ports, and to complicate 
business contact between the two countries by calling on American businesses to curtail 
their contacts and by limiting visas for Poles coming to the United States. "Strong" 
options included withholding fisheries and restrictively enforcing an agreement on import 
quotas for Polish textiles. "Severe" options included continued suspension of funds for 
agricultural aid, concerted opposition to IMF membership, pushing for hard requirements 
on Poland's international debt and rescheduling agreements to force default, working with 
private banks to force default, calling for a full embargo on Polish imports, and 
suspending Poland's MFN status. 84 
The final decision on imposing economic sanctions on Poland was articulated on 
December 23 and drew from all four levels of options. In a letter sent to Jaruzelski that 
day, Reagan recognized the "considerable external pressure to roll back reforms" and 
maintained that the United States was not questioning Poland's choice of political system 
or military alliances. However, he wrote "the United States government cannot sit by and 
ignore the widespread violation of human rights occurring in Poland. To do so would 
· make us party to the repression of the rights <,>f the Polish people." He then went on to list 
economic sanctions taken against Poland, making clear that his government was no 
longer considering the request for $740 million in agricultural aid (including $100 million 
in emergency aid that had already been approved), nor would the United States deliver 
remainder (about 10 percent) of$74 million in dried milk and butter that the U.S. had 
84 Briefmg Paper, 11 Possible Economic Sanctions against Poland," i-evisedDecember23, 1981, NSA, Soviet 
Flashpoints, Box 27, December 23-25, 1981. 
58 
agreed to provide the previous April. The letter also threatened to take further action if 
repression continued unchanged or increased. The letter ended on an optimistic note 
stating that Washington would reconsider these sanctions once the PZPR had "taken 
concrete steps to end repression, freed those who have been subject to arbitrary detention, 
and begun a search for reconciliation and a negotiated accommodation with the true 
representatives of all of the social, spiritual, and political elements of Polish society ... 
u85 
Addressing the American public in a prime-time message on the same night, the 
president spoke aboutthe meaning of Christmas and made public his decision to impose 
economic sanctions on Poland. Focusing again on human rights violations and in a clear 
reference to both Poland and the Soviet Union, the president said, "I want emphatically to 
state tonight that if the outrages in Poland do not cease, we cannot and will not conduct 
'business as usual' with the perpetrators and those who aid and abet them." He then went 
on to outline the specific new steps taken to respond to martial law: halting the renewal of 
Export-Import Bank insurance credits, suspending all LOT flights to and from the United 
States, suspending Poland's rights to fish in American waters, and working with NATO to 
"increase restrictions on technology trade with Poland." Again, Reagan threatened further 
steps if repression continued, and elucidated a slightly different set of conditions 
necessary for reconsidering sanctions. In the public formulation, the president called for 
the PZPR to "free those in arbitrary detention, to lift martial law, and to restore the 
internationally recognized rights of the Polish people to free speech and association." The 
president concluded his message with symbolic flair, calling for all Americans to place a 
85 Letter from Ronald Reagan to General Wojciecli Jaruzelski, dated December 23, 1981, MSZ, 30/85, W-
1, Dep Ill (1982), AP 22-2-82: 
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candle in their window "as a beacon of our solidarity with the Polish people .... Let the 
light of millions of candles in American homes give notice that the light of freedom is not 
going to be extinguished. "86 
Thus, on December 23, the White House ended its period of cautious non-
comments on Poland. The White House took actions it considered "severe" by 
suspending previously approved agricultural aid and suspending consideration of future 
aid. It also took the "strong" step of suspending fishing rights and the "medium" steps of 
suspending LOT flights and weakening Polish-American commercial relations by 
suspending consideration of Export-Import credit insurance. Smaller actions regarding 
joint trade commissions and trade fairs did not merit announcement during prime time, 
but were exercised quietly. Importantly, the White House also kept its strongest options 
in reserve: declaring Poland in default, rescinding MFN, and blocking Poland's entrance 
into the IMF. Reserving these options gave the administration flexibility to take future 
steps in the situation worsened. IMF membership and default issues also had implications 
for multi-lateral agreements, complicating the possibility ofunilateral action. Over the 
coming years, however, each of these strongest options was reconsidered and either acted 
upon or discarded (see chapter 2). 
Sanctioning the Soviets 
By December 23, the Reagan administration had already begun moving beyond 
sanctions against Poland and was focusing on the Kremlin. Reagan's Christmas speech 
had, in fact, noted that "through its threats and pressures" the Soviet Union "deserves a 
86 
"Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland, December 23, 1981," in Public 
Papers (I 981 ), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu. 
60 
major share of blame for the developments in Poland." Reagan also publicly 
acknowledged that he had sent a letter to Brezhnev urging him to allow the Poles to take 
steps to end repression and threatening punitive actions against the Soviets if the situation 
did not improve87 This letter outlined American arguments about Soviet interference in 
internal Polish matters and invoked the Helsinki Final Act to justify American policy 
towards the Poles. In his response, Brezhnev rebuffed Reagan's arguments, completely 
rejecting claims of Soviet interference. The first secretary also condemned the United 
States for interfering in sovereign affairs by declaring sanctions in response to an internal 
Polish decision. The CPSU leaders also "resolutely" rejected calls for changes in the 
Communist system and claimed that American statements in support of change in Poland, 
both before and after the declaration of martial law, constituted American interference in 
Polish and Communist bloc affairs. Brezhnev further rejected Reagan's use of the 
Helsinki Final Act, remindingthe president that this international accord "stipulates the 
refraining from any interference in affairs which come under the internal competence of 
another state" and arguing that American sanctions are "thoroughly amoral, and no sort of 
word game regarding the rights of man can conceal this fact." Brezhnev concluded by 
insinuating that the tone of Reagan's letter was offensive and inappropriate for 
superpower communications, but that the Soviet Union hoped to continue conversations 
about the arms race and attempts to "preserve peace on earth. "88 
As Pipes recalls, this response "made sanctions against the USSR inevitable."89 
87 
"Address to the Nation about Christmas and .the Situation in Poland, December 23, 1981." 
88 A translation of the Russian version of Brezhnev's letter to Reagan can be found as "Hotline 
Communication from Leonid Brezhnev to Ronald Reagan regarding Martial Law in Poland, December 25, 
1981," in Documentary History, 496-498. The quotes in this paragraph are taken from: Cable from Secstate 
to Amernbassy Moscow and Warsaw, "Brezhnev-Reagan Letter," dated December 26, 1981, NSA, Soviet 
Flashpoints Originals, Box I. 
89 Pipes, Vixi, 173. 
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NSC members and State officials met on December 27 to discuss the letter, and on 
December 28 Vice President Bush chaired a meeting of a Special Situation Group to 
discuss the proper response. The next day, Haig sent a letter to Soviet foreign minister 
Gromyko that "in light of President Brezhnev's response ... we can only conclude that 
thus far your government is unwilling to help bring about the process of national 
reconciliation" in Poland. The letter then explained the list of economic sanctions that 
would be taken.90 In a statement later that day, President Reagan made these sanctions 
public. Arguing that the "Soviet Union [bore] a heavy and direct responsibility for the 
repression in Poland." The list of steps taken by the United States included: 
-All Aeroflot service to the United States will be suspended. 
-The Soviet Purchasing Commission is being closed. 
-The issuance or renewal of licenses for the export to the U.S.S.R. of 
electronic equipment, computers and other high-technology materials is 
being suspended. 
-Negotiations on a new long-term grains agreement are being 
postponed. 
-Negotiations on a new U.S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement are being 
suspended, and a new regime of port -access controls will be put into 
effect for ali Soviet ships when the current agreement expires on 
December 31. 
-Licenses will be required for export to the Soviet Union for an 
expanded list of oil and gas equipment Issuance of such licenses will be 
suspended. This includes pipelayers. 
- U.S.-Soviet exchange agreements coming up for renewal in the near 
future, including the agreements on energy and science and technology, 
wili not be renewed. There will be a complete review of all other U.S.-
Soviet exchange agreements.91 
President Reagan concluded by saying that the United States was willing to pursue 
improved relations, but in a jab at policies pursued under detente, he said that "American 
9° Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Moscow, "Letter from Secretary Haig to Foreign Minister 
Gromyko," dated December 29, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2. 
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December 29, 1981," in Public Papers (1981), available on the Reagan Library's website: 
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decisions will be determined by Soviet actions." With this announcement, the Reagan 
administration completed a second decisive unilateral policy, imposing sanctions on both 
Jaruzelski in Belwedere Palace and his overseers in the Kremlin. 
As with sanctions imposed against Poland the final list of actions against the 
Soviet Union was not as harsh as it could have been. Most notably, the White House 
decided only to suspend negotiations on new grain agreements (rather than imposing a 
grain embargo as the Carter administration had following the invasion of Afghanistan) 
and did not take moves to suspend arms negotiations for either INF or MBFR. Regarding 
grain sales, Reagan had lifted the embargo the previous April because he had long felt 
that the embargo overly burdened American farmers. Given the recentness of the decision 
and Reagan's convictions, the option of reinstating the embargo in response to martial 
law was never on the table.92 On the issue of suspending arms negotiations, pragmatists 
in the Department of State convinced the president that stepping away from arms 
negotiations would severely alarm European allies, decreasing the likelihood that they 
would come into line with Washington's more reserved list of sanctions. As Haig 
explained to Genscher in a December 29 letter, "We have taken no decisions that would 
affect the INF negotiations. The president recognizes the special character of these 
negotiations, and we do not intend to alter our stance under present conditions. "93 The 
president and the NSC were not such convinced unilateralists, nor angry enough over two 
weeks after the declaration of martial law to risk torpedoing the entire sanctions policy by 
92 For a discussion of the decision to lift the embargo, see R~ymond Garthoff, The Great Transition 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookingslnstitution, 1994), 45-46. 
93 Cable from SecState toAmembassys Bonn, Paris, and London, "Poland: Message for the Foreign 
Minister," dated December29, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box I. This decision is also 
indicative ofReagan1s eniphasis on the special importance ofanns reductions, even early on in this first 
term. 
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pushing a wildly unpopular policy. As the Reagan administration knew, sanctions would 
not be as effective without Allied coordination. 
Getting the Allies in Line 
Even before the martial law crisis, the Department of State had been working hard 
to communicate and coordinate with NATO members on their response to events in 
Poland. A full year before the declaration of martial law, the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) of NATO met to discuss how to respond to the use of force in Poland. This earlier 
coordination with NATO focused on contingency plans for responding to a direct Soviet 
intervention in Poland: in December 1980, the Carter administration recognized the 
possibility of "Polish use of force against elements of the population" but felt that for the 
NAC it was "more profitable to focus our attention on the issue of what we would do in 
response to full-scale Soviet intervention." These contingency agreements were meant to 
be flexible according to the exact situation that arose, and the agreements included 
incremental steps for situations that did not involve Soviet troops directly-known as 
"gray area" scenarios. 94 So while NATO did not have contingency plans if martial law 
was imposed without a clear Soviet intervention, NATO did at least have a basic list of 
actions with which to begin the conversation. 
When martial law was declared, Haig was already in Brussels for an annual 
meeting of the NAC. British foreign secretary Lord Peter Carrington was also in 
Brussels, with German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and French foreign 
minister Claude Cheysson on their way. With a distinct lack of information, there was a 
94 Cable from Secstate to USMission NATO, "Guidance on Poland·,Contingencies," dated December 4, 
1980, NSA, Soviet Flash points Originals, Box I. 
64 
frenzy of activity in Brussels on December 13, but little concrete action was taken. Haig 
focused instead on maintaining close contact with the Allies and to "lead the alliance in 
these early hours." On the evening of December 13, Joseph Luns, NATO secretary 
general, called a meeting of the "quad"-the foreign ministers of Britain, France, West 
Germany, and the United States-to facilitate coordination and exchange intelligence and 
early assessments. After these meetings, which were more symbolic than substantive, 
Haig left Brussels to return to Washington95 In Warsaw, the envoys from NATO 
countries also met to swap intelligence and reports on what they knew.96 
In the first days after the declaration of martial law, each ally took individual 
public stances on Poland, mixing tough talk with sympathetic words, President Francois 
Mitterand's government issued a statement that France "deplores the chain of events," but 
Cheysson added that "the matter remained an 'internal Polish affair that must be handled 
by the Poles."'97 Lord Carrington issued a statement that the British "shall observe a· 
policy of strict non-intervention, and we expect the same of all signatories of the Helsinki 
Final Act. "98 West German Chancellor Helm ut Schmidt, who had been meeting in Berlin 
with East German leader Erich Honecker when martial law was declared, took a similar 
tact that "all the nations that signed the Helsinki declaration on European security should 
adhere to its non-intervention principle." The West Germans went a step further, 
releasing a statement that West Germany was following events in Poland with "sympathy 
95 For Haig1s account of these first few hours see, Caveat, 247-251, quoted 249. 
96 Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, "NATO Ambassadors' Report," dated December 15, 1981, 
NSA, Soviet Flash points, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981. 
97 Maureen Johnson, 11Deep Concern in the West, Protests at Polish Embassies," Associated Press (Dec. 13, 
1981), accessed Via _Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
98 MarkS. Smith, "International News," Associated Press (Dec. 14, '1981), accessed via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Universe. 
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and concern. "99 By invoking the sovereignty clause of the Helsinki Accords, the West 
Europeans were signaling to the Soviets that they should not intervene militarily in 
Poland. However, the West Europeans were simultaneously acknowledging that martial 
law was an internal, sovereign matter implicitly accepting part of General Jaruzelski's 
argument for how and why martial law was declared. 100 These signals, particularly when 
combined with declarations of sympathy, called into question whether the West 
Europeans would be willing to impose sanctions on the Poles, let alone the Soviet Union. 
In Washington, Reagan's cabinet recejved the Europeans' comments with 
trepidation. European statements did not evoke the anger felt by Washington or the 
American belief that events in Poland presented an opportunity for the West to stand up 
against the injustice and tyranny of Communism in Eastern Europe. So, the State 
Department moved to bring the NATO allies more in line with the American position. 101 
This offensive began on December 15, when Haig sending a letter to Cheysson, 
Carrington, and Genscher pointing out that "for some time our government has been 
holding very sensitive intelligence which convincingly confirms that the Soviets were 
intimately involved ... in the planning of this we.ekend's operation." This information 
was not for public pronouncements, but was to show the Europeans "the realities of the 
situation ... and about the general environment in which [they were] operating."102 A 
similar letter sent the following day questioned the validity and relevance of Jaruzelski's 
99 
"International," United Press Internat-ional (Dec. 14, 1981 ), accessed via Lexis-Nexis Academic 
Universe. 
100 See discussion of December 14 meeting with Ambassador Spasowski above, as well as footnote 48. 
101 For a more recent cri~icism of the European allies' reaction which reflects thinking-at the time see, 
Schweizer, Victory (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994). For a broader discussion ofWest European 
statements and trans-Atlantic tensions see Helene Sjursen,. The United States, Western Europe and the 
Polish Crisis: International Relations in the Second Cold War (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 
esp.63-89. . 
102 Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Bonn, London, and Paris, "Message from th~ Secretary," dated 
December 15,1981. 
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argument that martial law was "established by Polish nationalists in order to avoid Soviet 
intervention." The secretary's point was to push the three allies to increase pressure on the 
Poles "to restore the reform process" and "a genuine process of negotiation and 
reconciliation," and not regress to a pre-August 1980 situation. 103 
In Brussels, the NAC was simultaneously discussing possible NATO responses, 
with negotiations focusing on implementing the "gray area" contingencies agreed to 
earlier in 1981. The State Department took an incremental view that coordination with 
the NAC was not meant to move the Europeans to a particular position on Poland, but to 
exchange information and act "as a stage-setter for possible follow-on consideration of 
alliance actions as events in Poland unfold."104 However, the Americans faced an uphill 
climb; Canada, West Germany, and Norway all agreed with Jaruzelski's argument that 
martial law was imposed to prevent chaos from engulfing Poland. The French, British, 
and Italians appeared closer to American thinking, but U.S. reporting gave a clear sense 
that it would be difficult to push economic sanctions through the NATO framework. 105 
The Americans' full-court press on NATO began in earnest following Reagan's 
initial statement on Poland on December 17. U.S. Ambassador to NATO William Bennet, 
Jr. focused conversation on the worsening situation and "clear and gross violation of the 
Helsinki Final Act," as well as violations of standards of diplomatic conduct. (NATO 
members were unanimously upset that the Poles had cut telecommunication lines for 
103 AGtion Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Consultations with the Al-lies on 
Poland," dated December 18, 1981, from Byrne, Malcolm, Pawel Machcewicz and Christian F. Ostermann, 
eds., Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions. A Compendium of Declassified 
Documents and Chronology of Events (Washington, D.C.: The National Secnrity Archive, 1997). Copies 
are available-through the National Security Ar hive. 
104 Cable from Secstate to US Mission NATO, "Poland: Dec 16 NAC on 'Gray Area' Scenario," NSA, 
.Soviet Flash points Originals, Box I. 
105 Cable from USMission NATO to Secstate, "Poland: Dec 16 NAC on Gray Area Scenarios," NSA, 
Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box I. 
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_/ 
foreign embassies.) Benne! blamed both the PZPR and the CPSU for these developments. 
The American ambassador also asked that each national government intensify their 
. statements. In coordination with the Americans, both the French and the British planned 
to make strong protests at an upcoming meeting of the CSCE in Madrid. Canada and 
West Germany remained reluctant to toughen their rhetoric, although most other 
Europeans were beginning align with the American position. 106 
American pressure also continued directly from Washington. On December 19, 
Haig sent another letter to Cheysson, Carrington, and Genscher, warning that the West 
was "facing a critical, possibly tragic juncture in Poland." The letter stated: 
To forestall further repression, disintegration, and possible Soviet 
intervention, we must act urgent! y and simultaneously on two fronts: 
-We must bring pressure to bear on Jaruzelski to make some· 
move toward reconciliation with the Church and Solidarity. 
-And we must take steps to make clear to the Soviets that we 
understand the key role they are already playing and to make more 
credible our deterrent to their own intervening .... 
. . . We do need political and economic measures which we can take now 
and which we could take if the situation grows even more ominous. 
Haig called on his colleagues to view the situation in Poland in terms of its "genuine 
historical importance," and even tried to shame them into action: "Western inaction at 
this time will not be forgotten by those who assess the character of our nations and our 
individual qualities as statesmen in the years to come."107 A day later, Reagan followed 
Haig's message with a personal letter of his own to Mitterand, Thatcher, and Schmidt, 
giving his "personal assessment of the situation." He called Poland a "watershed in the 
political history of mankind-a challenge to tyranny from within." Echoing earlier 
106 Cable from USMission NATO to Secstate, "Poland: NAC Discussion on Allied Public Poslure," dated 
December 19, 1981, NSA, Flashpoints Originals, Box I. 
107 Cable from Secstat_e totAmembassy Paris, London, and Bonn, "Message for Cheysson, Carrington, and 
Genscher from the Secretary," dated December 19, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2. 
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communications, Reagan pleaded, "There are measures we can take now to help prevent 
both further repression and Soviet intervention. These measures must be addressed to the 
Soviet Union as well as to the Polish regime."108 This letter reflected the president's deep 
anti-Communist convictions and his belief that the world had been presented with a 
historical opportunity to confront the Soviets, and it showed where Washington was 
heading: toward political and economic sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet 
Union. 
To work out the details for an Allied response, Eagleburger was dispatched to 
Europe. In Rome he met with the Pope at the Vatican to share intelligence and to brief the 
Church on American policy. Because the Pope was a public figure closely tied to Poland, 
the White House knew that John Paul's public pronouncements could put added public 
pressure on the Europeans. Therefore, it was essential to keep the Pope well informed on 
American policy to influence the Vatican to make statements that would support 
America's strong response against both Poland.and the Soviet Union. Eagleburger also 
met with Italian foreign minister Emilio Colombo, where the Americans found basic 
agreement with their policies; Italian trade unions had raised a public outcry about the 
treatment of Solidamosc, pushing Italian public opinion toward the American position. 109 
The Italians and the Americans saw eye-to-eye so well that the U.S. wanted to bring the 
Italians into the quad discussions on Poland.110 
From Rome, Eagleburger flew to Bonn on December 21 where he met with 
108 Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Paris, London, andilonn, "Message for Mitterari.d, Thatcher, and 
Schmidt from the President," dated December 20, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Origin'als, Box 2. 
109 Michael Getler, 11U.S. Seeks European Support for Moves Directed at Soviet Union," Washington Post 
(Dec. 22, 1981): A12. 
110 No declassified record ofEagleburger's meeting with the Pope or Colombo exists. For the American 
attitude on bringing the Italians into the quad, see footnote 112. 
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Genscher for an hour and a half. The West German foreign minister was "not as reluctant 
as expected," and the two found considerable agreement on the need to use economic 
measures against Poland. 111 In return Eagleburger shared Reagan and Haig's very 
confidential belief "that General Jaruzelski just might succeed in suppressing Solidarity 
and convincing the Soviets that he has rolled back reform." Eagleburger provided the 
usual litany of evidence proving Soviet involvement in Poland, and Genscher conceded 
that political actions against the Soviets were necessary, particularly a presidential letter 
to Brezhnev. 112 Eagleburger's analysis of the conversation was, however, that the 
Americans would have to "play hell getting him [Genscher] to accept more than political 
moves [against the Soviets) immediately." Eagleburger also succeeded in getting 
Genscher to agree that the United States would be allowed to put all issues on the table at 
the next meeting of the quad.113 From Bonn, Eagleburger flew to Paris and London to 
coordinate with more like-minded allies, before returning to Washington. 
At a December 23 meeting of the NAC, American efforts to turn European 
opinion began to show growing consensus with American positions. First the British 
called for action against the Poles and Soviets at the upcoming CSCE meeting in Madrid. 
The British also reported that the European Community (EC- I 0) had agreed to suspend 
shipments of beef to Poland until it could be guaranteed that the food was delivered to its 
intended recipients. The Danes approved stronger COCOM restrictions. Of all of the 
Europeans, the Italians took the hardest line, supporting Haig's earlier letter and flatly 
stated that they would have trouble continuing their current economic relationship with 
111 Cable from Amembassy Brussels to Secstate, "My Meeting with Genscher," dated Decemqer 21, 1981, 
NSA, S9viet Flashpoints Originals, Box I. 
112 Cable from Amembassy Brussels to Secstate, "Eagleburger-Genscher Meeting on Poland, December 
21," dated December 22, 1981, NSA Soviet Flashpoirits Originals, Box 4. 
113 Cable from Amembassy Brussels to Secstate, "My Meeting with Genscher," dated December 21, 1981. 
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Poland. The West Germans, however, remained the key stumbling block. They argued 
against calling a special ministerial-level NAC meeting to discuss Poland. They also 
rejected economic measures and opposed using CSCE as a forum to present Western 
disgust regarding Poland. 114 Following continued efforts to take advantage of European 
public opinion and to lobby European representatives directly, the United States did 
finally succeed in getting a ministerial-level NAC meeting scheduled for January. 115 
The Poles also began to lobby their friends in the West. As Foreign Minister 
Czyrek articulated, "The position of Western Europe is positive for us: they are not 
joining the American economic sanctions."116 To maintain this advantage, the PZPR sent 
Central Committee member and Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski to Bonn 
on December. 30 to meet with Genscher. The two talked frankly about the situation in 
Poland, the Church's evolving role, and the possibility of a return to dialogue. Genscher 
explained that December 13 was a "shock" for the Germans, but this shock was not 
enough to cause the West Germans to take a harder stance against the Poles. To assure 
Rakowski, Genscher said that he did not "want to appear to be judging" the Poles, and 
near the end of the conversation, he told his Polish colleague, "We must continue a 
dialogue, we will do our best to help Poland."117 So, at the end of 1981 Americans still 
had their work cut out for them to get complete Allied support for sanctions against 
114 See Cable from Secstate info to Amembassy Tokyo, "(U) Poland: NAC Discussion December 23," 
dated December 30, 1981; and Cable from Secstate info to Amembassy Tokyo, "Poland: December 23 
NAC Consultations," dated December 30, 1981; both in NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 4. 
115 The mini.sterial-level meeting was agreed to at a December 30 meeting of the NAC. For American 
efforts tO influence European public opinion, see: Meino from Alexander Haig to the President, 
"Influencing European Attitudes on Poland/• dated December 26, 1981, in Byme, Machcewicz, and 
Ostermann, eds, Poland 1980-1982. For direct lobbying efforts see: Cable from Sesctate to EC Collective, 
"Secretary's December 28 Luncheon Meeting with EC-i 0 Ambassadors in Washington," dated December 
30, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 4. 
116 
"Protocol No. 16 ofPUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 19, 1981," in Documentary History, 482-
495; quoted at 483. 
117 For Rakowski's account of the meeting and quoted comments, see his published diaries, Dzienniki 
polityczne 1981-1983 (Warsaw: lSKRY, 2004), 151-152. 
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Poland. 
While Genscher was meeting with Rakowski, Schmidt was already inside the 
United States, vacationing in Florida before meetings with Haig and Reagan on January 4 
and 5. Haig explained the weight of the situation to the president as follows: "Given the 
FRG's political, economic, and military weight we need Germany almost as much as they 
need us, particularly on an issue such as Poland," adding, "dealing with Schmidt is 
difficult and frustrating .... On Poland, Schmidt is moving toward our position ... and 
your meeting provides a good chance to bring him further along."118 Following Reagan's 
meeting with Schmidt on January 5 the two statesmen made a joint statement 
emphasizing that they "agreed on their analysis of the Polish situation" and worked very 
hard to show strong coordination and consensus between the allies. For the first time, 
Schmidt agreed with the president on "the responsibility of the Soviet Union for 
developments in Poland," but there was no consensus on specific punitive steps against 
either the Soviet Union or Poland. 119 The next day, the press correctly interpreted this 
weak statement as a failure to move the FRG closer to the American position.120 
The depth of the disagreement between the United States and West Germany was 
more apparent when Haig and Schmidt met privately on January 6. Implicitly criticizing 
Reagan's earlier letters and statements Schmidt suggested that "the West needed to be 
118 Memorandum from Alexander M. Haig to the President, "Visit ofHelmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, January 5, 1982," dated December 31, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 
27, December 1981. See also Haig's memo after meeting with Schmidt: Memorandum from Alexander M. 
Haig to the President, "Your Meeting with Chancellor Schmid~" dated January 5, 1982, NSA, Soviet 
Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982. 
119 
"Joint Statement Following a Meeting With Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of 
Germany January 5, 1982," Public Papers (1982), available on the Reagan Library's website: 
www.reagan.utexas.edu. 
120 See for example, Reginald Dale, "Reagan demands 'tangible' allied moves on Poland," Financial Times 
(Jan. 6, 1982): AI; as well as Don Oberdorfer, "Haig Silent on Future Sanctions," Washington Post (Jan. 7, 
1982): Al. 
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realistic regarding the possibilities for change in Eastern Europe." Instead of entertaining 
the option of sanctions, Schmidt took the opposite approach and suggested that the West 
offer "massive foreign assistance under the conditions normally established for 
developingcountries." Tensions grew to the point where the chancellor exclaimed that he 
would "not be blackmailed" by nu-attributed threats of American troops pulling out of 
Germany, after which the conversation spiraled into a wide-ranging argument about the 
merits of detente and Ostpolitik with Schmidt arguing that the West needed to accept the 
"fact that changing the consequences of [World War II] and Y alta could very well 
involve a war in Europe." 121 For the West Germans, Reagan's call to push for change in 
Eastern Europe and the American sanctions to punish the CPSU and the PZPR for their 
actions were provocative moves that could threaten stability in Europe. So, while West 
Germany made a few small concessions to the Reagan administration in public, in private 
the two remained deeply divided. 
Having run into this wall, the secretary of state went back to work on drafting an 
Allied declaration to be presented at the special session of the NAC, scheduled for 
January 11. In a memo written prior to Schmidt's visit, State hoped that the NAC meeting 
would allow Washington "to pry loose some Allied sanctions against Poland and the 
Soviets ... [and] to create a common overall policy for the longer haul .... The outcome 
we want is not a rhetorical declaration but a calm and sober agreed policy. "122 After his 
last meeting with Schmidt, however, Haig approved a severely scaledcback version of a 
proposed Allied declaration on Poland. The first draft called for curtailing high-level 
121 Memorandum of Conversation, 11Secretaty- Haig's Breakfast Meeting With FRG Chancellor Schmidt," 
dated January 6, 1982, NSA, Soviet F1ashpoints, Box 27, January 1982. 
122 ActiOn Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Memorandum for the President on 
Poland, and Next Steps with the Allies," dated January 4, 1982, NSA, Soviet F1ashpoints, Box 27, January 
1982. 
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diplomatic visits with Poland and the USSR and listed specific economic sanctions 
(including redirecting commodity assistance to humanitarian assistance and suspending 
the "issuance of licenses on high technology and energy equipment"). The approved 
second draft, however, did not refer to specific steps but instead pushed for language 
which was supportive of Washington's position and which only committed the Allies to 
"do nothing to weaken the effects of' American sanctions. 123 At an NSC about the 
upcoming meeting, both Cap Weinberg and the president vocally disagreed with taking a 
more malleable line with the Allies.124 
When Haig returned to Brussels on January 10 for the special NAC session, he 
pursued the scaled-back package on sanctions, calling only for strong statements (not 
specific actions) and pushing for a statement about not interfering_ with individual ally's 
sanctions. 125 In the final NAC communique issued on January 11, NATO publicly 
condemned martial law, deplored Soviet pressure on the Poles, mentioned the 
"significance of the measures already announced by President Reagan," and pledged "not . 
to undermine the effect of each other's measures." On the all important issue of sanctions, 
the Allies did take a few significant steps, they: suspended new credits to Poland, delayed 
consideration of rescheduling Poland's debt, and insured that humanitarian aid sent to 
Poland would reach the people. The statement, however, made no specific commitments 
to impose sanctions on the Soviet Union, only an agreement to consult and consider 
political and economic sanctions against the PZPR and the CPSU "in accordance with 
123 For the initial text, see: Action Memorandum from H. Alien Holmes to the Secretary, 1'The Alliance 
Declaration on Poland," dated January 5, 1982, published in Poland 1980-1982. For the approved text, see 
Action Memorandum from H. Alien Holmes to the Secretary, "Revised NATO Ministerial Declaration," 
dated January 6, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, Jariuary 1982. 
124 Pipes, Vixi, 177. 
125 Actual American records of the January 10-12 NAC have not been declassified. These statements are 
made based on the briefing materials and contingency plans created for Haig's trip. Those records can be 
found in: NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982. 
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[each Allies'] own situation and laws. "126 When Haig left Brussels, he left on a.positive 
note, saying, "I consider today's meeting to be a solid success for the alliance .... We 
sought a common near-and-long-term strategy to help the Polish people, and today the 
alliance produced one. "127 No matter how he spun it, however, the communique was only 
a qualified success for the Americans. Suspending new credits, delaying debt 
rescheduling, and insuring aid went directly to the Polish people all had important lpng-
term effects, but the actions taken by NATO lacked the immediate punch that more 
immediate economic sanctions would have delivered. In the thirty days following the 
declaration of martial law, the American government had succeeded in creating 
consensus in Washington about a punitive response to events in Poland, but this political 
will could not be exported to Europe. 
The View from Warsaw 
For General Jaruzelski and other members of the PZPR leadership, the political 
path pursued by the Reagan administration in the first thirty days after the declaration of 
martial law was not a primary concern. For the first few weeks after December 13, 
WRON-the Military Council for National Salvation-became the primary government 
body for coordinating martial law and met continuously. The measures undertaken as part 
of military rule were both expansive and draconian, with tens of thousands of MSW, 
milicja (police), and Army troops involved. Martial law restrictions consisted of 
imposing a nighttime curfew, restricting freedom of movement, banning all public 
meetings, closing all border crossings and ports of exit, limiting bank withdrawals, 
126 For the· full text of the January !I NAC Ministerial Communique, see the NATO website at: 
http://www.nato.int/ docu/comm/49-95/c820Illa.htm. 
127 James Res ton, "Haig's Verbal Success," New York Time (Jan. 12, I 982): A23. 
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introducing legal reforms including summary jurisdiction and expanding military courts, 
as well as suspending all secondary school and university classes. 
Around 6,000 Solidarnosc activists were imprisoned in twenty-four interment 
centers. Most high-level Solidarnosc leaders were captured on their way to hotels in 
Gdansk following a National Coordinating Commission meeting there. Wal~sa was 
apprehended the first night as well, and was flown to Warsaw against his will for talks 
with the PZPR leadership. A few central leaders, including W!adyslaw Fransyniuk, 
Bodgan Lis, and Zbigniew Bujak managed to evade capture and immediately went 
"underground," carefully returning to their home districts to plan strike actions. These 
strike actions had little long-term effect. The military government successfully broke 
most occupation strikes with force, and with the exception of the Wujek mines, without a 
major loss of life. The last major strike ended by December 28.128 By almost all accounts, 
martial law was executed "to perfection" and was successful in controlling the upper 
echelons of Solidarnosc. 129 
At that point, the leadership's main concern became invigorating the party aktiv 
throughout the government bureaucracy. SolidarnosC's calls for pluralism and self-
government prior to December 1981 had threatened the leaderships control by 
decentralizing power within the party. Party members had implemented "horizontal 
structures" for decision making (rather than vertical, top-down structures) in the party. 
Workers in the MSW had even taken steps to create a trade union.130 Democratic 
centralism had been threatened, and Jarnzelski desperately needed to regain a strict 
measure of control over how the party functioned in order to have any chance of 
128 Documentary History, 514_ 
129 1bid., 32. 
130 See Paczkowski, Spring, 420. 
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reforming the economy to a point where Poland could function well on its own. 131 
In terms of international relations, the Polish leadership turned first to its main 
ally. Jaruzelski's decision to declare martial law came as a great relief to Moscow. On 
December 13, Brezhnev called Jaruzelski to congratulate him and expressed "his warm 
feelings towards [Poland] and stated that we have effectively engaged the fight against 
the counterrevolution. They were difficult decisions, but appropriate ones." According to 
Jaruzelski his public announcement "met with high acclaim" in Moscow. 132 Jaruzelski 
had finally taken the tough actions against Solidarnosc that the Soviets had been calling 
for since August 1980. 
In relations with their Warsaw Pact allies, messages soon moved beyond 
congratulations; the Poles were desperately interested in increased economic aid as a 
reward for stabilizing the situation. Jaruzelski personally asked Brezhnev about the 
possibility of increasing aid during their December 13 conversation. That same day the 
Kremlin sent out a telegram to leaders in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Cuba, 
Mongolia, Vietnam, and Laos asking them to consider sending economic and political 
support to Poland. 133 The Hungarians acted most quickly by sending an official 
delegation to Warsaw on December 27-29 to discuss the Hungarian experience of 
rebuilding after the 1956 revolution. 134 By January 14, 1982, the Kremlin had also agreed 
131 For a·discussion of the spread of pluralism within the party, see Documentary History, 12-13. For a 
representative discussion of Jaruzelski's desire to reform the party following the imposition of J.llartiallaw, 
see "Protocol No. 16 ofPUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 19, 1981," in ibid .• 482-495. 
132 
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474. 
134 For the Hungarian view of these meetings, see, "Hungarian Report to :HSWP CC Politburo on 
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to increase grain, oil, gas, and benzene shipments to Poland.135 
Despite Soviet attempts to increase economic aid, the PZPR felt the sting of 
American sanctions almost immediately, specifically the suspension of consideration of 
$740 million in agricultural aid, including an emergency appropriation of$100 million 
which had already been approved at lower levels. The agricultural aid-mainly in the 
form of corn and grain-was earmarked to be used as feed for the Polish poultry 
industry-. an important source of protein in a country where most ham was sold for 
export. As Jaruzelski proclaimed at a Politburo meeting on December 13, "The issue of 
buying corn in the USA is very important, the production of poultry will depend on 
that." 136 When word reached Warsaw on December 14 that Reagan had decided to 
suspend this aid, the Politburo became concerned about how a lack of grain would affect 
an already strained food situation. Five days later Central Committee member Marian 
Wo:lniak emphasized this point, arguing that, "The biggest problem is acquiring wheat 
and fodder outside the framework of the USA's embargo."137 From the perspective of 
well-informed outsiders, the Pole's problems went well beyond the issue of chicken feed 
and grain. As a Hungarian delegation reported back to Budapest, "The present poor 
condition of the national economy is a major burden .... To make matters worse, the 
USA had just affected an economic blockade, thus badly affecting the economy which 
had developed a cooperative dependence on the economies of the capitalist countries over 
the past ten years." 138 
135 
"Transcript ofCPSU CC Politburo Meeting, January 14, 1981," in ibid .• 504-507. 
136 
"Protocol No. 19 ofPUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 13, 1981," in ibid .. 461-472; quoted at 
470. 
137 
"Protocol No. 16 ofPl)WP CC Politburo Meeting, December 19, 1981," in ibid., 482-495; quoted at 
483. 
138 
"Hungarian Report to HSWP CC Politburo on Hungarian Delegation's Talks with Wojciech Jaruzelski, 
December 30, 1981," in ibid., 499-503; quoted at 501-502. 
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From an American perspective then, sanctions had an almost immediate positive 
impact. Reagan and his administration had wanted to punish Warsaw for imposing 
martial law. While it is unclear how much of an immediate effect suspending new credits, 
ending fishing rights, and blocking LOT flights to the U.S. had, the decision to suspend 
consideration of $740 million in agricultural aid worried the Polish leadership. Moreover 
the lack of feed eventually led to a large-scale slaughter of poultry when feed reserves 
dried up, causing long-term damage to the poultry industry by reducing the overall 
·number of reproducing chickens.139 In addition, the Poles were forced to turn toward the 
East for greater economic aid. Because subsidies for Eastern European purchases of oil 
and gas were already draining money from the Soviet economy, expanded Polish needs 
and increased aid from the Soviet Union fit perfectly with the Reagan administration's 
desire to punish the Soviets as well as the Poles. Moreover, by causing the Poles to draw 
more resources and capital out of the Soviet Union, economic sanctions against Poland fit 
well within the neo-conservative plans to wage economic war against the Soviet Union to 
k h fr . h. 140 wea en t e system om Wit m. 
· · Sirrprise and Distrust 
American economic sanctions also had a secondary, much less positive set of 
effects: sanctions caused a real break in trust between Washington and Warsaw. To 
understand this break it is essential to examine expectations on both sides of the Atlantic 
prior to December 13, 1981. From the Polish perspective, Jaruzelski believed that he had 
139 Author's interview with Zbigniew Karcz, July 8, 2004. Karcz was the director of the intematio~al 
department of the Ministry of Finance from 1976-1987. 
14° For a full discussion of.the nee-conservative plans to wage economic war against the Soviet Union, see 
Schweizer's Victory. 
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chosen the lesser of two evils, and that Western Europe and the United States would 
prefer this option over further instability or an invasion by the Soviets. Jaruzelski gauged 
the West Europeans correctly, particularly the West Germans who were pivotal in 
blocking a united stance on sanctions against Poland. He did not read the Americans 
correctly, however. 
From information gained well after the events in question, it appears that the 
principal miscommunication between the Poles and the Americans came just a few days 
before the imposition of martial law, when Deputy Premier Madej met with Vice 
President Bush. From statements made by General Jaruzelski in 1997, it is clear that he 
interpreted the vice president's statements of sympathy and his offers as economic 
support as a signal that the United States would accept martial law, if at least grudgingly. 
As he has stated, "And that for me it was an unusually important signal; that the United 
States knew about [plans for martial law], and they knew about it from sources, not only 
from Ryszard Kuklinski ... but also from CIA materials, and from the American 
embassy in Poland, that the process [of moving toward martial law] was going on. "141 
The significance of a lack of a strong warning was magnified by the Reagan 
administration's ambiguous statements and American businessmen's calls for stability in 
the months prior to December 1981. Based on these patterns, General Jaruzelski sincerely 
believed that the United States would not take a hard stance against this middle path. As 
he recalled at Jachranka: 
I admit, whenever I have such a rotten idea [robaczywe mysli], that the 
Americans would have deliberately liked us to go into a trance in advance 
of that coming event, which we had to bring to an end sooner, or later [there 
would be a] greater explosion, a greater tragedy, in connection to the 
coming intervention, to which we would become embroiled with the Soviet 
141 Wqdq nie Wejdq, 283. 
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Union .... For a long time, I believed that Later I corrected that idea. I am 
attentive, clearly the Americans realistically, wisely, wanted to [keep this 
from happening], and for Poland, and to save stability in Europe, the 
Americans would recognize that [the imposition of martial law] was a 
lesser eviL 142 
In retrospect it becomes clear that part of Jamzelski's decision-making process prior to 
declaring martial law included an attempt to weigh the American reaction to military 
mle. 143 The Polish government expected the Americans to begmdgingly accept martial 
law and, presumably, maintain longstanding relations. 
This expectation was also reflected in contemporaneous analysis by the MSZ. A 
week after the declaration of martial law and four days after Scanlan had met with 
Spasowski to explain that the U.S. was ending consideration of further aid to Poland, but 
two days before Reagan announced economic sanctions, the MSZ American department 
wrote a memo which asked, "Does the U.S. government have a considered, united policy 
toward Poland?" The general conclusion was that "it is possible to state that so long as 
the Polish crisis does not threaten territorial agreements within Europe and does not shift 
power as a result of a Soviet intervention, the Polish Problem will not occupy a high 
place in the list of the United States' priorities in their anti-Soviet politics." More 
generally the information note recommended continuing to follow the same "peaceful, 
patient line" they had been taking. The memo outlined the steps desired by the Reagan 
administration toward national reconciliation; however, economic sanctions were not 
142 !bid, 283-284. 
143 In Wejdq nie Wcg.dq, the issue ofJaruzelski's expectations following the Madej meeting took center stage. 
for a while, with the general commenting on the Reagan administration's inability to send him even a 
·private letter to diSsuade him from introducing martial law. The clear question that arises from this 
discussion and which Prof. James Hershberg asked at the conference was, would the general not have 
declared martial law if the Americans had clearly signaled that they would take very strong, punitive stance 
on the use of martial law? Unfortunately, Jaruzelski did not respond directly to that questions. This is, 
however, an interesting couri:terfactual that deserves further exploration. For discussion of this issue, see 
Wejdq nie Wejd~ 282-283 and 324-326. 
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even mentioned as a possibility. Rather, the memo substantiated Jaruzelski's view of 
martial law as the lesser of two evils and painted the solution as a middle-ground between 
increased instability and Soviet intervention. MSZ analysts believed that the United 
· States and the West would accept martial law, albeit reluctantly. The working assumption 
was that if Poland continued to control the internal situation, the West would continue to 
offer at least modest economic support. Based on this analysis, the MSZ was even 
hopeful that relations with the West could soon return to a pre-August 1980 state.144 
As soon as the Reagan administration began to make moves in response to the 
declaration of martial law, the PZPR leadership realized that this would not be the case. 
As Foreign Minister Czyrek noted on December 19, "The USA has launched an offensive 
in the name ef the Polish experiment .. The USA is pressuring other governments 
including the USSR They want to sustain [Solidamosc]."145 This break with Polish 
expectations, in turn, led to an emotional response from the Poles. American actions did 
not make sense to the PZPR, and Jaruzelski responded angrily. This anger is constantly 
revisited and evident in subsequent relations between Polish and American officials 
during the 1980s (see chapters 2 and 3 especially). Even sixteen years after the decision 
to impose sanctions, the general was still fuming about what he saw as the hypocrisy of 
the Reagan administration's decision to impose sanctions based on human rights abuses 
.in Poland. Again, at the Jachranka conference, Jaruzelski spoke about how the economic 
sanctions hurt the common Polish people, He openly questioned why the Reagan 
administration had such a friendly relationship with the Romanians who had had de facto 
144 11Notatka Infonnacyjna Obecne Stanowisko USA wobec Polski" [Information Note on the Present 
Position of the USA regarding Poland], dated December 21, 1981, MSZ, 49/84, W-1, Dep Ill (1981), AP 
22-1-81/B. 
145 
"Protocol No. 16 ofPUWP CC Politburo Meeting, Decemb.er 19, 1981," in Documentary History, 482-
495; quoted at 483. 
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martial law for twenty years. He asked the same question about the decision to support 
Augusto Pinochet in Chile. He openly condemned the American position of support to 
regimes in Saudi Arabia, Mobutu Sese Seco's Zaire, Pakistan, Greece, and Turkey, where 
human rights abuses were well documented. 146 It is ahnost as if economic sanctions were 
a personal affront to him. 
In Washington, the decision to introduce martial law also exposed intense 
feelings. As Pipes recalls about the December 21 NSC meeting at which the White House 
began to compose a specific list of economic sanctions against Poland: 
Real rage dominated after the declaration of martial law. Reagan wanted 
to apply extremely sharp means. The president erupted. It was a fantastic 
meeting, because the president delivered a great, emotional speech, the 
temperament of which reminded [Pipes] of the Quarantine Speech by 
Roosevelt in 1937. "This is a turning point. .. " [Reagan contended], "If the 
Allies don't go.with us, we will go it alone, if that becomes necessary." 147 
This rage and emotion grew in part from the fact that the declaration of martial law had 
truly come as a surprise to many people in the Reagan administration. They had been 
caught off guar.d. Moreover, the decision to impose martial law played upon Reagan's 
personal feelings about the evil nature of Communism. The president decided at that 
moment to take a stand, seeing himself like Roosevelt standing up to fascism. This was 
not a logical or rational response; it was driven by Reagan's fury and emotion at the 
moment. 
Of course,' anger is often hard to quantify, and it is certainly hard to recreate how 
this anger directly influenced events on the ground. Here it is useful to turn toward social 
scientists for some help, particularly discussions of trust. According to one definition, "in 
146 Ibid, 314. Jaruzelski had a similarly heated response to my question to him about American sanctions~ 
which I posed to him at a meeting at Warsaw University in winter 2004. 
147 !bid, 223. 
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its more instrumental form, trust is viewed as the expectation that specific others will 
reciprocate trusting behavior. In other words, people think they know what others will do, 
so they can adjust their level of cooperative behavior and precaution taking."148 More 
specific to the case at hand, trust violations are defined as "unmet expectations 
concerning another's behavior, or when that person does not act consistent with one's 
values." 149 Feelings of anger or bitterness as well as feeling "confused" or "stunned" are 
often associated with the initial "hot cognitions" after trust has been broken and distrust 
has been created. 150 
This framework fits well with relations between Washington and Warsaw 
surrounding the declaration of martial law. Both Reagan and Jaruzelski's anger came 
from a perception that the other side had not lived up to their expectations, and broken 
their trust. For Reagan, he expected thatthe PZPR would continue to try to negotiate with 
Solidarnosc, and not take any drastic steps. When the Reagan administration was 
considering sending $740 million in agricultural aid to Poland just before the declaration 
of martial law, this decision was based on the trust that the Reagan White House began to 
have for their counterparts in Warsaw. It was a fragile trust, but it was trust. Similarly, 
after hearing words of sympathy from Vice President Bush, General Jaruzelski expected 
that the United States' reaction to the declaration of martial law would by sympathetic. 
By declaring martial law, General Jaruzelski broke the trust Reagan had placed in him; 
by imposing economic sanctions, Ronald Reagan had broken the trust General Jaruzelski 
had placed in him. 
148 Tom R. Tyler and Roderick M. Kramer, ."Whither Trust," in their edited volume Trust in Organizations 
(Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1996): 1-15, quoted at 12. 
149 RobertJ. Bies and Thomas M. Tripp, "Beyond. Distrust: 'Getting Even' and the Need for Revenge/' in 
Trust in Organizations, 246-260; quoted at 248. 
l50 !bid, 254. 
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In the first thirty days after General Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law, the 
American government reacted emotionally to take the unilateral move to impose 
economic and political sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union. Washington 
also pushed to impose these sanctions in a multilateral forum, with only limited results. 
For Poland and its allies, the main issue in the first month was not sanctions from the 
outside but efforts to control their internal situation. While American economic sanctions 
did have a nearly immediate sting, their effects were also emotionaL In understanding 
Polish-American relations from December 1981 onwards, it is essential to recognize the 
significant emotional break that both sides felt. For Reagan, Poland was not just any old 
issue; it was a personal issue to him and segments of his administration. It was also a 
personal issue for Jaruzelski, who was equally enraged by American actions. These 
expressions of anger and shock indicated of a breakdown in trust between the two 
countries, or more precisely the creation of distrust between the White House and 
Belweder Palace. This distrust, in turn, created an environment ripe for emotional and 
angry reactions. The history of the next five. years in Polish-American governmental 
relations, can in fact, be seen as a series of attempts to both create trust between the two 
sides and alternately to sabotage that trust, time and time again. 
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Chapter 2 
"We are a card in their game": 
American Policy toward Poland Takes Shape 
January to September 1982 
In the initial month after the declaration of martial law, the Reagan administration 
imposed sanctions on Poland and attempted to sell this approach to Western Europe.' 
Economic sanctions, however, were not so much a framework for future policy as a 
punishment. Once sanctions were imposed, the question remained: what next? Beginning 
in 1982 the Reagan administration and the foreign policy community worked toward 
agreement on a long-tenn strategy to achieve America's three goals: end martial law, free 
political internees, and see negotiations restarted between the government, the Church, 
and Solidarnosc. Within the White House, discussions about how to proceed broke down 
into disagreements between hardliners (led by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger 
and centered in the Pentagon) and more moderate voices ( centered in the Department of 
State), who wanted to engage with the Polish government by combining punishments and 
rewards. From January through September 1982, these two opposing camps vied for the 
upper hand, each achieving successes and suffering setbacks. Without clear direction 
from President Reagan, whose outrage had been central in pushing through sanctions, 
policy toward Poland became bogged down in the national security bureaucracy. 
1 This quote in the chapter title is from General Wojciech Jaruzelski from an excerpt from the transcript of 
a May 25, 1982, PZPR Central Committee Meeting,.AAN, KC PZPR, V/174, 507. 
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With more difficult decisions and less centralization in policy making, a numbt;r 
of individual but intertwined policy initiatives took shape. The administration 
experimented with the options of economic incentives paired with sanctions, 
simultaneously arguing whether to base policy toward Eastern Europe on the existing 
framework of differentiation or to move in a new direction. The administration also 
spearheaded a global propaganda campaign against the PZPR and its Soviet comrades. 
Congress increasingly became involved in Polish policy, using budgetary oversight to 
join the conversation on how best to enforce economic sanctions. Outside government, 
humanitarian organizations entered the equation adding a counterweight to sanctions. 
Trade unions and other non-governmental groups also responded to martial law, 
providing substantial Western support to Solidarnosc, which was re grouping as an 
underground organization. General Jaruzelski's government reacted to American policy 
not by giving in, but by pushing back, maintaining a strong hold over the country, and 
strengthening partnershipw with the East. 
In the midst of these new initiatives American policy toward Poland began to 
show real signs of strain by the beginning of the summer of 1982. By then policy debates 
were entwined in confrontation with West European allies over sanctions against the 
Soviet Union, particularly restrictions on financial credits and technology to build a 
natural gas pipeline. Bilateral relations with the PZPR also hit a new low. After a 
personnel change in the executive branch, however, a subtle shift occurred in the balance 
of forces within the administration and US.-Polish relations began to improve. Relations 
with the Allies were patched and bilateral relations with Poland were reformulated to 
accept a more gradual approach to promoting change. 
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Carrots vs. Sticks 
From the beginning of the sanctions debate, diplomats in the Department of State 
voiced misgivings about the efficacy of economic sanctions and pushed for an alternative 
strategy. On December 22, 1981, EUR Acting Director H. Alien Holmes proposed an 
"additional bold move for the NSC": to call for a summit of the big five NATO leaders to 
"focus world attention on the moral and historic significance"-of recent events and to 
announce a "joint Marshall Plan for Poland." Holmes did not go into details, but argued 
that a major incentives plan for Poland would be "premised on a process of reconciliation 
moving forward" and that "it would put the Soviets on the defensive and give a positive 
dimension to our carrots and sticks policy. "2 The summit with European leaders did not 
take place, but Reagan did approve the use of carrots as well as sticks in U.S. policy. In 
his speech on December 23, 1981 (in which he announced economic sanctions against 
Poland), the president referred to the reversibility of sanctions: "If the Polish Government 
will honor the commitments it has made to human rights in documents like the Gdansk 
agreement, we in America will gladly do our share to help the shattered Polish economy, 
just as we helped the countries of Europe after both World Wars. "3 While Reagan did not 
mention a new Marshall Plan explicitly, he implied it and hinted at the possibility of 
rewards as well as punishments for the PZPR. 
Writing on December 26 and 27, Ambassador Meehan sent two analytical cables 
2 Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary, "Poland-Additional Bold Move for NSC," dated 
December 22, 1981, in Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz, and Christian Ostermann, eds., Poland 198(!-
1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions, A Compendium of Declassified Documents and 
Chronology of Events (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1997). 
3 
"Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland, December 23, 1981," Public Papers 
of the President of the United States (1981), available on the Reagan Library's website: 
www.reagan.utexas.edu. 
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expanding on the use of incentives. Interpreting America's main goal in post-December 
l3 Poland to "be, as previously, to maximize Russian disadvantages" and to "widen gaps 
between [Warsaw] and Moscow," Meehan argued that "we should not dismiss the 
possibility yet that [Jaruzelski] can be induced to make good on his commitment to return 
the country to renewal." Meehan saw three general possibilities in Poland's future: l) the 
general makes good on his promise to return to a process of reconciliation and renewal, 
2) he does not keep his promises and imposes increasingly repressive measures, or 3) he 
fails and is replaced by a hard-line Polish Communist or a full scale Soviet intervention 
and occupation. In Meehan's analysis, each scenario would "in varying degrees, severely 
weaken the Russian position," so the United States was in a win-win situation. However, 
when taking into account the "promotion of [the Polish peoples'] rights and liberties," the 
first option was most preferable. Moreover, Meehan had not given up on Jaruzelski: 
[Jaruzelski] is, I am sure, wholly committed to the Russian connection on 
the large strategic-political issues ultimately involving Germany. But he is 
a Pole, and Polish nationalism runs deep. Jaruzelski gave me the 
impression ... of being committed to a process of change in Polish 
political, economic, and social life. I would not entirely dismiss his claim 
that he acted on December 13 to prevent a drift to civil war, and the 
inference that he saw himself acting in Polish national interests, since civil 
war would inevitably mean foreign intervention. 
The question then became bow to move Jaruzelski back toward reconciliation. As 
Meehan explained: 
I ... believe we should hold out some carrot to him if he shows signs of 
relaxing the grip on the country in ways that we consider important. We 
have given him the stick, which he deserves, but if it is oiily the stick, he 
may not have much choice. How much carrot, and how it is dangled, is a 
matter for discussion, but I think we should not dismiss the option, 
however great our sense of outrage. 4 
4 Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, ,"Polish Situation: U.S. Policy," dated December 26, 1981, 
NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 26-29, 1981. 
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On December 27, Meehan wrote a second cable defining the kind of carrot he had 
in mind. His proposed that Reagan send a second presidential letter to Jaruzelski. "The 
operative part ofthe suggested message would be that just as we were responsive to our 
concern over negative actions on the part of the Polish government ... we would be 
responsive to clear evidence of a return to the renewal course." To sweeten this deal, "we 
could also indicate a willingness to restore either fishing or landing rights if Jaruzelski 
takes concrete steps toward reform and renewal." Meehan realized that it would be 
difficult to manage the Polish situation in a carrot-and-stick framework, but he believed 
that the United States held some tasty carrots, particularly the ability to reschedule debt.5 
Meehan's proposal went a step further. Echoing Holmes' earlier memo, he 
advocated a more radical approach: 
There is a much bigger, dramatic framework possible than the one I have 
suggested. It has the feel of classical Post-WW2 U.S. world leadership 
about it-but it would cost money. In other words, not small carrots; great 
big carrots. It would be an offer from the President to Jaruzelski to support 
a broad-based Western economic recovery program for Poland provided 
certain clear political and economic criteria were met. The offer could be 
surrounded by all sorts of other conditionality, notably an eastern 
contribution, but it would be an offer all the same. 
With these suggestions, Meehan was arguing for a more pragmatic approach to Warsaw. 
Meehan's ruminations on carrots also showed up in meetings with MSZ 
representatives. Meeting with J6zef Wiejacz, director of Department Ill, on December 
28, Meehan referenced the reversibility of American steps and emphasized that 
Washington was "impatiently waiting" to see what the PZPR did in the new year, hinting 
5 Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, "Polish Situation: U.S. Policy," dated December 27, 1981, 
NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 26-29, 1981. 
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at the possibility of rewards6 On December 30, Dan Ho ward, the embassy officer in 
charge of scientific, educational, and technical exchanges, took a more straightforward 
approach. He mentioned to an unnamed Polish source that Reagan imposed economic 
sanctions without consulting the embassy and that Meehan was advocating both carrots 
and sticks. Ho ward specifically stated that if the Poles took steps to continue reform and 
restore individual freedoms, Washington could respond with economic help, "on the scale 
of the 'Marshall plan."'7 The State Department codified incentives in January 1982 in 
guidelines for short-term policy that included a call to "be ready swiftly to offer a carrot 
if any genuine step toward reconciliation is taken, but a carrot that is proportional to the 
step, leaving the rest of our sanctions intact "8 
In tenus of an economic package on the scale of a new Marshall plan, Reagan 
never proposed the possibility directly to Jaruzelski. However, the administration did act 
upon the idea. In the first two weeks of January 1982, the president's lead negotiator at 
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty talks in Geneva, Ambassador Paul Nitze, spoke 
with his Soviet counterpart, Yuli K vitsinskii about a large-scale economic recovery 
package for Poland. At the second of two meetings, Nitze read from an official statement: 
I am instructed today to call special attention to the proposal made.by 
President Reagan in his remarks of December 23. "If the Polish 
government will honor the commitments it has made to basic human rights 
in documents like the Gdansk Agreement, we in America will gladly do 
6 
"Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z Ambassadorem USA F. Meehan'em w dn. 28.xii.8 I ( cz~sc og61no-
polityczna)" [Information Note from the Conversation with U.S. Amb. F. Meehan on 28.12.81 (general-
political section)], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep Ill (1982), AP 22-1-82/A. In Wiejacz's analysis, Meehan was 
trying to relativize (zrelatywizowanie} the political impact of economic sanctions. Wiejacz speculated that 
this change in position was caused by Eagleburger's meetings with West European allies. 
7 11Notatka z rozmowy z prz~dstawicielem Ambassady USA w Warszawie p. Howardem w dniu 
30.xii.l98lr" [Note from theConversation with U.S. Embassy Officer in Warsaw Mr. Howard on 
30.12.1981], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep lli (1982), AP22-l-82/A. The origin of this document remains 
unclear. According to a cover note, it w<is created outside of the MSZ and sent to the American department 
on December 31, 198 L 
8 Memorandum, "Poland- The Next Thirty Days," dated January 8, 1982, in Poland 1980-1982. 
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our share to help the shattered Polish economy, just as we helped the 
countries of Europe after both world wars." This proposal is a serious one. 
In the proper setting it could become a large-scale and significant effort 
which could make a constructive contribution to Poland's economic and 
social renewal. But its realization depends upon the establishment of a 
process of national reconciliation in Poland: the lifting of martial law; 
release of detainees, and resumption of the dialogue among all elements of 
Polish society. As President Reagan has ~mphasized, this is the sole path 
to long-term stability in Poland and therefore in Europe as a whole. 
Speaking from notes K vitsinskii rejected the proposal because the decision to introduce 
martial law was an internal Polish decision, saying: "No one was in a position to 
prescribe to the Polish state how to order its affairs." The possibility of a U.S.-Soviet 
agreement on Poland appears to have gone no further. 9 
While the Soviets had not taken the bait, State continued to support the possibility 
of a substantial incentives package for Poland. On March I 0, Holmes prepared an action 
memo for Haig to start an the interagency planning process to craft a public push for a 
large incentives package. Holmes acknowledged that a proposal like this would meet 
resistance in the both the White House and Congress; however, he believed that "we 
would be wrong not to exploit the public relations windfall which would be ours were we 
to come forward now with a major assistance proposal." Deputy Secretary of State 
Waiter Stoessel returned the memo for revision, writing in the margins, "Haig has always 
favored the carrot. The question is, What are its econ[ omic] and pol[itical] components? 
Before any interagency work is started I want a memo for the Secretary that lays out a 
9 Cable from USMission Geneva to Secstate, "(S) U.S. Statement on Poland," dated January 12, 1982, 
NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.1 have not been able to locate any materials in Polish sources to 
show that the Sqviets raised the American demarche.on a joint economic package with the PZPR. Nitze's 
cable mentions that Kvitsinskii spoke from notes at their second meeting; therefore, it is safe to presume 
that Kvistinskii mentioned the first meeting with Nitze to his superiors in Moscow. Given the state of 
dedassification in Moscow, 1 have not attempted to trace any of these conversations in Soviet archives. 
This tangent, like many others in this dissertation, offers ample reason for more follow-up. In addition, this 
overture provides another small example of Reagan Sending quiet signals- to the Soviets to spark 
superpower cooperation. As with his handwritten letters to Soviet leaders, this demarche shows that Reagan 
was not as rabidly anti-Communist as his public pronouncements. 
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detailed proposal on what EUR think the carrot would look like."10 Two weeks later, a 
detailed incentives memo made its way to Haig's desk, laying out a package which would 
include lifting sanctions and approving new credits if Jaruzelski took the three steps 
demanded by the West Haig approved raising incentives at the NSC Polish Interagency 
Group and also approved State to begin work on a speech for the president to announce 
• . 11 
an mcentJve program. 
The possibility of a major incentives program ended at the interageilcy level, 
without any presidential speech. However, the importance of this aborted policy should 
not be overlooked. While Reagan and his neo-conservative allies in the NSC were 
focusing on how to punish Poland and the USSR, the State Department and the embassy 
in Warsaw looked beyond punitive actions to restore some kind of working relationship 
with the Polish government State even engaged directly with the Soviets to foster a 
bref!kthrough. Haig had been in favor of incentives from the beginning, but in the 
president's emotional fever following December 13, members of the NSC who pushed for 
tough measures played into the president's hard-line instincts and won out in the early 
stages of the policy-making process. 
Agreement within State to offer carrots to Warsaw should not be confused with a 
finalized policy. The administration remained conflicted on how to push for change in 
Eastern Europe. On February 2, 1982, the NSC asked the Department of State to review 
' Presidential Directive 21, the standing national security document on policy toward 
Eastern Europe which had been signed by President Carter in September 1977. After 
10 Action Memo from 1-L Alien Hol~es to the Secretary, "POland: Incentives as a Means of Obtaining our 
Objectives," dated March 10, 1982, in Poland 1980-1982. 
11 Action Memorandum from John D. Scanlan to the Secretary, "Poland- An Incentives Package," dated 
March 25, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, March 1982. 
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completing the review, the head of State's European bureau, Lawrence Eagleburger, 
recommended that State lead an interagency group to bring the Reagan administration's 
guidelines "in line with the current situation in Eastern Europe," i.e. changes in Poland. 
The interagency group met occasionally during March and April and focused on 
one central issue: whether to continue the past doctrine of differentiation or to move to a 
policy of non-differentiation. Differentiation had been official policy since the mid-
1960s, when President Lyndon Johnson made "bridge building" a priority.12 As it was 
defined in the spring of 1982, differentiation meant "that the U.S. should ... 
encourage[ e] diversity [between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe] through active 
· political and economic policies tailored to individual countries." In particular 
differentiation was meant to: "encourage liberalizing tendencies in the region," "increase 
economic dependence of Eastern European countries on the West," "expose the region to 
demands for better human rights performance," "increase antagonism between Moscow 
and some of the East European states," and "weaken the Warsaw Pact as a unified 
military institution. "13 The main weapons to achieve these ends were economic: 
agreements for government loans, favorable trade arrangements, special technology 
transfer exceptions, and concessionary sales agreements to provide needed aid. 14 
12 For an overview of American policy toward Eastern Europe during the 1970s see: Raymond Garthoff, 
Detente and Confrontation.' American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to.Reagan rev. ed. (WaShington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1994), esp. 549-555. For information on Johnson's policies see Foreign Relations of 
the United States, I 964-1968, vol. 17 Eastern Europe, particularly document 15; "National Security Action 
Memorandum No. 352/1, Bridge Building," dated July 8, 1966 (accessed via the www.state.gov/www/ 
about_ state/history)-
1311U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe," attached to Memorandum from Hugh Simon to JOhn Davis, "U.s-. 
Policy Toward Eastern Europe: HA Changes," dated April22, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, 
April-June I 982. 
14 Presidential Directive 21 had pursued differentiation, and. President Carter's national security advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, pursued a vigorous differentiation policy toward Poland prior to and during the 
Polish Crisis. See Patrick Vaughn, "Beyond Benign Neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 
1980," Polish Review 44, no. I (1999): 3-28. it should be noted that the Reagan administration's policies 
towards Polarid were largely in line With positions taken by the Carter administration.- Given Brzezinski's 
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Reagan's decision on December 8, 1981--overturned after December 13-to reward 
Jaruzelski for his leniency toward the Solidarnosc trade union by providing $740 million 
in American feed grain reflected his government's application of differentiation. 
As its name implies, non-differentiation advocated the opposite approach to 
Eastern Europe. The purpose of non-differentiation was to "call on the [U.S. government] 
and its allies to minimize political and economic contacts with the region ... [to] weaken 
the USSR." Under non-differentiation the Soviet Union would be weakened by: 
"increasing strains within the [Warsaw] Pact and forcing diversion of resources away 
from military use," "helping to stem the flow of Western technology to the USSR," and 
"weakening the appeal of communism" by causing it to loose its allure in the West by 
forcing a "deterioration in the quality oflife [in Eastern Europe] and harsher police 
regimes." 15 Sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union fit within the non-
differentiation framework. 
The disagreement over differentiation and non-differentiation, and over the proper 
use of carrots in addition to sticks, had a clear lineage with the neo-conservative critique 
of American foreign policy. Officials like NSC staffer Richard Pipes, Defense Secretary 
Weinberger, and U.N. Representative Jeanne Kirkpatrick believed that differentiation-
as practiced by Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Carter-weakened national security. 
Because differentiation advocated continued economic exchanges with the Communist 
world, it allowed the East to rely on the West for support, artificially propping up East 
advocacy of a confrontational line with the Soviet Union and his lead role on Polish policy, as well as 
Carter's increasing mistrust of the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan, it is unlikely that 
America's Poland policy under a (hypothetical) second Carter term would have looked much different from 
Reagan's.policie·s. If anything, Brzezinski might have been more sensitive to iritelligence coming from 
Colonel Kuklinski and the NSC certainly would not have been without a national security advisor in 
December 1981. 
15 
"U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe." 
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European economies and extending the life of communism. By accepting the Soviet bloc 
as partners rather than adversaries, differentiation also gave tacit moral credibility to 
Communism. For nee-conservatives, differentiation was a remnant of detente that needed 
to be discarded. 
The Reagan administration had won the 1980 election, in part, by advocating a 
new relationship with the Communist world based on a stronger America willing and 
able to stand up to Soviet aggression. This meant waging economic war to weaken 
Warsaw Pact capabilities and to undermine Communist regimes throughout the world. 16 
The plans for waging economic warfare were not fully articulated in the first months of 
1982. (NSDD 75, which laid out this invigorated U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, 
was being drafted by Pipes and others, but it would not be signed by the president until 
December 1982.)17 Nonetheless, the debate over economic incentives for Poland and the 
larger debate over differentiation took place while neo-conservatives were working to 
articulate, defend, and implement a new policy to confront Communist power around the 
globe. State's positions were in conflict with hardliners in other parts of the bureaucracy. 
Raymond Garthoffbreaks these two opposing camps into "pragmatists" and '"ideological' 
Cold Warriors." As he explains: "The pragmatists wanted to control trade but also to use 
it by linkage as a carrot to gain Soviet concessions ... [The neo-conservatives 1 wanted to 
16 For the most complete retelling of the work and beliefs. behind the nee-conservatives• efforts to wage 
economic war against the Soviet Union, see Peter Schweizer, Victory (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 
1994). Schweizer had yxcellent access to many members ofRecigan's administration and is clearly 
sympathetic to the nee-conservative voices from that peri.od. This sympathy makes his book an excellent· 
source for understanding what the neo-conservatives (Reagan included) believed and what they thought 
they were accomplishing. His lack of objectivity, however, often leads Schweizer to overstate the effects of 
these p~lic.ies or gloss over details and accounts which provide alternative explanations for the gradmil 
collapse of the Soviet system over the course of the 1980s. 
17 For Pipes' account of the drafting process ofNSDD 75, see Vixi, 188-202. 
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wage economic warfare to strain the Soviet economy and polity. "18 For the diplomats 
advocating incentives for Poland, their ability to implement a dynamic carrots-and-sticks 
approach was hampered by this larger debate between ideological and pragmatic voices 
on how to relate to Eastern Europe in general. 
Debt Repayment 
Concurrent with the differentiation debate, the executive and legislative branches 
of the U.S. government quarreled over how to exploit Poland's debt to Western lenders. 
By December 1981, Poland had accrued roughly $26 billion in debt to the West. Of this, 
$3.15 billion in loans (14 percent) came from the United States of which $1.3 billion was 
in non-guaranteed loans from private banks. The remainder of the American portion 
came from the U.S. government: $1.6 billion in direct credits and guarantees by the 
Credit Commodity Corporation (CCC), $244 million in Export-Import Bank loans, and 
$6 million in AID loans.19 In April 1981, the United States and other Western 
governments, who conducted negotiations through an ad-hoc group of governmental 
lenders known as the Paris Club, agreed to reschedule 90 percent of Poland's debt for 
1981, deferring repayment for four years until 1986. To deal with their debt to private 
Western bankers the PZPR signed an agreement on December4, 1981, to reschedule $2.4 
billion in debt principal. As part ofthis agreement with the London Club, the ad hoc and 
unofficial group that negotiated agreements for private bankers, the Polish government 
agreed to pay $500 million in interest by the end of 1981. 
When martial law was declared neither of these agreements had been paid off in 
18 Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 45. 
19 For this breakdown of Poland's debt, see "Fact Sheet on Poland's Debt" published as part of Senate · 
Appropriations Committee, Polish Debt Crisis. 97th Cong., 2nd Session, 1982, 18-19. 
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full. Polish diplomats concerned about bankers' reactions met with private bank 
representatives on December 14, telling them that Poland was still planning to pay the 
full amount of their back interest payments by December 28.20 Polish Finance Minister 
Marian Krzak also met with government representatives from the Paris Club to clarity 
martial law economic policy: Poland intended to maintain "normal economic relations 
with Western partners" and hoped to get a $350 million bridging loan from Western 
governments to cover a shortfall in export proceeds and the withdrawal of short term 
deposits. They needed this bridging loan to pay the balance due to the London and Paris 
Clubs.21 When Western governments chose not to offer bridging loans and the Soviet 
Union refused to bail Poland out, it was clear that Poland would not be able to make its 
payments. Now American politicians had to decide whether to declare Poland in default. 
The Reagan administration understood that control over debt repayment and 
rescheduling offered the United States its strongest point of leverage against the PZPR. 
According to calculations by the State Department's Economic and Business Affairs 
Bureau and the European and Soviet Affairs Bureau, even with the economy in shambles 
Polish exports could pay for all necessary Westei"? imports. But, in the coming year the 
Warsaw government did not have enough hard currency to cover their payments. To keep 
their economy afloat the Poles needed $5.6 billion in public and private debt rescheduling 
and $3.8 billion in new export and agricultural credits from the West. Thus, Western 
economic leverage after December 13 came from "continuing trade relationships; debt 
20 Information Memorandum from Robert Hormats to the Secretacy, "Actions taken in response to your 
calls from Brussels on Polish Economic Assistance," dated December 14, !981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoihts 
Originals, Box 3. 
21 Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Vienna, "Finance Minister of Debt Service and Emergency 
Measures," dated December 24, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 23-25, 1981. This 
request is further evidence of Poles' expectations of a conciliatory Western policy following the declaration 
of martial law. 
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servicerelief, both public and private; and access to new credits, both public and private." 
This leverage, however, would be weakened if the Poles declared a unilateral moratorium 
on Western debt repayment, by decreasing the need for hard currency. Therefore, 
"Western economic levers [were] most effective if the Poles (attempted] to service their 
external hard currency debt." This· meant that it was in the U .S. government's best 
interests for public and private American bankers not to declare Poland in default22 
Not everyone, however, agreed with this assessment. More ideological members 
of the cabinet, particularly Weinberger and Kirkpatrick, believed that the United States 
should push the Polish economy toward complete collapse, and declare Poland in default. 
If the government declared Poland in default, private bankers could do the same, after 
which the private banks could attempt to seize Polish assets through court action.23 
The initial focus of this debate was whether to recall Poland's debts on 
government loans rescheduled in Aprill981. As part of the rescheduling agreement the 
Western creditors included a so-called "Tank Clause" which allowed them to rescind the 
rescheduling agreement under exceptional circumstances-understood to mean either 
Soviet military intervention or Polish use of force against its own people. If the Tank 
. Clause was exercised, debt servicing became due and payable immediately. Invoking the 
clause would cause private banks to declare Poland in default as well. According to an 
interags;ncy report, the effects of such an action 
would be_ for Poles to stop payments to official or private entities declaring 
default. It the default were widespread, it would precipitate total cessation 
of interest payments to the West. There would be no effect on Poland's 
22 Action Memorandum from Robert Hormats and Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Western 
Economic Leverage on Poland and Secure Phone Call to Regan," dated December 17, 1981, NSA, Soviet 
Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 198L 
23 Dan Morgan and Robert Kaiser, ~'Group of Aides Sought Tougher Stand on Poland," Washington Post 
(Jan.15, 1982): Al. 
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ability to borrow, since it cannot borrow now. Polish trade, however, 
would be hampered in tbe short run. 
The same report concluded that not exercising tbe clause would keep pressure on the 
Soviets and Poles to continue to make some payments, that invoking the clause could 
lead to widespread budget and financial difficulties in Western Europe (particularly the 
solvency of West German lenders), and that refusing to participate in rescheduling 
Poland's debts coming due in 1982 would be a much more effective step to limit Polish 
access to Western credits. The State Department and Haig were particularly concerned 
about tbe negative effects tbat a unilateral American government decision which hurt 
European bankers would have on allied cohesion at a point when relations were already 
strained. Advocates for declaring default (represented by Defense) acquiesced to State's 
arguments in the final report, but inserted language not to invoke the Tank Clause "at tbe 
present time. "24 
On January 31, the conclusions of this debate became public when the Reagan 
administration announced its decision not to declare Poland in default and to pay $71 
million to U.S. banks to cover past due payments on CCC guaranteed loans. In return 
American banks agreed to not call for Poland to repay its loans in full, ending the default 
debate. The White House made clear tbatthis was only a temporary arrangement until 
Warsaw could pay tbeirdebts again. But, as the Washington Post reported tbis initial 
payment led to a much larger commitment: "For fiscal 1982, the total exposure on 
guaranteed loans comes to $308 million, and in the next two fiscal years, the total owed 
24 11Report on the Working Group on the Implications of Invoking ihe Exceptional Circumstances Clause of 
the 1981 Polish Official Debt Rescheduling Agreement," dated January 20, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, 
Box 27, January 1982. 
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to the banks and guaranteed by the CCC comes to $613 million. "25 To cover this 
expenditure, the Wliite House attached a provision to increase the CCC's borrowing 
authority to $5 billion to a spending bill for unemployment benefits, agricultural loans, 
and heating assistance for the poor.26 
In a domestic atmosphere obsessed with deficit spending, this was a difficult 
message to swallow. Soon after the administration's announcement, conservative 
commentators spoke out against the idea. On February 3, the Wall Street Journal editorial 
page condemned ~e decision. The editors argued that Washington was "slipping into 
tacit collaboration with martial law by making it easier for the Soviet bloc to finance 
repression."27 Public nncertainty about the decision increased after it became clear that 
Washington's decision protected West German bankers who had made the most loans to 
Poland, and therefore had the most liability if they were declared in default. The decision 
to bail out Warsaw appeared to contradict the president's earlier commitment to no longer 
conduct business-as-usual. 28 
With high public interest and a clear budgetary stake in the decision, Congress 
stepped into the discussion. Congressional interest in Poland had been high since the 
declaration of martial law: Republican Senators Larry Pressler and Charles Percy from 
the Foreign Relations Committee traveled to Poland on January 15, 1982; a number of 
I 
coilliiiittees held hearings; and Congressional Research Service issued several reports.29 
25 Dan Morgan, "U.S. tells its Banks Some Polish Debt will be Paid," Washington Post (Feb. 2, 1982): A 11. 
26 Margot Homblower, "Congress Approves $7 A· Billion for Aid," Washington Post (Feb. 11, 1982): AI?. 
27 
"Congresses Choice on Poland," Wall Street Journal (Feb. 3, 1982): 24. 
28 Reporting on this topic is too wide to .include all references, but for a representative, if mild, sample see: 
Leslie Gelb, "Reprieve on Polish Debt," New York Tilpes (Feb. 3, 1982): AI, and Paul Lewis, "Role of the 
Western Banks in Poland's Debt Crisis," New York Times (Feb. 3, 1982): AIO. 
29 For the Poles' Version ofPressler and Percy's visit see: MSZ, 30/85, W-1, DIll (1982), 220-1-82. 
Congressional Research Service issued Martial Law in Poland on January 6 and Polish Crisis on January 9, 
both available through Lexis-Nexis Congressional Research Digital Collection. 
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Prior to early February, however, Congress's role was mainly advisory. With an 
appropriations issue on the table, legislators could now have a direct effect. On February 
8, New York Democratic senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduced an amendment to 
the appropriations legislation, requiring the president to report to Congress when CCC 
funds were used to pay for Polish loans. He also convened hearings of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee (together with Republican Senator Robert Kasten of 
Wisconsin) calling Undersecretary for Defense Policy Fred Ikle and Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic and Business Affairs Robert Hormats to Capital HilL Facing tough 
criticism from Moynihan that the "United States and its allies have not found a way to 
apply meaningful pressure on either the military junta in Warsaw or its masters in 
Moscow," the State and Defense representatives put forth a united front despite earlier 
disagreements. Ikle emphasized that the agreement to pay Poland's debt was only 
temporary and could be reversed easily. Because Washington was dealing with "the 
chronic failure of the Communist economic system," Ikle argued that the president could 
take time to pursue a "prudent policy." Hormats noted that the United States had already 
stopped the flow of new credits and delayed consideration of new rescheduling talks. He 
also restated internal arguments "that our officially declaring Poland in default might be 
used by the Polish government as an excuse to relieve itself of its obligations to make 
repayments. In addition, [declaring Poland in default] would be a sanction that would be 
hard to reverse if the Polish situation improved. ,,Jo These arguments did little to calm 
either Moynihan or Kasten. In the wider Senate debate, however, the executive branch's 
arguments prevailed and Moynihan's amendment was defeated. 
Nonetheless, Moynihan continued to use hearings to voice opinions critical of the 
30 Polish Debt Crisis; Moynihan quoted at 50, Ikle at 7, and Hormats at 40. 
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Reagan administration's policy. On March 16, Tom Gleason of the International 
Longshoreman's Association and Tom Kahn, assistant to AFL-CIO president Lane 
Kirk:land, expressed labor's point of view: the AFL-CIO was "disappointed by the mild 
sanctions ... announced against Poland." Lab or was especially critical of the moral 
ambiguity bankers displayed by willingly loaning money to Communist regimes. 31 In 
more detailed comments made outside of Senate hearings, Kirkland elaborated on this 
criticism: 
In effect, President Reagan told the Soviets to disregard his tough talk. He 
announced that the United States would not use the most potent economic 
weapon at our disposal in defense of Solidarity .... The AFL-CIO does 
not believe that American foreign policy should be made by the bankers-
or the giant grain companies. We believe the people ought to have 
something to say about how their government responds to the suppression 
of freedom in Poland.32 
Another voice at the hearings, former ambassador to Poland Richard T. Davies, went as 
far as to say, "The Reagan administration appears to be long on threats and short on the 
kind of actions which are essential ingredients of leadership. "33 The Appropriations 
Committee did not present any voices supporting a softer position; all of the testimony 
argued in favor of declaring Poland in default. 
Congressional interest in Poland's debt crisis .also led to a House of 
Representatives fact-finding mission. From March 4-7, seven congressmen from the 
31 The AFL-CIO was consistently critical of Reagan's policies for being too soft, calling for much stronger 
economic sanctions than those which were imposed. On D.ecember 28, 1981, Tom Kahn called for the U .S. 
government to: call in the balance of Polish debt, refuse to extend further credits to either Poland, the 
Soviet Union, or Eastern Europe; halt all grain shipments to the Soviet Union; suspend export licenses for 
the Siberian pipeline; restrict technology transfers; recall American delegates to the CSCE meetings in 
Madrid and arms talks in Geneva; publish satellite photos of detention camps in·Poland; and beef up 
American radio broadcasts. "Statement by Tom Kahn to the Congressional Committee on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe," dated December 28, 1981, GMMA, Information Department, CIO, AFL-CIO 
· Press Releases, I 937-1995, Box 47, 47/6. · 
32 
"AFL-CIO Press Release, February 4, I 982 [re Kirk land statement on Reagan Administrations policy on 
Polish debt]," date February 4,1982, GMMA, Information Department, CIO, AFL--CIO Press Releases, 
1937'1995, box 48,48/3. 
33 Polish Debt Crisis, 176; Kahn quote is from 163. 
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House Foreign Affairs, Budget, and Appropriations committees, led by Wisconsin 
Democratic representative David Obey, traveled through Poland meeting with embassy, 
govermnent, Solidarnosc, and church officials. For the Polish government this was an 
important trip to show American lawmakers that economic sanctions were making it 
more difficult for Poland to move "beyond the crisis," increasing the likelihood that 
martial law would be prolonged. 34 The trip also allowed PZPR leaders to argue that 
sovereign Polish decisions would not be determined by outside pressure: issues like when 
to end martial law, when to release Solidarnosc internees (particularly Lech Wah;sa), and 
when to resume talks with the Church and society would be determined based on internal 
dynamics and developments. 35 
On the issue of default, the congressmen returned convinced that the president 
made the correct choice. They also came back with a more positive outlook for Poland's 
internal development. All were impressed by how the Polish public was handling the 
hardships of martial law, and all were struck by Poles' optimism. The congressmen also 
became aware of "how difficult it is for an American President or any American· 
administration to really have a direct and significant affect on events over there." More 
broadly, the Congressmen believed that developments were taking on a more 
"evolutionary" progression. Changes and reforms were not going to take place quickly, so 
it was "awfully important for [the U.S. government] to tryto figure out the right mix of 
34 
"Pilna Notatka" [Urgent Note], dated March I, 1982, MSZ, MSZ, 30/85, W-1, Dep Ill (1982), AP 220-2-
82. 
35 For the POlish government's reporting on Obey's trip, s-ee "Notatka Infonnacyjna o Wizycia grupy 
czlonk6w Izby Reprezentent6w Kongresu Stan6w Zjednoczonych Ameryki" [Information Note about a 
· Visit by a Group from the United States House of Representatives], dated March I!, 1982, MSZ, 30/85, W-
1, Dep Ill (1982), AP 220-2-82. 
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both carrot and stick in order to affect events as best we can. "36 
In the first three months of 1982, the White House agreed on a policy to leverage 
Poland's $26 billion international debt: for the mean time, they decided to pay the balance 
on Polish loans to keep Poland from being declared in default The State Department won 
this debate; however, this was considered a temporary policy that could be revoked at any 
point More generally, by broadening discussions from 1600 Pennsylvania A venue to 
include voices from the legislative branch, the dynamics of decision making began to 
change. More people and more voices were forcing themselves into the discussion on 
America's Poland policy. 
Propaganda Wars 
With an eye toward the global Cold War, Washington began looking at ways 
beyond sanctions to punish the Poles and particularly the Soviets. On December 19, Haig 
approved some geopolitical options to pursue, including: "working with CIA and DOD to 
develop a program of direct US. arms aid to Afghan rebel forces"; discussing "with CIA 
other covert action opportunities in Central America, Ethiopia, and elsewhere"; working 
"with ICA [the International Co!lllilunications Agency] and BIB [Bureau for International 
Broadcasting] to increase our broadcast efforts targeted against the USSR ... "; and 
36 Quotes taken from Obey's comments on the McNeil/Lehrer Report, "Congressmen Laud Spirit of the 
Polish People," dated Wednesday, March 10, 1982, retrieved from AFL-CIO, International Affairs 
Department Files, Inactive Records, "Solidarnosc 1982 #2 File." For the report given directly to Reagan, 
see, Action Memorandum from Richard Pipes to William Clark, "Congressional Deleg~:tion's Report on 
Trip to Poland," dated March 17, 1982, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter refemid to as 
RRPL), Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda I 981-1983 [February-April 1982]. See 
also: House Committee on the Budget, The United States afzd Poland, 97th cong., 2nd session, April 1982; 
and Memorandum from John Davis to Alien Holmes, "Poland After Five Years," dated March 16, 1982, 
NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, March 1982. 
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developing "a plan for strategic consultation with [China]."37 While these strategic efforts 
reflected the Reagan administration's penchant for attacking Soviet interests worldwide, 
only Haig's approval of further action on international broadcasting directly affected 
events within Poland. It also signaled an upturn in the propaganda war between the 
United States and Poland. 
The United States was handed its first victory in the post-December !3 
propaganda war against the PZPR when Polish Ambassador to the United States 
Romuald Spasowski called Deputy Assistant Secretary Jack Scanlan to ask for political 
asylum. Scanlan honored the request, and by the evening of December 20, Spasowski 
was in front of news cameras. In his speech Spasowski condemned the Jaruzelski 
government for declaring martial law and for placing so many professors and workers 
into prisons. Referring to the PZPR's "brutality and inhumanity," the ambassador 
explained that he had defected in solidarity with Wal«sa. Shadowing Reagan's moralistic 
rhetoric, Spasowski concluded, "There is only one morality in the human family, the 
morality of people who live according to the principles of truth and justice .... It is this 
morality which shall prevail. "38 Two days later, Reagan met with Spasowski and his wife, 
expressing his gratitude and providing a tear-filled photo opportunity for the press 
corps.39 As Reagan later recalled, "It was an emotional meeting for all of us and left me 
with more disgust than ever for the evil men in the Kremlin who believed they had the 
37 Action Memorandum from Richard Burt to the Secretary, "Poland: Current U .S. Geopolitical Options," 
dated December 19, 1981, in Poland 1980-1982. 
38 For Spasowski's comments see, "Transcripts of the Statement made by the Polish Envoy on -his 
Resignation," New York Times (Dec. 21, 1981): AI?. A few days after Spasowski's speech, Polish 
ambassador tn Japan, J6zefRurarz and his wife defected as well. For a general account of Spasowski's 
experience see his autobiography, A Liberation of One (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986). 
39 Memorandum for Mr. James W. Nance, "President Reagan's Meet-ing with Ambassador Spasowski," 
dated December 21, 1981, in Poland 1980-1982. 
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right to hold an entire nation in captivity."40 In Spasowski the White House found a 
distinguished Polish spokesman to sound the anti-Communist trumpet 
On the same day Reagan met with Spasowski, ICA Advisory Board members 
discussed further means for America to condemn events in Poland. One member, Alien 
Weinstein, executive director of The Washington Quarterly, went so far as to say, "the 
U.S. needs to undertake 'ruthless politics of symbolism and moral gestures.'" Overall the 
group----including ICA director Charles Wick, career Foreign Service officer Len 
Baldyga, Assistant to the President David Gergen, and Commentary Editor Norman 
Podhoretz-proposed thirty-three options to pursue. Among them, a single theme 
emerged: "to keep the media pot boiling" and to "create a great moral wave" against the 
abuses in Poland.41 
Ultimately, this media blitz took the form of a day to "Let Poland be Poland." 
Reagan first referenced this initiative on January 5, and by January 8, American 
diplomats began to pressure their European, Japanese, and Austrl!lian allies to take part in 
what was then called, "Light a Candle for the People of Poland" (reflecting language 
from the president's Christmas speech). Embassy staff were requested to urge foreign 
leaders to videotape statements "in support of the Polish.people," to be collected and 
\ 
combined with footage of events in Poland and images of international protests against 
the declaration of martial law. 42 
In the end, ICA Director Charles Wick spent between $350,000 and $450,000 of 
privately donated money to produce a ninety-minute program which included statements, 
40 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Pocket Books, 1990), 303. . 
41 Memorandum of meeting, "U.S. Response to Polish Crisis," dated December 22, 1981, NSA, Soviet 
Frashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981. 
42 Cable from BecState to All NATO Capitals, "Poland," dated January 8, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints 
Originals, Box 3. 
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from Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Orson Welles, and Frank Sinatra, among others. 
According to State's analysis, "with reruns and new runs we anticipate that 50 countries 
and 300 million people will have seen 30 minutes or more. This is an historic high for 
any [U.S. government] information effort. "43 Analysis from outside the government, 
however, was not so rosy. A number of PBS stations declined to air the speciaL In 
Western Europe, most stations aired only thirty minutes of the program or simply showed 
highlights on the nightly news. The press also chided Washington for exploiting Polish 
suffering for obvious propaganda: Time magazine called the international response to the 
program "mixed" and suggested that a star-studded television spectacular might be an 
"inappropriate response to military repression;" the New York Times ran an article 
focusing on the international criticism that the program sparked; and the BBC declared 
the program a "complete failure. "44 
These two smaller projects were not the most important propaganda consequence 
of the declaration of martial law; rather, December 13 served as a catalyst for long-term 
changes in America's public diplomacy infrastructure. As a former broadcaster, Reagan 
believed in the power of radio and spoke about America's "neglected ability of 
communications" in the 1980 campaign.45 Events in Poland galvanized bureaucratic 
support forinternational broadcasting efforts. Writing to Haig on December 30; 1981, 
Eagleburger pushed for action "to step up our radio broadcasting to Poland, the rest of 
43 Information Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Poland Solidarity Day-Net 
Assessment," dated February 3, 1982, in Poland 1980-1982. 
44 
"Better to let Poland Be?," Time Magazine (Feb. 8, 1982); Reuters, ''TV Program on Poland is Criticized 
by Many," New York Times (Feb. 2, 1982): AS; and "'Let Poland be Poland': 'Complete Failure' of US TV 
Programme," Summary of BBC World Broadcasts (Feb. 2, 1982). 
45 For quote from Reagants 1979 speech,_ see KirOn Skinner, Annelise Anderson;. and Martin Anderson, ed., 
Reagan in his Own Hand (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 128. For a broader discussionofReagan's 
views on the role of international broadcasting see Schweizer, Reagan's War, 191-199~ 
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East Europe, and the USSR. "46 Haig agreed and eo-signed a memo to Reagan with Wick 
and Frank Shakespeare, BIB chairman, arguing that the Polish crisis underlined the 
importance of radio broadcasting which had been neglected during the era of detente.47 
This initiative reached full consensus on June 7, when Haig sent a draft NSDD on 
international broadcasting to the Oval Office under the title, "Response to Martial Law: 
Modernization of our International Radios." Reagan approved the draft on July 15 as 
NSDD 45. The decision directive prioritized improvement in programming and technical 
abilities in international broadcasting with the same budgetary and resource allocations 
"as in the case of other programs deemed vital to the national security." The NSDD called 
for the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFEIRL) to 
"undertake _a major, long-term program o( modernization and expansion." Particular 
emphasis was placed on overcoming Soviet jamming, which had increased after 
December 13.48 
On June 19, Reagan went public with this reinvigorated policy on international 
broadcasting in a speech at a signing ceremony for Captive Nations Week. The president 
focused on Poland as the impetus for his plan by mentioning a letter Solidamosc leaders 
had sent about the "power of ideas and the effectiveness of broadcasting as their carrier." 
Reagan then called for "a relatively modest expenditure" to rebuild and modernize 
46 Action Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburgerto the Secretary, "Response to the Polish Crisis: Radio 
Broadcasting," dated December 30, I 98 I, NSA, Soviet Flash points, Box 26, December 30-3 I, I 982. 
47 Memorandum for the President from Alexander-Haig, Frank Shakespeare, and Charles Wick, "Response 
to the Polish Crisis: Radio Broadcasting," dated January 5, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 
1982. 
48
-Action memorandum from Richard Burt-and MarkPalmer to Secretary Haig, "Response to Polish 
Martial Law: Modernization of our International Radios," with attachments, dated June 7, 1982, NSA, 
Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982. For the final version ofNSDD 45, "United States 
International Broadcasting," dated July 15, I 982 see the Natianal Archives and Wecords Administration's 
Archival Records Collection (ARC) on-line at: www.archives.gov/research/arc/.lnterestingly, a paragraph 
on the uses of Ann-ed Forces Radio and Television Service is excised from the declassified NSDD, _but is 
included in the draft version. 
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RFEIRL and VOA He concluded the speech with trademark rhetorical flare: "The love 
ofliberty, the fire of freedom burns on in Poland just as it burns on among all the peoples 
of the captive nations. To the leaders of Solidarity, to the people of Poland, to all those 
who are denied freedom, we send a message today: Your cause is not lost "49 
Events in Poland provided a similar impetus for Congress to pass an official 
budgetary request for increased funds for the BIB (which controlled the RFE/RL budget). 
For fiscal year .!983 the administration asked for an increase of$13.2 million, an increase . 
of almost 15 percent. Wick and his deputies in RFE/RL, Jim Buckley and Ben 
Wattenberg, testified to Congress that Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan were the 
main reasons for the needed modernization. Supplementary materials in the 
Congressional record also argued that RFE/RL needed immediate funds because Soviet 
jamming efforts had increased "measurably in recent years in the wake of turmoil in 
Poland."50 The administration's push worked. In addition to the FY 1983 supplement, 
RFE/RL received $21.3 million specifically for facility modernization and enhanced 
programming in 1983, as well as another increase in the annual appropriation51 
The Reagan administration came into office with a desire to intensify propaganda 
against the Communists bloc. This was an uncontroversial viewpoint, shared by 
ideological Cold Warriors and pragmatists. Events in Poland and the declaration of 
martial law, however, invigorated the White House's predisposition. Martial law was the 
catalyst behind NSDD 45 and allowed Reagan to move beyond ideas to concretely 
increase funding for RFE/RL. Without martial law, the executive branch may well have 
49 
"Remarks on Signing the Captive Nations Proclamation, July 19, 1982," Public Papers (1982), available 
via the Reagan Library website (www.reagan.utexas.edu). 
50 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, BIB Supplemental Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1983, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1982. 
51 Michael Nelson, War of tHe Black Heavens (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 173. 
110 
pursued these policies, but the president's urgency and public arguments would have 
taken a very different form. More centrally, in the months following December 1981, 
Poland's shadow began to stretch further and fi.1rther throughout Washington, affecting 
how, when, and why policies were chosen and acted upon. 52 
Humanitarian Aid 
Martial law also pushed Reagan to engage with non-governmental organizations, 
looking for outside partners to help solve central problems in Poland policy. One such 
problem was making sure that sanctions did not provoke a humanitarian crisis in Poland. 
Reagan wanted to insure that sanctions penalized the regime, not common people. 
Humanitarian and charitable groups in coordination with the U.S. government had, in 
fact, spearheaded a food program for Poland since 1981. In March 1981, Pope John Paul 
II called on Catholics to send food to Poland, where shortages and rationing were 
becoming facts of everyday life. Cardinal John Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia, met 
with Spasowski on March 24 to discuss American aid. CARE, Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS), and Project HOPE (a group specializing in medical aid and equipment) also 
' heeded the Pope's request. The PZPR responded by signing Politburo decision 26/81 
which opened the way for Western charitable groups by promising "to deliver such gifts 
from overseas benefactor intended for the specific agencies." The Polish American 
Congress (PAC), the national organizational and lobbying group for Polish-American 
52 For a further example of Poland effecting a Reagap. administration policy~ see the discussion ofReagan's 
- speech to the British Parliament in June I-982 and the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy 
in chapter 3. 
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fraternal organizations and charities, also began a drive called a "Tribute to Poland."53 By 
the end ofJuly, PAC had raised a total of$576,188.42, out of which they disbursed: 
$37,740.00 for 3,000 food packages; $15,000 for 35,708lbs of food (infant milk foods, 
vegetable oil, rice, and semolina); $70,000 to Project Hope (! 0,000 units of insulin, 41 
cases ofSporidicin, 129,000 soap bars, and 720 medical books); and $100,000 for CARE 
food packages (rice, flour, non-fat dry milk, oil, tinned beef, sugar, brown lentils, and 
split peas).54 
CRS also moved to send aid. In May Reverend Terrance J. Mulkerin, CRS's 
coordinator for disaster and relief services, traveled to Poland to make contacts. By the 
end of August, CRS was "finalizing an agreement with the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture to purchase at favorable prices dairy products-milk, cheese, butter-for 
shipment to Poland. "55 Following Father Mulkerin's second trip t~ Poland with CRS 
member Robert Quinlan in September to meet with Cardinal Glemp, American embassy 
officials, and Polish officials from the Ministry of Health, CRS finalized the outline for a 
"Family Feeding Program" to distribute just under $15 million in AID wheat flour, rice, 
and vegetable oiL The aid sailed to Gdansk on vessels paid for by the Catholic Church 
and the Polish government. From there it was handed over to the Charitable Commission 
of the Polish Episcopate (Komisja Charytatywna Episkopatu Polski or KCEP) who 
53 Thi .. early information on food efforts to Poland is compiled from-sources-in the CRS A~chives, Catholic 
Relief Services Archive (hereafter referred to as CRS), EURMENA XVII-C, Box 4, Poland 
Correspondence 1970-1986, 1981 Poland Food Aid. 
54 Letter from PAC President Aloysius Mazewski to Members of the Board, dated July 31, 1981, CRS, 
EURMENA XVll-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, 1981 Poland Food Aid. 
55 Letter from Edwin Broderick to Most Reverend Albert Abramowicz, dated August 21, 1981, CRS, 
EURMENA XVll-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, "1981 Poland Food Aid." Food aid from 
AID generally came from resources provided as part of the Food for Peace program. Food for Peace, or 
Title !I ofPul?lic Law 480 allowed the U.S. government to provide food aid to be distributed by private 
voluntary organizations (PVOs) when humanitarian need existed. P .L. 480 was signed by President Dwight 
Eisenhower in 1954 and was dubbed "Food for Peace" by President John F. Kennedy. The U.S. government 
also supported foo,d aid in l:mmanitarian cases by allowing PVOs to purchase food at concessionary prices 
through the CCC. 
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distributed the food to each of Poland's twenty-seven Catholic diocese. Aid was 
distributed at the parish level by local priests to the elderly and "families with young 
children who would find it physically difficult to wait on lines or economically difficult 
to purchase food." 56 In an almost completely homogenous Catholic society where parish 
priests either saw everyone in church or at least knew everyone, this dispersal program 
provided complete coverage. By December 10, 1981, CRS had "responded to urgent 
requests initiated by the Polish-American community and the Church in Poland by 
shipping 16,921,128lbs. of food valued at a total of$10,181,512.89."57 
In the wake of martial law, organizations like CRS were unsure of how their 
humanitarian efforts would be affected. To make matters worse, the winter of 1981-1982 
was turning harsh, particularly in the Plock area about seventy-five miles northwest of 
Warsaw which experienced devastating floods after ice darns formed on the Wisla 
(Vistula) River. Voluntary organizations, however, responded decisively to the public 
outcry and Poland's humanitarian needs. By mid-January 1982, CRS and CARE had 
raised $3.7 million in cash and $1.5 million in private donations. CARE planned to send 
about 28,000 tons of dairy products valued at $29 million in 1982, in addition to about 
20,000 food packages (22.2 lbs. each) to individuals in February 1.982 alone. In January 
J 982, CRS shipped about one million pounds of food and clothing to Poland every two 
weeks. CRS also purchased truck tires, truck batteries, and spare parts to service the 
government-own~d trucks which delivered materials around the country.58 Smaller 
. 
56 Memorandum, "Poland Operational Plan Coverage Outline," dated October 16, 1981, CRS, EURMENA, 
XVII-C, Box4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, "1981 Poland Gen." 
57 Letter from CRS Director of Operations Jean J. Chenard to Russel Stover Candy Company, dated 
December 10, 1981, CRS, EURMENA, XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, "1981 Poland 
Gen." 
58 Letter from Robert Charlebois to Janet Turner, dated January 5, 1982, CRS, EURMENA Program 
Correspondence Box 11, 1982 Poland: PL-IE-002 Spare parts for Trucks: Tires and Accumulators. 
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organizations like the protestant Church World Services and Lutheran World Relief, 
shipped blankets, quilts, clothing, and hygienic items like water purification tablets and 
soap 5 9 As the Christian Science Monitor reported just before New Year's Day, 1982: 
"[Humanitarian aid officials J agree that as Poland's difficulties have increased, so has the 
generosity of contributors. Since the crackdown, says an official of the Boston bank 
which handles contributions to the Polish Relief Fund, 'the response has just been 
outstanding. "'60 
The U.S. government's humanitarian response to martial law, however, was not as 
clear cut. From the beginning Reagan had been adamant that the U.S. government needed 
to continue humanitarian aid shipments,61 but it was unclear of how this would be 
balanced against sanctions. In a first move, the Americans announced on December 14 
that consideration of$740 million in long-term agricultural aid through direct U.S. 
government subsidies from the CCC to the Polish government would be suspended, 
including $100 million in grain sales aimed at saving Poland's struggling poultry industry 
which had already been approved.62 However, $30 million of indirect Food for Peace aid 
already promised to CRS and CARE continued to flow. 
Immediately after this announcement, Washington searched for a way to walk the 
line between punishing Poland's government and supporting its people. On December 15, 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers contacted Father Mulkerin to talk about 
reprogramming the $100 million in suspended direct CCC aid into Title II aid that could 
59 For a laundry list of assiStance sent to Poland in January 1982, see "Emergency in Poland Operations 
Report #2, January 14, 1982," CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence Box!!, 1982 Poland: 
Agreement/Operational Plan & Relate (Bi-Lingual). 
60 Rushworth Kidder, "US helping hand extends to Poles," Christian Science Monitor (Dec. 31, 1981): 14. 
61 Alexander Haig, Caveat (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984), 250. 
62 For a further discussion of this move as it relates to eGonomic sanctions, see chapter 1. 
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be distributed privately.63 Members of the European and Economic Bureaus of State also 
contemplated replacing the suspended poultry feed with $1 00 million in indirect 
humanitarian aid. A December 31, 1981, draft memorandum took a cynical line and 
argued for the politicalrather than humanitarian improvements this gesture could make: 
"This would demonstrate both domestically and internationally that our brief is not 
against the Polish people, but instead against the present repressive measures of the 
Polish regime, and against those who support and contribute to such measures. "64 The 
final memorandum to the president proposing increased aid, however, made clear that 
legally the U.S. government could not simply replace the $100 million in suspended CCC 
credits with an equivalent amount in Title ll funds: any increase in humanitarian aid 
required a supplemental appropriation, not just a reprogramming for pre-approved funds. 
New funds could not be appropriated until Congress reconvened on January 25.65 
As the discussion moved to the White House, a final decision became embroiled 
in concerns about extracting political concessions from the PZPR. On January 14, Philip 
Johnston, executive director of CARE, briefed State department officials on his recent 
trip to Poland and presented a letter from Jaruzelski requesting $1 00 million worth of 
feed grain to be overseen and monitored by CARE. To receive this large of an assistance 
package, Johnston was told that the PZPR would have to agree to two conditions: lifting 
martial law and releasing political prisoners.66 When Johnston met with Waiter Stoessel 
63 Memo from Father Mulkerin to File, dated December 15, 1981, EURMENA XVII-C, Box 4, Poland 
Correspondence I 970- I 986, I 98 I Poland Gen. 
64 Memo from Ernest Johnston and Lawrence Eagleberger to the Secretary, "Memo to the President 
Requesting Increased Humanitarian Assistance to the Polish People," dated December 3 I, 1981, NSA, 
Soviet Flashpolnts Originals, Box I. 
65 Memorandum from Alexander Haig to the President, "Humanitarian Aid for Poland and the Kirkland 
Proposal," dated January 7, 1982, with attachment, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January I 982. 
66 Memorandum for William Clark, "General Jaruzelski 1s Request for Humanitarian Assistance (Feed Grain 
for Poultry),'' dated January 16, I 982; NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982~ 
115 
on February 26, CARE's executive director learned that the proposal for feed grain had 
been rejected. A secondary request for $60 million to help support small private farmers 
in Poland was also rejected67 Ambassador Meehan spoke with officials in Warsaw about 
Johnston's proposals, but the Poles were not willingil,o lift martial law or release 
detainees to gain access to feed grain. As Holmes summarized, "we remain at square 
one.u68 
Catholic Relief Services simultaneously worked to increase its government-
sponsored programs, with little progress. On January 8, CRS sent a "Generic Grant 
Proposal" to Department of State with requests for $3.5 million in the form of food, 
diapers and formula for children, and spare parts and fertilizer for farmers. 69 When Father 
Mulkerin returned from another trip to Poland to attended a meeting of the Task Force on 
Poland in Washington, D.C., on March 9, he inquired about requests for increased Food 
for Peace aid and CCC help; he left the meeting with "very negative vibes ... It [seemed] 
obvious to us that there [was] no urgent desire to approve either of the two programs ... : 
in fact, a number of exquisitely bureaucratic reasons why the two programs should not be 
approved were presented .... Unless high level intervention is forthcoming the final 
67 Philip Johnston made a second trip to Poland from February 15-23 to meet with Polish government 
officials about the possibility of starting a program for individual, private Polish fanners. For Polish records 
related to this trip, see: Notatka [Note re Meetings with Care officials], dated February 17, 1982, and 
NOtatka o wyniku rozm6w przedstawicieli organizacji CARE oraz Mii1isterstwa Rolnictwa i Gospodarki 
Zywnosciowej [Note about results of a conversation with officers from CARE and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Economics], dated March 4, 1982, both in MSZ, 30/85, W-3, Dep Ill (1982), AP 39-
4-82. 
68 Briefing Memorandum from H. Alien Holmes to the Deputy Secretary, "Your Meeting with Mr. Philip 
Johnston, Executive Director of Care, February 26, 10:00 a.m.," dated February 26, 1982, NSA, Soviet 
Flashpoints, Box 27, February 13-29. For the Polish version ofMeehan's meeting with Vice Premier 
Ozdowski and Jan Kinast on January 19, when Ambassador Meehan placed political conditions on· the 
extension ofCCC credits, see Notatka [Notdrom January 19 of Vice Premier Ozdowski request ofU.S. 
Ambassador to Poland Francis Meehan], dated Januaty 20, 1982, MSZ, 30/85, W-3, Dep lll (1982), AP 39-
4-82. 
69 See proposal in CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence Box 11, Poland 1981-1983. 
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answer will be negative. "70 
While the White House dragged its feet on humanitarian aid to Poland, CRS 
struggled forward. Father Mulkerin visited Poland again from April 22 to May 24 to meet 
with KCEP colleagues, other Western aid organizations, Polish government officials, and 
American embassy staff. Mulkerin reported back that in the first quarter of 1982 KCEP 
had successfully handed out huge amounts of CRS aid: 4,277,000 packages of butter, 
1,134,000 packages of cheese, 1,383,750 packages of dried milk, 754,000 rations of 
wheat flour, 1,152,300 rations of rice, and 1,648,500 rations of vegetable oiL However, 
this was still not enough: KCEP asked that CRS increase programs for infants, providing 
hard-to-find items like diapers, cotton shirts, rubber pants, layettes, bottles, and nipples. 
Father Robert L. Charlebois, another CRS executive, traveled to Warsaw to work with 
Mulkerin, and together they wrote another grant proposal to the U.S. government to 
provide materials for children and infants, as well as a "Emergency Program to the Plock 
region" for families and farmers who had been hit by the January flood. 71 
When Father Mulkerin returned to CRS headquarters in New York at the end of 
May, the bureaucratic process in Washington had finally reached a conclusion. 
According to a draft written by an interagency group studying humanitarian aid, the 
70 Memo from Bishop Broderick to Anthony Foddai, "Poland," dated March 24, 1982; CRS, EURMENA, 
XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, 1981 Poland Gen. An interagency group on Poland 
met to discuss humanitarian aid to ·Poland and other issues on March 25, 1982. For a snapshot ofhow the 
bureaucracy ~as moving on humanitarian aid, see: Information Memorandum from All en Holmes to 
Lawrence Eagleberger, "March 231nteragency Group Meeting on Poland," dated March 26, 1982, NSA, 
Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, March 1982. From January 7 to February 24, Father Mulkerin traveled to 
Poland to survey the situation and determine Poland's post-December 13 needs. For his report, see: Report, 
"Overview of CRS Program in Poland," dated March 4, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence 
·,Box 11, Poland 1981-1983: 
71 For an account of Mulkerin's April to May trip, See "Overview of the CRS Program in Poland," undated; 
CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence, Box 11, Poland 1981-1983. For specifics on the emergency 
program for Plock, see Interoffice Memorandum from Father Mu1kerin to Oscar, undated, CRS, 
EURMENA, Program Correspondence, Box 11, Poland 1981-1983. Both are attached to an Interoffice 
Memorandum, "6/10/82 Meeting on Poland," dated June 10, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, Program 
Correspondence, Box 11; Poland 1981-1983. 
117 
decision to provide increased aid was political, not humanitarian. People were not 
starving, nor were they on the brink of starvation: "Despite the gloomy economic 
situation and outlook ... Poland's situation is not so poor that it would meet the normal 
criteria for granting of [Title II food] aid." But, as the report argued, humanitarian aid 
offered certain political advantages: 
Our assistance is widely visible in Poland, undermining regime 
propaganda and providing material· evidence of Western support for 
Solidarity and the Church. Our continued assistance would help refute 
European criticism of sanctions and the view that Poland is a screen for a 
U.S. policy of confrontation with the Soviets. Our assistance also 
undermines Soviet propaganda portraying themselves as the only true 
friends of Polish workers. 72 
These political arguments found support within the White House. On May 28, the 
Wall Street Journal reported that the president had authorized $60 million in aid, targeted 
toward needy children, the elderly, and handicapped people. Of this, $23.7 million was 
marked to be spent for the rest of FY 1982 and $37.5 million in the first quarter ofFY 
1983.73 According to AID, CRS and CARE would receive enough Title II assistance for 
Poland to maintain the programs' current levels through the end of December 1982 "with 
the understanding that the program[ s] ... would be continued through the balance of FY 
1983 at a total not to exceed $40.0 million." The president also approved $5 million for 
72 See Confidential Memorandum, ,Draft Decision Memo on Options for Humanitarian Assistance to 
Poland," dated May 12, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982. Following the workers 
uprising in East Germany in 1953 the U .S. government implemented a humanitarian aid program with 
similar political goals, providing individual aid packages to EastOermans able to travel to distribution 
' points in West Berlin. For further information on this program see Christian Ostermann, Uprising in East 
Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the iron 
Curtain (Budapest: Central European University Press, 200 I). 
73 Wall Street Journal (May 28, 1982). For CRS's view, see Memorandum from Oscar Ratti to Father 
Charlebois, "CRS Program in Poland," dated May 28, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence, 
Box !I, Poland 1981-1983. 
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Project HOPE.74 CRS's proposals for an emergency program for Plock and increased 
medical aid to children had not been accepted (Project HOPE, presumably would include 
programs for children, however). CARE's proposal to provide aid to private fanners had 
also been rejected. 
Six months after the declaration of martial law, private humanitarian 
organizations were utilizing U.S. government funds to alleviate humanitarian needs in 
Poland. The final program was not as large as the $100 million agricultural aid package 
that had been agreed to before martial law, but neither had Poland been completely cut 
out. Meat, protein, and luxury goods remained scarce, but the country had enough 
vegetables and grain to feed its population. American governmental aid combined with 
private donations and other Western European aid helped ease hardship in Poland, but the 
picture remained bleak .. As Mulkerin reported following a third trip to Poland from July 
21 to August 22: 
The harvest was not so good in 1982 as it was in 1981. The grain harvest 
was a little better but still represented a shortfall of more than one million 
tons based 09 normal production figures. The sugar beet crop, which is a 
cash crop, and the potato crop, which provides a staple food, were not so 
good this year as they were last year. There is some distress slaughtering 
of animals taking place because of the lack of feed grains. The broiler 
[chicken] industry, with its 200,000 tons of chicken, no longer exists. 
Food prices have doubled and, in some instances, tripled since February. 
The target groups we serve continued to be in need. The food supply 
situation has deteriorated ... 75 
CRS representatives were disappointed at the level of US. government support. 
They saw a larger need than they were able to serve. However, the White House was 
successfully walking the tightrope, balancing punishing the Polish government against 
74 Letter from W. Antoinette Ford to Bishop John Broderick, dated June 28, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, 
Program Correspondence, Box 11, 1982 Poland: Agreement/Operational Plan & Relate (Bi-Lingual). 
75 Report to File, "Overview of the CRS Program in Poland," undated, CRS, EURMENA, Program 
Correspondence, Box 11, Poland 1981-1983. 
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supporting its people. Washington ensured that the public was not in danger of starving, 
but no attempt was made to flood the country with new aid to fulfill all needs. Funding 
was appropriated for humanitarian purposes because both the public and the 
administration felt strongly that the Polish people should not be abandoned. The United 
States rewarded Poland for her steps toward greater pluralism before the introduction of 
martial law; now was no time to revoke that commitment to the Polish people. However, 
as is clear from declassified documents, humanitarian aid to Poland was primarily 
political. Officials supported continued funding to CARE, CRS, and Project HOPE 
because it played wdl in the Western press, counteracted Polish propaganda, and showed 
that economic sanctions were not meant to punish the Polish people but were a aimed at 
the Polish government and their supporters in Moscow. 
The Growth ofConspiracy 
As humanitarian organizations were reporting, life under martial law was difficult 
for the Polish public. Price increases were quickly approved following the introduction of 
martial law, causing food prices to rise an average of241 percent, and fuel and energy 
costs to rise by 171 percent. All of this lowered Poles' real incomes by 32 percent in 
1982.76 Rationing, empty shelves, and long lines became a fact of Polish life until well 
~fter martial law was lifted. 77 
As average Poles began to acclimatize to their new reality, Solidarnos6 began to 
76 Andrzej Paczkowski, The Spring Will be Ours (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2003), 476. 
77 For a full accounting of the PZPR's predictions for food production in 1982, see: Wnioski z aktualnej 
sytuacji w skupie product6w rolnych i prognoza do staw iywca; zboia i mleka [Findings on the Current 
Situation in Purchase of Agricultural Products and the Prognosis for Livestock, Grain, and Milk], dated 
March 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/173, 214-225. 
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rebuild. Strikes started immediately after the declaration of martial law were crushed by 
the security services, Milicja, and ZOMO. Operations to capture Solidamosc leaders and 
clashes between strikers and the authorities had been violent and often brutal, but they 
had not broken the back of either Solidamosc or the larger opposition movement. One of 
the most widespread signs of resistance was the explosion of anti-government graffiti 
after December 13 with slogans like, "The winter is yonrs but the spring will be ours," 
and "CDN" (the Polish acronym for "to be continued"). Large numbers of people also 
took to more subtle forms of protest like placing lighted candles in windows on the 13th 
of every month and taking long strolls outside during evening newscasts on state-
sponsored television78 
As another widespread form of protest, activists printed and distributed illegal 
flyers, pamphlets, and weeklies (or niezalezny [independent] press). Protest flyers and 
pamphlets popped up immediately, often printed in shops where workers first held 
occupation strikes. After these strikes were broken, opposition activists created new (or 
revitalized existing) underground presses to produce huge numbers of weekly newssheets 
and journals. The most famous of the niezalezny weeklies included Z dnia na dzien 
[From Day to Day] out ofWroclaw, Observator Wielkopolski [Wielkopolska Observer] 
from Poznail, Biuletyn Malopolski [Malopolska Bulletin] from Krak6w, Glos Wolnego 
Hutnika [Voice of the Free Steel Worker] from Nowa Huta, and Wola [Will], Tygodnik 
Wojenny [Wartime Weekly], and TygodnikMazowsze [Mazowsze Weekly] from 
Warsaw. Tygodnik Mazowsze became the most widely produced and circulated 
publication and played an important role as the major publisher of pronouncements and 
78 Paczkowski, Spring, 455. 
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commentaries from the Solidamos6 underground structures. 79 
Entire underground printing "houses" functione~ under martial law. The most 
well known and important houses were CDN, NOW a (Nizalezna OJYcyjna Wydawnicza, 
or Official Independent Publishing House), and Krqg. CDN was a new creation. Krqg had 
operated since 1977, and NOW a was the most significant independent publisher prior to 
December 13. Both houses had established connections to the West: NOW a signed a 
publishing agreement with members of the Polish emigre publication, Kultura, run by 
Jerzy Giedroyc in Paris, and Krqg had a similar agreement with ANEKS publishers run 
by Eugeniusz Smolar in London. In the first months of 1982, each of these underground 
houses began producing books; NOW a published Karl Jaspers' Problem winy [The 
Problem of Guilt] in January 1982. Each also produced their own independent weeklies. 
All three houses played a role in publishing Tygodnik Mazowsze, although NOW a was 
the first to do so and the primary printer. Krqg published Wola, Kos-a [Committee for 
Social Resistance), and Tu Teraz [Here Now), while CDN published Wiadomo§ci Dnia 
[News of the Day] and CDN-Glos Wolnego Robotnika [Free Worker's Voice].80 These 
major printing houses and other much smaller printing shops spread illegal, independent, 
underground periodicals spread throughout the country, becoming a complete social 
phenomena. According to one estimate, "during the course of 1982 at least eight hundred 
megal periodicals appeared."81 
79 Ibid., 458. 
8
° For a full exPloration of these publishing houses' roots and their creation, see Pawel Sowinski, "Sita 
wolnego slowa- Nowa, Kri\g, CDN (!982-1989)," in Solidarnosc Podziemna 1981-1989, edited by 
Andrzej Friszke (Warsaw: Instytut Studi6w Politycmych PAN, 2006), 637-665, esp. 637-642. 
81 Paczkowski, Spring, 458. The Polish government estimated that 850 sepatate undergrotmd titles were 
produced in 1982; see "Formy, Metody, i Tresci Oddzialywania Nielegalnej Propagandy na Swiadomosc 
Spolecm'l_" [Forms, Methods, and Contents of Various Illegal Propaganda in the Social Consciousness], by 
Marek Zieiinski, dated November !986, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter referred to as Hoover), 
Poland, SluzbaBezpieczenstwa Department Ill, Box 6, 6/L The most complete collection of these 
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As independent publishing grew, SolidarnosC's central organs reorganized and 
reconstructed themselves. On the night of December 12, 1981, government forces 
captured around 6,000 Solidarnos6 activists, including most national leaders who were 
meeting in Gdansk, a shattering blow to the trade union's national organization. On a 
local level, however, regional strike committees remained strong and were able to 
organize occupation strikes. Also, despite government efforts, a handful of well-known 
Solidarnos6 leaders evaded capture and lived an "underground" existence, relying on 
friends and eo-conspirators to hide from the authorities. Five of the most important, 
nationally known Solidarnos6 leaders who eluded capture were Bogdan Lis and Bogdan 
Boruszewicz from Gdansk, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk from Wroclaw, Wladyslaw Hardek 
from Krak6w, and Zbigniew Bujak from Warsaw. 
In their new underground life, each of these leaders worked to recreate a national 
structure of Solidarnos6. In the first days after December 13, Wroclaw and the 
surrounding region ofDolny Slqsk was able to maintain the strongest regional 
·organization, so Frasyniuk took the first step to approach other regional leaders .. Through 
his close confidant, Barbara Labuda, Frasyniuk sent messages to Hardek and Bujak about. 
coordinating a national strike to force the government to release internees, end martial 
law, and push for the re-emergence of Solidarnos6.82 This, however, led to the first of 
what became innumerable disagreements over tactics. Bujak disagreed with Frasyniuk's 
emphasis on a large strike and sent a letter back to Frasyniuk and to Lis., arguing that the 
underground publications can be found at the KART A archives in Warsaw. They have over 3,000 
independent periodicals in their collection with nearly 5,000 censored books and brochures published both 
in Poiand and smuggled in from .abroad. For a full listing of these materials, see: Agnieszka Iwaszkiewicz, 
ed., Archiwum Opozycji, vo!." I (Warsaw: Osrodek Karta, 2006). 
82 This position of waging an open confrontation with the authorities waS later most eloquently argued by 
Jacek Kuron. Kuron was a founder of the Workers Defense Committee (KOR) in 1976, one of the most 
important predecessors to SolidamoSC. Kuron was ~lso one of the most influential advisers to SolidamoSC, 
but he was still interned in January 1982. 
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opposition should create a decentralized, informal opposition structure. This structure 
would focus on supporting internees and their families, distributing independent press, 
collecting and exchanging information, and developing a means to affect public opinion. 
In Bujak's formulation, this would gradually create a nationwide movement based on 
passive resistance and civil disobedience. While Frasyniuk was calling for a quick, large-
scale retaliation, Bujak was advocating a "long march" toward reform. 83 As Andrzej 
Friszke summarizes: 
The dispute about the form of the underground organization was at the 
same time a dispute about its goals. From the perspective of preparing for 
a general strike, it was essential to build a cohesive organization with 
strong support in industrial plants, which respected the rules of 
subordination and were capable of creating uniform actions in given 
territories. From the "long march" perspective, such an organization was 
not necessary. It was sufficient to create loose contacts between 
autonomous groups of activists. From that perspective, centralizing the 
organization was even undesirable, because the introduction of a security 
service agent could cause the exposure of not only one cell, but the entire 
structure84 
In February and March Solidamosc leaders corresponded regarding tactics, a slow 
process given that letters could only be sent through trusted couriers. The underground 
activists also discussed how the organization would work in coordination with a 
"national" organization that had been founded by striking workers in Gdaiisk.85 In early 
Aprill982, Frasyniuk and Bujak exchanged a flurry of letters, in which Frasyniuk argued· 
_
83 Victor Kulerski, a longstanding opposition activist, is generally credited with creating the formulation of 
the "long march." 
84 Andrzej Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ 'SolidarnosC' (1982-1987)," in his 
Solidamosc Podziemna. 17-182, quoted at21. 
85 On December 13, 1981 a new "national" organization was declared in GdaOsk. Two strike leaders at the 
Lenin Shipyards decided to create the All-Po1and Resistance Committee ( Og6/nopolski Komitet Oporu, or 
OKO) to replace SolidarnoSC's previous central organ, the National Strike Committee. A conversation 
ensued between the leaders in Gdallsk, Wroclaw, KrakOw, and Warsaw on what to name the new group 
and whether a different more representative _group should succeed the National Strike Committee. This 
issue was resolved when the two main leaders of OKO were captured- a'nd acquiesced to fonn a different 
organization. 
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that any new organization's name should reflect their "temporary" situation, until the 
trade union could be resurrected. He also wrote that the organizations did not have to 
provide specifics about their goals; people already knew what Solidarnosc stood for. On 
the issue of tactics, Bujak argued that the new body need not be the source for finding the 
answers to every problem. On April 20 Bujak, Hardek, Lis, and Frasyniuk met secretly in 
a villa in the Zoliborz neighborhood of Warsaw to create a new national body: the 
Interim Coordinating Commission (Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna, or TKK). 86 
The TKK's first announcement, published in Tygodnik Mazowsze, provided few details 
other than that the committee had been set up to coordinate actions among their four 
regions to fight for an end to martial law, a release of internees and prisoners, and the 
return of citizen's rights. The announcement also declared that the group was a temporary 
structure, until the Solidarnosc trade union could be resurrected, with Lech Wal~esa at its 
head. 
In interviews published in Tygodnik Mazowsze, Bujak, Frasyniuk, Hardek, and 
Lis expanded on their thoughts for creating the TKK. Frasyniuk and Hardek called for a 
strong organization that could bring together the disparate opposition groups to help 
coordinate their actions, proving the people's continuing power to the authorities. Both 
Lis and Bujak underlined the need for society and the government to negotiate, for the 
country to move toward a normalized relationship between the state and the people, and 
for the government to take steps which would allow Poland to acquire new money and 
86 For an account of the meeting and analysis of the events that led to this creation from which this 
summary is taken, see Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna," 17-27. For 3.n English source on_ 
this early period of SolidamoSC, see Maciej Lopiiiski, Marcin Moskit, and Maruisz Wilk, Konspira, trans. 
by Jane Cave (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
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new credits from the West in order to get Poland's economy moving again.87 
To show the movement's continued strength, Solidarnosc activists and supporters 
took to the streets shortly after the founding of the TK.K. On May 1, the Socialist holiday 
for workers, thousands of activists in most of Poland's major cities gathered to counter-
demonstrate against official rallies. May Day demonstrations were large in Solidarnosc's 
traditional strongholds in Gdansk, Wroclaw, and Krak6w, but the largest single crowd of 
about 30,000 appeared in front of the Old Town Castle in Warsaw, to chant slogans, hear 
speeches, and sing national hymns. The authorities appeared caught off guard by these 
counter demonstrations and most proceeded peacefully.88 When 10,000 demonstrators 
appeared in Warsaw's Old Town two days later on May3, the anniversary of the signing 
of Poland's first constitution in 1791, riot police came out in force, dispersing the crowds 
with water cannons, tear gas, and truncheons. Similar incidents took place throughout the 
country with clashes lasting into the night.89 The unrest continued on May 13, when the 
TKK implemented at fifteen-minute nationwide strike. Again the regime reacted 
forcefully, firing at least 1,100 workers and taking administrative actions against others. 
As the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency concluded: 
The anti-regime protests from 1 to 13 May clearly exhibited the depth of 
feeling among Poles against martial law and the degree to which 
opposition, particularly Solidarity, could still guide the dissent oflarge 
numbers of workers andcitizens. The outpouring of feeling on 1 May, the 
bloody confrontations on 3 May, and the widespread strikes on 13 May 
were all remarkable shows of force against a regime committed to 
suppress such activities. 90 
87 Tygodnik Mazowsze, nr. 11 (April 28, 1982): 1-2, KART A, Archiwum Opozycji. 
88 For a report on the May I events, see: John Dam ton, "30,000 Poles defy Army in Warsaw in May Day 
March," New York Times (May 2, 1982): Al. 
89 For a report on the May 3 events, see John Dam ton, "Polish Protesteis Clash with Police in Several 
Cities," New York Times (May4, 1982): Al. 
90 Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal, "Poland: Situation After Six Months of Martial 
.Law," dated June 23, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982, 5. 
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The future of Solidamosc, however, remained uncertain. Despite puboic support for the 
opposition, Wal~sa and other influential Solidarnosc leaders were still interned. 
Western Support for Conspiracy 
With a revitalized opposition movement, groups of emigre Poles, Solidarnosc 
activists trapped outside of Poland, and sympathetic groups from the West began to take 
steps to send covert aid to Solidarnosc's emerging leadership structures. The most well-
known American group supporting Solidamos6 was the AFL-CIO. Even before events in 
the Lenin Shipyards in 1980, Lane Kirkland "had long been convinced that ordinary 
working people, and not diplomats, would bring about Communism's demise"; moreover, 
two movements that Kirkland felt passionately about-anti-communism ·and free trade 
unionism--<::onverged in Solidamosc. 91 On August 20, 1980, before the Gdansk 
agreements were even signed, the AFL-CIO executive council released a press statement 
exclaiming their support for the striking workers, criticizing any repressive measures 
taken against the workers in advance. 92 Less than a week after the Gdansk agreements 
were signed, Kirkland and the AFL-CIO General Board backed their words with actions 
and announced the creation of the Polish Workers Aid Fund (PW AF) which was given an 
initial donation of$25,000.93 By November 1981, the PWAF had raised nearly $250,000 
i 
from private donations, t-shirt sales, individual union donations, and shop floor 
collections. 9·4 
91 Arch Puddington, Lane Kirkland (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 163. 
92 
"Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on Strikes in Poland," dated August 20, 1980, GMMA, 
Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1980, Box 45, 45/2. 
93 
"Statement on the Polish Workers Aid Fund," dated September 4, 1980, GMMA, Information 
Department, AFLcCIO Press Releases 1980,.Box 45,45/3. 
94 The AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer kept immaculate records on donations to the PWAF from November 
!980 through the end of !981. Most of the individual donations are less than $20, with larger donations 
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To determine how to spend these funds, the AFL-CIO tnrned to Solidamosc for 
guidance. The first report about SolidamoSC's needs came to the AFL-CIO from an 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) representative, Charles 
Kassman, who traveled to Warsaw and Gdansk from September 9-15, 1980. Wal~sa had 
heard about Kirkland's $25,000 pledge and was "skeptical of large financial contributions 
at the time being." As Kassman reported, "It is obvious that the AFL-CIO's gift of 
$25,000 has created problems for the Committee. They will probably have difficulties in 
explaining to the authorities what the money will be used for and that it is notproof of a 
conspiracy between Gdansk and the USA. The sum has not yet been accepted." Wal~sa 
did, however, ask for donations of "practical" support in the form of office equipment, 
specifically duplicating machines, writing paper, and carbon paper.95 AFL-CIO 
representatives from the A. Phi lip Randolf Education Fund confmned these requests 
when they met with Wal«sa in late Spring 1981. Wal«sa was quoted as saying, "financial 
aid can be a delicate matter, because .it could be regarded that we are financed by 
somebody." However, "there was general agreement that what [was] most needed [were] 
... items not purchaseable in Poland, such as printing presses, cameras, mimeographs 
machines. "96 AFL-CIO funds distributed prior to December 13, 1981; were used 
precisely as Wal«sa requested: for the mundane matters of office and printing supplies.97 
from individual unions up to $10,000. For donation information see: AFL-CIO International Affairs 
Department Files, .Inactive Records, "After Nov. 24 PW AF [Polish Workers Aid Fund]" and "Letters of 
Contribution from Individuals to the AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fnnd, 1981." 
95 
"Report to the ICFTU on visits to WarS:chau and Gdansk, 15/9-18/9/1980," undated, AFL-CIO, 
International Affairs Department, Inactive Records;"Wat~sa, Lech." 
96 
"A. Phillip Randolph Education Fund, Report to AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland on: Poland and the 
American Labor Movement," circa May 198 I, AFL-CIO Kirkland Presidential Files, Inactive Records, 
"Polish Workers Strike and Fund." Bayard Rustin, Charles Bloomstein, and Adrian Karatnycky took the 
trip. 
97 As the second Polish Workers Aid Fund Update reported, "TheAFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund has 
supplied typewriters, both electric and manual, duplicating machines, office supplies and small appliances, 
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After the declaration of martial law, Kirk! and remained staunchly committed to 
Solidarnosc. First, he unequivocally condemned the imposition of martial law, blaming 
both the Polish government and the Soviet Union. AFL-CIO statements also supported 
robust sanctions against both countries. Finally, Kirk! and proclaimed that his 
organization would do whatever it could to help. As before, the AFL-CIO deferred to 
Solidarnosc for guidance: 
The AFL-CIO pledges its full support to our Polish brothers and sisters. 
We do not presume to recommend what Solidamosc should or should not 
do. These are decisions that only the Polish workers can make for 
themselves. Whatever the decisions of these courageous people, we shall 
do what we can to assist them .... Poland's working men and women are 
struggling against tremendous odds to build and maintain an effective 
trade union. Their battle is ours. We shall not Jet them down.98 
In the week after December 13, the AFL-CIO also spoke with members of the 
Reagan administration to look for common interests. On December 15, State Department 
officials met with AFL-CIO Secretary Treasurer Tom Donohue, Executive Assistant to 
the President Ken Young, and Special Assistant for International Affairs Dale Good. 
After a briefing on what the administration knew about events, the government officials 
asked if there was a chance that Polish government officials searching Solidamosc 
offices might find "any written communications ... which could be an embarrassment.to 
either [AFL-CIO or Solidarnosc] and which could provide fuel for Polish government 
and in a larger outlay of funds, a small bus-like vehicle which is now in regular use by Solidarity"; quoted 
from "Update #2," AFL-CIO, International Affairs Deparnnent, Unprocessed records, "Update #2." The 
largest single donation on record from the PWAF was sent to ICFTU President Jan Vanderveken, who 
utilized the money to purchase and send SolidarnoSC-a new off-set printing plant; see: Letter from J. 
Vandervenken to Lane Kirkland, dated August 20, 1981, AFL-CIO, International Department Files, 
unprocessed records, "Letters of Contribution from Individuals to the AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund, 
1981 (Box 2)." According to internal accounting a total of$152,000 was spent on office supplies and 
material for Solidarnosc prior to December 13; see: "Note to Editors," dated June 14, 1982, GMMA, AFL-
CIO, Information Departroent, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1937-1995, Box 49,49/2. 
98 AFL-CIO Press Release, dated December 14, 1981, GMMA, AFL-CIO, Information Departroent, AFL-
ClO Press Releases 1937-1995, Box 47, 47/2. 
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propaganda." Donohue assured them that everything would be "straightfmward" and that 
there had been nothing of a "covert" nature.99 Three days later Reagan met with Kirkland 
(who had been in Paris for a meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development). As Kirkland recalled, the president greeted him by joking, "Well, at least 
we have something we can agree on." Kirkland responded, however, by calling for a 
sharp American reaction to martial law, including tough economic sanctions and 
declaring Poland in default. Kirkland also mentioned that the union was looking into 
sending support through existing channels. "We'll use whatever resources we can," he 
added, "but whatever [additional] resources could be provided [by the government] 
would be [helpful]."100 
Meetings between Kirkland and government officials-Haig and Vice President 
Bush attended the AFL-CIO's February 1982 Executive Council Meeting, for example-
continued over the next few months. At these. meetings, the administration attempted to 
coordinate policy with the union to help push both domestic and European public opinion 
to accept sanctions on Poland and the USSR. 101 Even after Reagan's December 23 
99 Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Department Briefing for AFL-CIO Executive Staff," 
dated December 16, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box I. Concern about the provocative nature 
of AFL-CIO support to Solidarnosc was long-standing. Carter's Secretary of State Edmund Muskie 
consistently pressured Kirkland not to send aid (see Puddington, Kirk/and, 168-169). This pattern 
continued in the Reaganadministration; see Briefing Memorandum from H. Alien Holmes to the Secretary, 
"Your February 10 Meeting with Lane Kirkland: Poland," dated February 9, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints 
Originals, Box 4. · 
10° For Kirk;land's recollections, see "An Interview with Lane Kirkland," conducted for the-Labor 
Diplomacy Oral History ProjeCt by John F. Shea and Don R. Krienzle (November 13, 1996), 20 (copy 
available at the GMMA library). Based on a close reading, Kirkland may have been compounding events in 
his memory, aad he may not have actually asked the President to declare Poland in default. This was 
verifiably a position taken by the AFL-CIO only later in December. Kirkland's commitment to tough 
sanctions, however, was unwavering. In Puddington's version of the meeting it takes place on December 15 
(Lane Kirk/and, 174), however, State Department documents place the meeting on December 18. For 
Reagan's briefing materials, see: Memorandum for Mr. James W. Nance, "Poland- President'S Meeting 
with Lane Kirklimd," dated December 17, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981. 
101 Puddington, Kirkland, 174-175. See also: Briefing Memorandum from H. Alien Holmes to the 
Secretary, "Your Meeting in Chicago with Lane Kirkland, AFL-CIO," dated January 29, 1982, NSA, Soviet 
Flashpoints, Box 27,January 1982. 
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announcement of sanctions, however, Kirkland and his deputies used these meetings to 
push for even tougher economic and political sanctions. 
Another group joined the AFL-CIO in their fight to protect free trade unions in 
Poland: the Committee in Support of Solidarity (CSS). CSS was founded in New York 
City on December 14 "to gather information and to report on the situation in Poland in 
order to inform the American public, the U.S. government, and international bodies about 
the scope of repression against Polish society and the extent of Solidarity's resistance to 
the communist regime.'" 02 As a less public goal, the CSS was also formed for 
"maintaining contact with Solidarity in Poland." 103 The group drew members from 
sympathetic Americans like Eric Chenoweth; Solidarnos6 leaders stranded in the United 
States, like Miroslaw Chojecki and later Wacek Adamczak, member of Solidarity's 
National Commission, and Miroslaw Dominczyk, the chairman of the Kielce Region and 
a member of the National Commission; as well as emigre Poles who had been active in 
the democratic opposition in the 1970s, like Irena Lasota, Jakub Karpinski, and Piotr 
Naimski. The committee was well connected to American Polonia (emigre writers 
Stanislaw Baranczak[Harvard) and Czeslaw Milosz [Berkeley J as well as philosopher 
Leszek Kolakowski [University of Chicago], all signed CSS's first press release). CSS . 
was also very well connected to the American trade union movement. CSS Executive 
Director Chenoweth had been employed by the Polish Workers Task Force of the League 
for Industrial Democracy, where CSS had its first offices. In addition, Tom Kahn, AFL-
CIO international affairs department director, and Arch Puddington, director of the 
102 
"Annual Report, Committee in Support of Solidarity, 1983," Private collection of the Committee in 
Support of Solidarity (hereafter referred to as CSS), Administrative Files, "CSS Annual Reports 1983-
1986." 
103 Memo from Torn Kahn to Tom Donahue, "Committee in Support of Solidarity," -dated June 8, 1982, 
AFL-CIO, Unprocessed Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity." 
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League for Industrial Democracy, sat on the CSS's board. By January 1982, Kahn and 
Kirkland had agreed to take a direct stake in CSS by paying their Telex bills. 104 Kahn 
made the AFL-CIO's first direct payment to support CSS's more conspiratorial activities 
when he authorized the union to pay $57 5 to purchase a round trip ticket for Chojecki to 
travel to Brussels on January 7.105 
Chojecki traveled to Brussels to meet with Solidamosc activists who had been 
stranded in the West. A group of about thirty met in Zurich on December 19 and then in 
Brussels on January 8-9 to decide how to proceed. Following this second meeting, 
Magda Wojcik, former assistant head of the international department ofSolidarnosc, sent 
a letter to international unions asking for assistance to set up Solidamosc information 
offices outside of Poland. As she explained in a separate letter to Kahn, it had "been 
agreed that no 'Solidarity in Exile' is formed but that in every colintry where there are 
members of our Union they all should come together and work jointly in an 'Information 
Office of Solidarnosc.' ... [These information offices] are in no way a leadership body. "106 
As of December 22, 1981, Krzystyna Ruchniewicza had created one such group in 
Brussels. Slawomir Czarlewski and Seweryn Blumstzajn also started a Solidamosc 
Coordinating Committee in Paris and had raised 8 million francs (about $1 million) from 
French trade unions. 107 
Foil owing this initial decision to create separate information offices, word 
104 lbid. Tom Kahn's first payment to CSS for Telex bills was $513 for expenses incurred through March 
20, 1982. Memo from Kahn to Tom Donohue, dated April I, 1982, AFL-CIO, Unprocessed Records, 
"Committee in Support of Solidarity." 
105 Note from Tom Kahn to William Collins, dated January 6, 1982, AFL-CIO, Unprocessed records, 
"Committee in Support of Solidarity." 
106 The. original call for support came in a letter from Magda Wojcik to Lane Kirkland dated January 18, 
1982. For this letter and the letter from Magda Wojcik to Tom Kahn, dated January 18,1982, see AFL-
CIO, unprocessed records~ "Wojcik, Magda. 11 
107 Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja," 62-63. 
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reached Solidarnosc activists in the West that the TKK wanted to take the opposite 
approach and create a central office for coordinating SolidarnosC's foreign contacts. On 
July I, 1982, Lis sent a letter calling for activists to create this office in Brussels under 
the leadership of Jerzy Milewski, a member of the National Commission who had 
political organizing experience. This decision was controversial because it undermined . 
the activities of some of the offices that had already been started (particularly the Paris 
office). Solidarnosc activists ultimately accepted the decision, however, because it was 
"justified from a political point of view as well as the necessity for arranging a central 
structure authorized to maintain contacts with central unions and procure funds from 
them for the union's underground activity."108 
In a July 18 press release, Solidarnosc members meeting in Oslo announced that 
they had agreed to create a central Solidarnosc office abroad headed by Milewski. "By 
these means, until the restitution of freedom for the Union in Poland, a unified structure 
for action abroad by ISTU 'SolidarnosC' has been formed, with an explicit mandate from 
the authorities of Solidarnosc in Poland." The Brussels office's main tasks were 
"coordination of effective and wide support for the Union in Poland, 2) cooperation with 
trade unions and their international organizations, and 3) coordination of activities 
intended to inform the public about the actual conditions faced by ISTU 'Solidarnos6' in 
Poland." Office staff included Bohdan Cywinski (ideological and political matters), 
Krystyna Ruchniewicz (finances), Milewski (director and contact with trade unions), 
Chojecki (coordination of aid to Solidarnos6 in Poland), Slawomir Czarlewski 
108 For an explanation of the creation of the body, see ibid., 60-63; quoted at 63. 
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(coordination of aid to Solidamosc in Poland), and Blumsztajn (information).109 The 
Solidarnosc Coordinating Office Abroad opened its doors on July 29, 1982, in Brussels, 
with a branch office in Paris. 
On August 1, Milewski sent his first communication to Kirkland, outlining the 
new office's role and requesting support from his brothers in international trade unions. 
Generally, the trade union's tactics for moving toward a peaceful solution to the 
"socioeconomic crisis" in Poland were to "show restraint in its demands and willingness 
to reach a compromise with the authorities" while simultaneously "demonstrate[ing] to 
the authorities the strength of Solidamosc ... [by] preparing various actions and short 
strikes." To help "build a strong organization structure for the trade union" the 
coordinating office was made responsible "for the rapid delivery oflarge amounts of 
printing and radio equipment, as well as funds, to all parts of Poland." Milewski asked 
the AFL-CIO to help pay for the coordinating bureau's expected annual operating fee of 
$175,000 and to help provide part of the $800,000 needed to purchase the necessary 
"material and equipment (photographic, broadcasting, communications, printing, etc.)." 
For security reasons, Milewski could not be more specific about the equipment 
requests. 110 
Although the AFL-CIO was supportive ofSolidamosc's new office, the union 
109 Solidarity International Press Release, dated July 18, 1982, AFL-CIO, unprocessed records, 
11SolidarnoSC 1982 #2." 
1 10 Letter from Jerzy Milewski to Lane Kirkland, dated August I, 1982, AFL-CIO, International Affairs 
Department Files, Inactive Records, "Milewski, Jerzy." I was unable to locate any records in the AFL-CIO 
files shOwing that Kirk land or Kahn sent the requested funds. According to Idesbald Gooderis, a Belgian 
scholar whO works on European trade unions'-support for SOlidarnoSC, European unions· and international 
labor organizations in Brussels provided the coordinating office's initial budget. I am deeply indebted to 
Gooderis for filling in the missing European pieces in my own research. Significant aid from the AFL-CIO 
to the coordinating office did not materialize until late in 1983 after the creation ofthe National 
Endowment for Democracy (see chapter 3). Likely reasons for the lack of a response include: the 
controversy surrounding the creation of a centralized Brussels office, general misgivjngs about Milewski 
within Western opposition groups, and dwindling funds in the PW AF. 
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created its own channels to run aid to Poland overseen by CSS eo-director Irena Lasota. 
Initially Lasota sent material to her friends and contacts in the opposition in parcels 
disguised as care packages. They included censored books and small amounts of cash (in 
American dollars) hidden in common objects. Because there were so many care packages 
being sent to Poland by well-meaning Americans, Lasota assumed that the government 
could not possible search all incoming mail, ensuring that a fair amount of support made 
it to their intended destinations. Disguising contraband remained an essential part of the 
task. To help aid independent publishers, in particular, Lasota purchased containers of 
Hershey's syrup, emptied the contents, cleaned them, and refilled them with printing ink, 
thereby concealing the contents.111 
Lasot(l and the CSS also sent specific communications and electronic equipment 
needed by the opposition. The details of the operation remain unclear, but on June 18, 
1982, Lasota sent receipts and a note to Kahn, asking to be reimbursed for $489.43. The 
receipts, from Radio Shack and another electronics store, were for one 14-812 audio 
recorder, two adapter cassette recorders, two accessory tapes, and $250 in transistors 
from Alpine Radio and Television Corp. The attached handwritten note read: 
Dear Tom 
Enclosed you will find receipts for the transistors, tape-recorders 
and other "accessories'' I already sent to Poland. People from Poland asked 
for them-I should send much more than that but people are not too 
willing to take. But they take. 
Can I go up to 1? 2? 3? thousand dollars? 
[ ... ] 
Best Regards, [signed Ireria] 
P.S. The check (for $489.63) can be written either to me personally or to 
the Committee. Whatever is more convenient.112 
111 Author's interview with Irena.Lasota, June 19,.2007. 
"'For this note and the receipts see: AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, 
~~committee in Support of Solidarity." 
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Seven months into martial law, the AFL-CIO had established lines of communication 
through CSS to send materials requested by the democratic opposition in Poland. These 
first steps were small but important The American conspiracy to support Solidarnosc had 
begun in earnest 
Developments in the Polish Communist Party 
For Jaruzelski and his colleagues, their main concern during the first nine months 
of 1982 was not what was happening outside of Poland, but rather what was happening 
within its borders. In early January, the general centralized power in a directorate of 
seven PZPR members including himself, Minister of Internal Affairs Czeslaw Kiszczak, 
Deputy Defense Minister Florian Siwicki, Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, 
and three central committee members. In Politburo meetings during the first three months 
of 1982, the leadership focused almost exclusively on reforming the economy and 
purging and strengthening the party. To reinvigorate the Party aktiv they spent significant 
time drafting a paper, "0 co walczymy, dok~id zmierzamy" [About what we are 
struggling for, where we are heading].113 Economic reforms included: "a considerable 
broadening of enterprise autonomy, the abolition of intermediate management units, a 
greater role for market mechanisms, the abolition of restrictions on the private sector in 
small-scale. industry, and an end to the underprivileged status of private agriculture vis-a-
vis cooperatives and the state farms." 114 Political reforms created a Patriotic Movement 
of National Rebirth (PRON) to take over for the Front of National Unity in an attempt to 
reinvigorate government structures and increase the party's popular legitimacy by 
113 For one Politburo conversation on this paper, see the records for Protocol23 of the February 6~ 1982 in 
AAN, Mikrofilm 2998;KC PZPR Syg. 1829,220-228. 
114 Paczkowski, Spring, 475. 
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creating "the appearance of a ruling coalition."115 
Although efforts to transform Polish society were the government's main focus 
following the declaration of martial law, they were not very effective. As Andrzej 
Paczkowski explains, although Jaruzelski and other leaders were constantly claiming to 
be reforming, "the techniques of govemment were completely identical to the old 
methods." The political and economic reforms introduced reworked old ideas and 
rehashed failed attempts. No bold steps were actually taken, creating a system of "change 
without change." 116 
International affairs were considerably less important during 1982 than internal 
improvements, but the PZPR did engage with the outside world. In addition to the visit 
from Hungarian communists mentioned in chapter one, Jaruzelski and members of his 
inner circle traveled to their socialist brothers to request increased economic support. 
Jaruzelski's first.trip out of Poland after December was to Moscow on March 1-2. On the 
first day he spoke with Brezhnev and high-level leaders for one-and-a-half hours about 
the internal situation. and the steps taken since introducing martial law. The bilateral 
portions of the meeting focused on: "manifestations of full understanding" to show Soviet 
approval Jaruzelski's decisions, questions of economic help, and proclamations about 
"opening a new era in the development of close relations and cooperation between our 
parties and nations after the difficult period triggered by the Polish crisis." Jaruzelski also 
proposed specific economic requests for the Soviets: to give long-term credits worth $1 
billion, to provide one million tons of crude oil, to send 250,000 tons of grain in the 
115 Ibid., 470. In Poland, a few parties including the ZSL and SD had been allowed to continue to exist 
alongside the Polish United Workers Party. These parties existed in the Sejm but never acted with any 
autonomy from the dictates-ofthe PZPR. 
116 lbid, 470 and 465_ For a fuller explanation of this phenomena of change-without change, see Spring, 
465-477. 
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second quarter of 1982, to make Soviet raw materials available to Polish industries, and 
to consider building a gas pipeline to the West through Poland.l17 
During the same trip, lower-level Polish and Soviet officials negotiated a general 
outline for developing Poland's economy over the next few years. These officials agreed 
to focus on projects to exploit Poland's industrial potential, to" create tighter connections 
with Soviet industry, and to "make Poland's economy independent from the capitalist 
. 118 . • 
countnes." When the PZPR InternatiOnal Department produced a final report on 
cooperation, the meetings' outcome became clear: "Strengthening and expanding Polish-
Soviet economic and scientific-technical cooperation should have primary [zapewniony] 
priority in the foreign activity of our economic organs and scientific institutions.',! 19 
As his second trip, Jaruzelski visited Budapest on April 2 L This afforded him the 
opportunity to hear again that imposing martial law was the right decision. Hungarian 
Party leader Janos Kadar also briefed the Poles on Hungary's internal situation: its 
economy, its problems with the Church, and its foreign debt. Kadar also explained 
Hungary's decentralized economic model and entertained Jaruzelski's calls for greater 
bilateral economic cooperation. No specific agreements were signed, but general 
possibilities of increased coal shipments from Poland and long-term cooperation to 
produce buses ~ere discussed.Jaruzelski made clear to Kadar that he saw Hungary as an 
117 Pilna Notatka z wizyty w Moskwie Delegacji Partyjno-Pru\stwowej z I Sekretarzem KC PZPR, 
Prezesem Rady Ministr6w tow. Wojciechem Jaruzelskim, w dniach 1-2 marca I982 r. [Urgent Note from 
the Visit to Moscow by the Party-Government with First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, Head 
pfthe Council of Ministers Wojciech Jaruzelski from I to 2 March 1982], dated March 5, 1982, AAN, KC 
PZPR, V /172, 555-56I; quote<:! at 556 and 560. 
118 Podstawowe Problemy Wsp61pracy Gospodarczej Mi~dzy PRL i ZSRR oraz Pomocy Radzieckiej dla 
Polski [Basic Problems of Economic Cooperation between the PRL and USSR as well as Soviet Help for 
Poland], dated March t982,AAN, KC PZPR, V /172, 562-566; quoted at 562. 
'·_
19 Proiramowe za!oienia Umocnienia i R.ozwoju stosunk6w Pols:kt. z ZSRR [Program Assumptions for 
Strengthening and the Development ofPoiish-USSR Relations], .dated April27, I 982, AAN, KC PZPR, 
V/174, 32-5 I; quoted at 50. 
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example to be emulated. While Hungary's economic system was flawed, its mix of 
decentralization and private initiative offered the best working example of a successful 
socialist economy in central Europe. Beyond economics, the Poles wanted to understand 
the Hungarian's "exit from the 1956 crisis, especially in areas like winning back society, 
the press, the intelligentsia, and youths' trust. 'ol 20 
Other PZPR officials traveled throughout the Socialist bloc. From March 24-26, 
Politburo member M. Wo:Zniak and directors from the PZPR foreign and economics 
departments visited Yugoslavia, looking for economic help (corn, truck batteries, and· 
nickel in this case).121 Politburo member and Minister of Foreign Affairs J6zef Czyrek 
made short trips to visit Erich Honeker in East Berlin and Gustav Husak in Prague on 
March 29 and April4. Again, the fraternal leaders praised their Polish guests, and the 
allies planned for intensified economic cooperation. 122 
These trips showed a clear change in Poland's foreign policy. Simply put, Poland 
turned inward toward the Socialist world in the aftermath of December 13. The PZPR 
took no initiatives to engage with the West. Rather than pressing on with previous 
policies and seeking to undercut American sanctions by working with sympathetic 
Western economies like West Germany, the PZPR decided to reorient their economy 
toward the East; this was their chosen path to recovery. According to one Politburo 
report: "The key issue for resuscitating our economy, in most of its industries, is the 
intensification of production for export .... Cooperation with the USSR and other 
12° For the report on Jaruzelski's visit to Hungary, see: Notatka Infonnacyjna z przebiegu wizyty delegacji 
partyjn-panstwowej PRL w Budapescie w dniu 2 I .kwietnia I 982 r. [Infonnation Note from the proceedings 
of the visit of the PRL Party-National delegation in Budapest on 21 April 1982], daied April 23, I 982, 
AAN,KC PZPR, V/1 73, 719-730; quoted at 729. 
121 See Sprawozdanie z pobytu delegacji KC PZPR w Jugoslawii (24-26.iii. I 982 r) [Report from the Trip 
by aPZPR Central Committee Delegation to Yugoslavia (24-263.1983)], dated March 27, 1982, AAN, KC 
PZPR, V/173, 250-263. 
122 See Czyrek's comments on his trip to East Berlin in AAN, PZPR KC, V/173, 199-201. 
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socialist countries has essential significance." The report also mentioned improving 
economic relations with non-aligned, developing nations. Hopes for improved trade with 
the West, however, were placed at a minimum. The Poles believed that their policies 
prior to December 1981 had led to an "irrational" situation where they relied extensively 
on capitalist goods and technology; the time had come to orient their economy back 
toward the Socialist world. Economic relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc 
were given the highest priority. This new policy advocated strengthening commitments 
and coordination through COMECON.123 
For some in Washington this was the desired response from Warsaw. NSC staffer 
Richard Pipes, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, Defense Secretary 
Weinberger, and DCI Bill Casey had backed economic sanctions as part of their global 
strategy to wage economic warfare against Moscow. From their perspectives, sanctions 
were designed to punish Jaruzelski and to force Poland to draw more resources from the 
Soviet bloc. In this sense, sanctions against Poland succeeded: Jaruzelski turned toward 
the East for economic help, draining resources that could otherwise be used for military 
expenditures. 
In another sense, however, economic sanctions had a very negative effect By 
pulling away from reliance on economic help from the West, Jaruzelski further limited 
Western leverage. Politically and especially militarily the United States had little 
influence. Prior to December 1981, all meaningful connections were based on trade and 
.economics; therefore, America's strongest pressure points in Poland had been to offer 
123 See excerpts on foreign trade in Referat Biura Politycznego KC PZPR na Vlll Plenum KC [PZPR 
Central Committee Politburo Report for the 8th Central Committee Plenum], dated March 13, 1982, AAN, 
KC PZPR, V/!73, 553-556; quoted at 553. This report also called for circumventing sanctions by attaining 
needed -imports from the West through secret arrangements with other Socialist countries. 
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